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Abstract
Abdullatif A. Alshaikh
Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council Neighbours:
A Study in International Boundary Management
The most important challenge to a demarcated boundary is the management of the
boundary itself. After establishing the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in May 1981
with the aim of achieving 'unity' between the Member States, the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait, the management practices
along the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours offer evidence as to the extent to
which the aims of the GCC have been achieved, and to assess the degree of openness
along the boundary. Four aspects of boundary management have been explored in this
thesis: political and legal management; management of access for people;
management of access for goods; and security management. Regarding political and
legal management, the major findings were that Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards
its GCC neighbours generally characterised as a cooperative policy, and the major
objective in this policy is to achieve security in the Gulf region. The boundary lines
themselves are generally clear and demarcated and are the basis for peaceful
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries. Regarding the
management of access for people the major findings were that time consumed at the
three Saudi check-points selected for study, Alkh4i (with Kuwait), KFC (with
Bahrain), and Albateha (with UAE), for departures from the Saudi side the majority of
travellers spent 20 minutes or less to finish their formalities. The results of examining
the management of access for goods showed that the majority of arrival trucks spent
two hours or more, some of them spent up to 24 hours, to finish the necessary
regulations. Concerning security management at the three Saudi borders, illegal
crossings at the open border are less in terms of numbers compared to other Saudi
boundaries. Regarding smuggling, the study found that seized smuggling incidents at
the check-points with the GCC represent a serious problem. By analysing the four
aspects of management, the study showed that a well developed management
strategies which still allow reasonable access and control operates along the Saudi
boundaries with its GCC. Because of security concerns and differences in legislation
and laws between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, the Saudi boundaries are
likely to continue to function as a barrier to the movement of goods in particular.
Contents of thesis
	 2
Table of Contents
List of Tables
	 8
List of Maps and Figures
	
10
List of Plates
	
13
Declaration, Copyright and Dedication 	 14
Acknowledgements 	 15
Chapter One: Introduction 	 16
1.1 Introduction
	
17
1.2 The significance of the study 	 18
1.3 Literature review 	 18
1.3.1 General studies on boundaries 	 19
1.3.2 Studies on Saudi Arabia's land boundaries 	 26
1.4 Research objectives and questions 	 30
1.5 Study methodology 	 33
1.5.1 Fieldwork
	
33
1.5.2 Questionnaires 	 34
1.5.3 Interviews
	
34
1.6 Data analysis 	 35
1.7 Research difficulties and constraints 	 35
References 	 37
Chapter Two: Theoretical Studies on International Boundaries 	 41
2.1 Introduction 	 42
2.2 Theories on state territoriality 	 42
2.2.1 Intrinsic value of territory 	 43
2.2.2 Relational value of territory 	 44
2.3 Theories on boundary conflict 	 47
2.3.1 Conflicts associated with international politics 	 49
2.3.2 Conflicts associated with ethnic and religious factors 	 52
2.3.3 Conflicts associated with historical legacy 	 53
2.4 Theoretical models of trans-boundary interaction 	 54
2.4.1 House's model
	
54
2.4.2 Soffer's model
	
57
2.4.3 Martinez's model 	 59
Contents of thesis 	 3
2.5 Conclusion 	 62
References 	 65
Chapter Three: Geographical Settings and Historical Background 	 68
3.1 Introduction 	 69
3.2 Geographical settings 	 69
3.2.1 Climate 	 71
3.2.2 Topography
	
75
3.2.3 Population and settlement
	 75
3.3 Historical background
	 78
3.3.1 Creation of Saudi Arabia
	
80
3.3.2 The 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention
	
82
3.3.3 The 1915 Darin Anglo-Saudi Treaty 	 85
3.3.4 Development of the Kuwait-Saudi boundaries 	 86
3.3.5 Development of the Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary 	 88
3.3.6 Development of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary 	 90
3.4 Conclusion 	 95
References 	 97
Chapter Four: Political and Legal Management 	 99
4.1 Introduction 	 100
4.2 Saudi foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours 	 102
4.3 The Saudi boundary treaties 	 104
4.3.1 The Kuwait-Saudi boundary agreements
	 107
4.3.2 The Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary agreement
	 113
4.3.3 The Saudi-U.A.E. boundary agreement
	 115
4.4 Demarcation of the Saudi boundaries
	
122
4.4.1 Demarcation of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary 	 126
4.4.2 Demarcation of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary
	
127
4.5 Cartographic records of the Saudi boundaries 	 127
4.6 Conclusion
	
132
References 	 134
Chapter Five: Management of Access for People 	 136
5.1 Introduction 	 137
5.2 The Unified Economic Agreement 	 137
5.3 Access for people 	 142
Contents of thesis	 4
5.3.1 General characteristics of the travellers 	 143
5.3.2 Check-Points infrastructures
	
152
5.3.3 Monthly movement of people
	 156
5.3.4 Travellers' frequency of crossing the border
	 159
5.3.5 People's purpose of travelling
	 160
5.3.6 Travellers' trip origin and destination
	 165
5.3.7 Time consumed at the check-points
	 172
5.4 Conclusion 	 179
References
	
180
Chapter Six: Management of Access for Goods 	 181
6.1 Introduction 	 182
6.2 Truck drivers' characteristics 	 189
6.3 Types of goods 	 194
6.4 Frequency of crossings by truck drivers 	 194
6.5 Time consumed at the check-points 	 195
6.6 Conclusion
	
202
References
	
204
Chapter Seven: Security of Saudi Arabia's Borders
	 205
7.1 Introduction
	 206
7.2 Threats to Saudi security
	 208
7.2.1 External threats
	 210
7.2.2 Internal threats
	
213
7.3 Methods of border security management 	 214
7.3.1 Security Agreements
	
214
7.3.2 The Border Guard
	 216
7.3.3 Customs Department
	 218
7.4 Illegal crossing
	
223
7.5 Smuggling 	 231
7.5.1 Smuggling along the borderline 	 231
7.5.2 Smuggling at land check-points 	 236
7.6 Conclusion 	 247
References 	 249
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 	 252
8.1 Introduction 	 253
Contents of thesis
	
5
8.2 Study Conclusions
	
253
8.3 Recommendations 	 259
8.3.1 Provision of better facilities at border crossing points 	 261
8.3.2 Adoption of high-technology surveillance systems 	 262
8.3.3 Tracking illegal migrants 	 262
8.3.4 Borderland development 	 263
8.3.5 Institutional arrangements 	 263
References
	
265
Bibliography 	 266
Appendices 	 279
Appendix I
Questionnaire form (departures) 	 280
Appendix II
Questionnaire form (arrivals) 	 284
Appendix III
Questionnaire form (truck drivers) 	 288
Appendix IV
The Gulf Co-operation Council Charter 	 291
Appendix V
The Unified Economic Agreement 	 296
Appendix VI
Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention (1922) 	 301
Appendix VII
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to Partition the Neutral Zone (1965) 	 302
Appendix VIII
Annexed Agreement Delimiting the Boundary Line of the NZ (1969)
	 306
Appendix IX
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement Demarcating Offshore Boundary (2000) 	 309
Appendix X
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement (1958) 	 312
Appendix )Cif
Saudi Arabia-UAE Boundary Agreement (1974) 	 315
Appendix )CII
Sample size selecting method 	 320
Appendix XIII
Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transport (arrivals) 	 321
Appendix XIV
Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transport (departures) 322
Contents of thesis
	 6
Appendix XV
Other types of travellers' purposes 	 323
Appendix XVI
Simplified family tree of Al-Saud families 	 324
Contents of thesis	 7
List of Tables
1.1: Some characteristics of the selected boundaries 	 32
2.1: 'Borderlands' and 'border regions' 	 63
2.2: The connection between Martinez's model and management activities 	 64
3.1: Population in Saudi Arabia's main provinces in 1992
	 77
3.2: Border cities and towns in the eastern province in 1992 	 77
4.1: A sample from Schedule I of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty 	 106
4.2: A sample from Schedule II of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty 	  .106
4.3: Significant figures in co-ordinates of latitude and longitude 	 107
5.1: The sample size for each check-point 	 143
5.2: Sex groups according to the travellers' answers 	 144
5.3: Travellers' companions 	 146
5.4: Nationalities of travellers 	 146
5.5: National and non-national population in Saudi Arabia and its GCC
neighbours 	 148
5.6: Amenities available at every check-point
	
154
5.7: Travellers' frequency of crossing the border 	 159
5.8: The purpose of travelling 	 161
5.9: Travellers' origin of departure 	 169
5.10: Travellers' trip destination 	 170
5.11: Time consumed for departures at Saudi and GCC check-points
	
174
5.12: Time consumed for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points 	 174
6.1: Saudi Trade of national products with its GCC neighbours 	 184
6.2: Age groups of truck drivers 	 191
6.3: Truck drivers' employment details structure 	 191
6.4: Nationality of truck drivers 	 194
6.5: Types of goods transported by trucks 	 194
6.6: Type and number of trucks passing through KFC 	 197
6.7: Time consumed by trucks at the check-points 	 200
7.1: Military balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iraq and Israel 	 211
7.2: Total arrivals at all entry points in 1996
	
219
7.3: Total amount of cleared goods entered the Kingdom in 1995 	 219
7.4: Captured illegal crossings at all Saudi land boundaries 1982-1997 	 225
7.5: Nationality of captured illegal crossing at the Saudi eastern boundaries
with the GCCs in 1998 	 226
7.6: Major smuggled materials seized at the borders with the GCC 	 234
7.7: Caught smuggled materials at the Saudi border sections in 1982 	 235
7.8: Nationality of caught smugglers at the borders with the GCC 1998 	 236
7.9: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995 	 237
Contents of thesis 	 8
7.10: Total cases of caught smuggling at each check-point 	 241
7.11: Types of illegal materials caught at all the three check-points 1997 	 242
7.12: Cases of smuggling illegal materials caught at the three
check-points 1997 	 246
Contents of thesis	 9
List of Maps and Figures
1.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries with its GCC neighbours 	 31
2.1: Process of conflict development 	 48
2.2: House's model 	 55
2.3: Soffer's model 	 58
2.4: Martinez's model 	 60
3.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries and major cities 	 70
3.2: Temperature in selected Saudi and GCC cities 	 72
3.3: Rainfall in selected Saudi and GCC cities 	 73
3.4: Topographic map for eastern Saudi Arabia 	 76
3.5: Kuwait limits according to the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention 	 83
3.6: Territorial claims in south eastern Arabia 1913-1955 	 92
4.1: Major government bodies responsible for boundary management
in Saudi Arabia	 101
4.2: Kuwait-Saudi boundary 	 108
4.3: Sketch map for Kuwait-Saudi new maritime boundary June 2000 	 109
4.4: Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary 1958 	 114
4.5: Sketch map for the Bahrain-Saudi checkpoint services area 	 116
4.6: Saudi-UAE 1974 boundary and oilfields 	 118
4.7: The Saudi-UAE major boundary turning points 	 119
4.8: The Saudi-Qatar maritime boundary 	 121
4.9: The Iraq-Kuwait boundary 1992
	 123
4.10: Boundary points of sections of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary 	 124
4.11: A sample record of Pillar 106 of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary 	 125
4.12: The Saudi-UAE 1974 Boundary Agreement 	 131
5.1: Saudi departures to GCC states 1982-1996 	 140
5.2: GCC nationals arrivals to Saudi Arabia 1982-1996 	 141
5.3: Travellers' companions 	 145
5.4: Travellers' age groups 	 149
5.5: Travellers' occupations 	 150
5.6: Travellers' mode of transportation	 151
5.7: King Fahad Causeway 	 155
5.8: Monthly Saudi departures at Al Khafji 1997-1998 	 157
5.9: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Al Khafji 1997-1998 	 157
5.10: Monthly Saudi departures at ICFC 1997-1998
	
157
Contents of thesis 	 10
5.11: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at KFC 1997-1998 	 157
5.12: Monthly Saudi departures at Albateha 1997-1998
	
158
5.13: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Albateha 1997-1998 	 158
5.14: Frequency of crossings 	 162
5.15: Purpose of travelling 	 163,164
5.16: Major cities and towns in Kuwait 	 166
5.17: Major cities and towns in Bahrain 	 167
5.18: Major cities and towns in UAE 	 171
5.19: Time consumed at the checkpoints 	 175,176
5.20: Time consumed at the checkpoints 	 177
6.1: Saudi Arabia exports of national products 1985-1996 	 185
6.2: Saudi Arabia imports of national products 1985-1996 	 185
6.3: Saudi exports of national products to Kuwait 1985-1996 	 187
6.4: Saudi imports of national products from Kuwait 1985-1996 	 187
6.5: Saudi exports of national products to Bahrain 1985-1996
	 187
6.6: Saudi imports of national products from Bahrain 1985-1996 	 187
6.7: Saudi exports of national products to UAE 1985-1996
	
188
6.8: Saudi imports of national products from UAE 1985-1996 	 188
6.9: Truck drivers' age groups
	
190
6.10: Truck drivers' employment status
	
192
6.11: Truck drivers' nationality 	 193
6.12: Frequency of crossings by truck drivers' 	 196
6.13: Time consumed at KFC 	 198
6.14: Peterson's view of the relationship between legal sovereignty
and Balassa's classification of economic co-operation 	 201
7.1: Saudi Arabia's main military facilities 	 209
7.2: The sand bank and the steel pipe built by Saudi border guards along
the Kuwait-Saudi boundary 	 221
7.3: The sand bank and the steel pipe built by Saudi border guards along
the Saudi-UAE boundary
	 222
7.4: Apprehended illegal crossings at all the Saudi border 1982-1997 	 224
7.5: Illegal crossings along the Saudi boundaries 1997
	
227
7.6: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia
1982-1998 	 228
7.7: Nationality of captured illegal crossers to/from the eastern borders
of Saudi Arabia 1997-1998 	 229
7.8: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern border sections 1998 	 230
Contents of thesis	 11
7.9: Smuggled alcohol seized at the borderline 1984-1996 	 233
7.10: Smuggled livestock seized at the borderline 1984-1996
	
233
7.11: Smuggled foodstuffs seized at the borderline 1984-1996 	 233
7.12: Nationality of apprehended smugglers at the borders with the GCC
in 1998 	 238
7.13: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995 	 239
7.14: Types of illegal materials seized at all three checkpoints 1997 	 240
7.15: Materials smuggled at each checkpoint 1997
	
243
7.16: Types of illegal materials seized at each checkpoint 1988-1997 	 244
7.17: Smugglers' nationality at the checkpoints 1997 	 245
8.1: A model of the Saudi boundary management 	 260
Contents of thesis 	 12
List of Plates
4.1: Point D-3 of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line
	
128
4.2: Point D-3 of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line 	 128
4.3: Point A of the Saudi-UAE boundary line 	 129
4.4: Point B of the Saudi-UAE boundary line 	 129
4.5: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line 	 130
4.6: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line 	 130
7.1: The border guards' sand bank along the Saudi-UAE boundary line 	 220
7.2: The border guards' pipe along the southern section of the Kuwait-Saudi
boundary line 	 220
Contents of thesis 	 13
Declaration
No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an
application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other
institution of learning.
It does not exceed 100,000 words in length.
Signed:  ,V• a4/S/11g,it&
Abdullatif A. Alshaikh
Durham
January 2001
Copyright
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be
published without prior written consent from the author, and information derived from
it should be acknowledged formally, giving full bibliographical details.
Dedication
I dedicate this work to my country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Contents of thesis 	 14
Acknowledgements
All praise be to Allah Almighty, the Most Generous and the Most Kind for enabling
me to accomplish this study. Without His help and grace this study could not have
been undertaken and completed.
I should like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my supervisors
Professor Gerald Blake and Dr Jonathan Rigg for their expert guidance, support and
consistent encouragement. Their critical review and constructive criticism are greatly
appreciated - without them this study would not have been completed.
Thanks are also due to General Talal Anqawi, General Director of the Saudi Border
Guards; Dr Mohammed Aljabor, General Director of the Saudi Customs Department;
Brigadier Faisal at the Border Guards headquarters in Riyadh; General Muraie
Alshahrani, General Director of Military Survey who gave me some excellent maps;
and Mr Abdullatif H. Alshaikh at the Border Guards headquarters (who died in
September 2000, may Allah have mercy on him).
Brigadier Mutlaq Abuthneen, Director of the Border Guards at the Eastern Province,
gave me a great deal of assistance during my fieldwork along the Eastern borders, as
did Colonel Salih Alharbi from the Border Guards at Salwa.
Much of my work would have been impossible without the co-operation of managers
of the Customs Departments at all of the check-points: Mr Salih Alamro (Alkhafji);
Mr Sulaiman Attwaijeri (KFC); and Mr Abdulaziz Alhamad (Assistant Manager,
Albateha). I would also like to thanks the managers of Passport Control at the check-
points: Major Mohammed Alassaf (Alkhafii); Major Sand Aljeberie (KFC); Captain
Abdulaziz Thagfan (Albateha). I am grateful to all their staff for advice and help.
I would also like to thank Mr Hamood Alghahtani and Mr Mohammed Alghamdi
from the Customs Department headquarters in Riyadh; Mr Mohammed Almotairy
from the Ministry of Interior; Mr Hamad Alfaris and Mr Abdullah Alaifan from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided me with enormously useful information. I am
also grateful to Mrs Karen Atkinson of the Geology Department, University of
Durham for drawing the maps in this thesis, and Mr Peter Hughes for his editorial
assistance. I am also very grateful to the staff of the International Boundaries
Research Unit (IBRU), University of Durham, for their help and enabling me to use
their library.
Finally, a very special thanks go to my family; my mother, full sister, wife and
children for their sincere supplications, support, and patience for being a way from
them during my study in Durham. I would like also to thank the rest of my brothers
and sisters for their encouragement and support.
To those I have been unable to mention but who gave help and support in one form or
another I send my sincere thanks.
Contents of thesis 	 15
Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The subject of international boundaries has attracted scholarly attention for many
decades. Much research has been undertaken on the subject, but most of this is focused
on the practical aspects of international boundaries, such as their allocation,
delimitation, demarcation, and dispute resolution between states. However, the most
challenging problem facing a settled boundary is the management of the boundary line
itself. Unfortunately, little systematic effort has been directed towards studying
boundary management.
It is appropriate first to define 'boundary management'. The difficulty is that
international boundaries have wide dimensions and they are changeable in nature. They
are not just restricted to land or maritime boundaries, which mark the limits of state
sovereignty (Prescott 1987), but they encompass airports, seaports, cyberspace (e.g.
the interne° and even outer space. Boundaries may also extend to encompass cultural
and social boundaries between different groups (Falah and Newman 1995; Passi 1999).
The word 'management' has several meanings. For example, according to The
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999), the verb 'manage' means:
"I be in charge of run. 2 supervise (staff). 3 be the manager of (a sports team or a
performer). 4 administer and regulate (resources under one's control). 5 maintain
control or influence over (a person or animal). 6 control the use or exploitation of
(land)..." (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1999, p.864).
The first two definitions cited above are specifically related to the science of
management, but the other definitions are more general. What is generally implied
international boundary 'management' is based largely on definitions 4, 5 and 6:
'administer', 'regulate', 'control' and 'influence'. Therefore, in the world of boundary
studies, management embraces all the activities which ensure the peaceful operation of
the boundary so that it remains stable and accessible which offering citizens of the state
a sense of security. These activities include notably surveillance, maintenance of border
demarcation and crossing points, control of access, and provision for collaboration.
This thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap in geographical studies of boundary
management. Its main focus as Saudi land boundaries with its Gulf Co-operation
Council (GCC) neighbours. The leaders of U.A.E., Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Qatar and Kuwait established the GCC in May 1981. The aim of this organisation is
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"to effect co-ordination, integration and inter-connection between Member States in all
fields in order to achieve unity between them" (GCC Secretariat General 1992, p.4.)
The main aim of this study is to describe and analyse the contemporary management
of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours. Boundary 'management' in this
context includes the measures undertaken by the Saudi government along its boundary
that are designed to preserve territorial sovereignty while allowing a growing level of
cross-border interaction. Four aspects of boundary management have been chosen:
political and legal management, management of access for people, management of
access for goods, and security management. Other aspects of management such as
transboundary resources management, environmental management, and crisis
management are not included, as will be explained below.
1.2 The significance of the study
The analysis of the management of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours is
important for a number of reasons. First, this study is the first that tackles the issue of
boundary management in the area. Second, the study will explore the extent to which
the aims of the GCC towards more open borders as implied by drive to unity have been
achieved. After almost two decades of operation, it is worth investigating how far the
general policies and agreements undertaken by this organisation have affected
boundary management under the aegis of the GCC.
It is to be hoped that the findings of this study will help decision-makers, especially
on the Saudi side, to evaluate policy and to make any necessary improvements to
practices and procedures at the borders.
1.3 Literature review
During the past century, studies on international boundaries have developed
significantly in terms of concepts, focus and methodology. This development has
helped to enhance understanding of international boundaries, especially their nature
and functions in the contemporary world, where dramatic changes have occurred in the
traditional international political systems. The collapse of the USSR, the emergence of
supranational organisations such as the European Union, the emergence of new states
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such as the Central Asian States, and devolution processes which have been taking
place in some longstanding states, such as the United Kingdom, are a few examples of
those changes.
Below is a brief review of some major studies on international boundaries
categorised in two main areas. First, general studies on boundaries will be brought up
in a chronological way. The author adopted this method to see how concepts and focus
on boundaries have developed through time. This approach also helps to indicate
where to place this study within the totality of work to date. Second, major studies
accomplished on Saudi Arabia's land boundaries will be reviewed.
1.3.1 General studies on boundaries
Boundary studies, during the past century, can be classified into three periods, each
of which has focused on certain theme(s) or concept(s). The first period, from the late
nineteenth century to the outbreak of the Second World War in early 1940s, is
characterised by studies that focus on the nature of boundaries, and how to evaluate
them from different points of view, especially military. The second period, from the
Second World War to the early 1980s, witnessed a distinct shift from focusing on the
nature of boundaries to the functions of boundaries. Finally, from the early 1980s to
the present, new concepts have been introduced to boundary studies as well as new
methodologies derived from disciplines other than geography, such as international
relations, political science and the like. These three periods will be discussed more
thoroughly below.
During the first period, two boundary concepts can be distinguished; the concept of
the organic state, and the concept of the scientific boundary. At the end of the
nineteenth century, Friedrich Ratzel, the German geographer, proposed the concept of
the organic state, where the state is like a living organism which has different stages of
growth. Each state, according to Ratzel has "an idea of the possible limit of its
territorial dominion" (Prescott 1987, p.8), what he called 'space conception'.
Consequently, states and their boundaries are dynamic features and when they were
become fixed in position they are simply witnessing a temporary halt in the process of
political expansion (Prescott 1987). This view derived largely from Ratzel, whatever its
merits, was manifested to an extreme a few decades later during the age of Nazi
expansionism.
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In the early twentieth century, two opposing concepts emerged, those of Thomas
Holdich and L. W. Lyde. Holdich believed that the best boundary, to maintain peace
between two neighbours, must be 'a strong and as definite a physical fence as can be
found' (Johnson 1917, p.208). Thus, the good boundary, according to Holdich, must
be a 'formidable barrier' that divides and separates countries. The natural boundary, or
as he called it the scientific boundary, is the best type, and mountains are the best
natural boundary that serves as a barrier. This view reflects the military background of
Holdich and also of his era, when the strategic value of the boundary was so important.
On the other hand, Lyde suggested a completely different view of the boundary. For
Lyde, the ideal political boundary is not a barrier, rather it is 'a feature which actually
encourages peaceful international intercourse' (Johnson 1917, p.210). Rivers, as Lyde
suggested, were the best boundary for they draw the inhabitants on both banks
together and offer an opportunity for peaceful interactions. These two .opposing
concepts held sway for a quite long time.
However, Holdich's view was criticised by scholars like Albert Brigham, Stephen
Visher, and Richard Hartshorne (Brigham 1919; Visher 1932; Hartshorne 1936, 1937).
Brigham supported Lyde's view and at the same time introduced a new concept of
economic equilibrium. Brigham suggested that the ideal stage of civilisation is when
states can peacefully live together and share mutual profit, and he asserted that
societies should be working towards the time when:
"national limits are to be set for equal welfare on both sides of the line, when
considerations of defence and aggression fall out of sight, and justice is the only goal."
(Brigham 1919, p.202).
Visher criticised the concept of natural boundaries because, among other reasons,
they act as a barrier to peace, and he favoured artificial boundaries because they
encourage interaction between people (Visher 1932, p.295). Hartshorne also rejected
the distinction between the natural and artificial boundary and stated that all
boundaries are man-made. He classified boundaries according to their relationship with
the cultural landscape as antecedent boundaries, subsequent boundaries, and
superimposed boundaries (Hartshorne 1936). He also emphasised differences in the
cultural character of the population at the border areas as a main factor in boundary
problems (Hartshorne 1937).
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During the second period, three scholars, Whittmore Boggs, Stephen Jones, and G.
Pearcy (Boggs 1940; Jones 1945; Pearcy 1965), emphasised the concept of boundary
functions. In his famous book International Boundaries, Boggs (1940) saw boundaries
as barriers to economic intercourse, and their functions as generally negative rather
positive, but at the same time he stated that:
"Any boundary is permeable to some extent, and consequently a sort of osmosis takes
place." (Boggs 1940, p.10).
Boggs also thought that boundary functions might cause problems and friction
between the two neighbours, which may present a need for diplomatic negotiation
(Boggs 1940, p.11). He classified boundary functions into two main categories, in
respect to persons and in respect to things. As to the first category, a government may
have some reason to impose restrictions upon the movement of people entering or
leaving its territory. As to the second category, a government may impose restrictions
upon the movement of goods incoming to or outgoing from its territory.
Jones followed Boggs in stressing the importance of boundary functions, and added
that the general political situation of the two neighbouring states is of great importance
in determining the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a boundary function. He gave an
example of the US-Canada boundary, when USA imposed the liquor laws (in 1920)
and how this matter created some tension at the border:
"Of recent memory are the tension and increased policing, minor but not insignificant,
that arose from differences in the liquor laws of the two countries, laws aimed at
internal, not international, problems, but changing the general situation of the
boundary." (Jones 1945, p. 3).
Jones suggested that one solution to problems arising between two neighbouring
states might be to reduce the functions of their boundary to some degree to those of
internal boundaries. He also suggested that in order to increase the interaction between
states and to promote free trade movement 'changes in the concept of national
sovereignty and the evolution of effective international control seem necessary' (Jones
1945, p.17). In fact, this view is strongly related to the subject of this study, as the
discussion in the following chapters will reveal.
Pearcy described what he called the normal functions of the boundary (Pearcy
1965), when a state tries to maintain a degree of isolation and a degree of interchange.
Abnormalities to the normal functions are either towards minimum restrictions on the
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movement of people and goods or towards maximum restrictions and tight control
over the movement of people and goods.
Some other concepts, also emerged during this period such as Spykman's power
balance (Spykman 1942), Reeves's boundary of justice (Reeves 1944), and Pounds'
ideological boundary (Pounds 1972). However, Pounds in particular emphasised the
importance of supranationals organisation in affecting boundary functions and stated
that:
"International organizations, some of them calling for complete freedom of trade
between their members, others requiring greater liberty of movement of both people
and goods, have deprived boundaries of some of their function." (Pounds 1972, p.97).
During the third period from the early 1980s, the focus was on the changing nature
of the meaning and significance of international boundaries over space and time
(Anderson and Dowd 1999), as clearly reflected in the changes in Western Europe and
Northern America in the past two decades. These changes have redirected boundary
studies towards new emphases towards borderlands, transborder interaction, cross-
border co-operation, cross-border regions, and boundary management. In respect of
borderland, however, some efforts had emerged earlier than this period such as
House's study (1959) on the effect of boundary shift in the Alpes Maritimes when in
1947 France had been awarded the upper valleys of the Roya, V6subie, and Tin&
(Minghi 1963). House explored those areas adjacent to the boundary between France
and Italy which had been held by Italy before the boundary shift in 1947. All these new
emphases on boundary studies have attracted not only geographers, but also scholars
from other social sciences (Blake 1999).
The discussion by some geographers (Prescott 1987; Minghi 1991) of the concept
of the borderland focuses largely upon how the boundary creates its own distinctive
region (Minghi 1991) and how these regions are affected by state policies and
regulations (Prescott 1987). Moreover, Minghi argued that the borderland region
creates a type of barometer of the changes in the relations between the states divided
(Minghi 1991, p.15).
In a book edited by Martinez (1986), the contributors discussed a wide range of
transborder interaction aspects. Most of their papers tackled issues of transborder
interaction along the Canada-US and Mexico-US borders, however some papers
discussed those issues along some African and European borders. For example,
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Duchacek (1986) showed that the interaction could be established through the
activities of subnational governments, especially those located alongside the
international boundary (e.g. Michigan State in U.S.A.), and he pointed out how these
activities affect the foreign policy of central governments. Moreover, Duchacek
argued, that subnational governments may create their own foreign relations with their
neighbours or even with their neighbours' neighbours (Duchacek 1986, p.13).
Hansen (1986) discussed border region development and cooperation by comparing
some borderlands in Western Europe and the Mexico-US borderland. He pointed out
that international conflicts tend to inhibit the economic development of border regions,
and showed how peaceful political relations and international economic integration
have removed border barriers and encouraged borderland development (Hansen 1986,
p.42).
Stoddard (1986) suggested that joint border structures or binational organisations
are the best way to solve border problems. He stressed, however, that:
"The mere existence of a joint structure or binational organization does little for
problem solving, unless the essential powers of problem resolution are also included in
its mandate by both nations involved." (Stoddard 1986, p.65).
Another collections of works, the proceedings of the IGU symposium held in Basle,
Switzerland in 1994 (Gallusser et al 1994), consisted of a wide range of papers
discussing a variety of topics but all focusing upon two main concepts, cross-border
co-operation and cross-border regions. In this volume, topics were classified into
three main areas: new border situations, motivations of transborder co-operation, and
theory and methodology. The most interesting paper is by Koter (1994), who
examined what is called 'Euroregions' along Poland's borders with Germany, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine and Belorussia, where several border regions, from
opposite sides of the boundaries, joined together to form a unique regional setting
along the border. Several papers revealed that there is a wide range of factors which
motivates transborder co-operation. Among them is the geographical location of the
state. For example, landlocked states invariably try to attain access to the sea through
their neighbours. In this respect Geisse and Arenas (1994) examined the economic
agreement between Bolivia, as a landlocked state, and Chile, and Zaidi (1994) also
examined the transborder co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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There are other factors which motivate states or border regions to seek co-
operation such as complex human geographic factors, urban settings, migrations,
transportation, and economic factors (Newman 1994; Zalad 1994; Mladek and Simko
1994; Meir et al 1994; Palomaki 1994; Chanda 1994; Lezzi 1994).
Blake (1994a) discussed international transboundary collaborative ventures as forms
of transborder co-operation. He focused on bilateral agreements between states to
achieve certain objectives such as `transfrontier protected natural areas', 'marine
parks', 'joint offshore zones' and the like.
Unfortunately, boundary management has still not been given much attention by
scholars. However, two works deserve to be mentioned in this review. The first is the
proceedings of the conference on the peaceful management of transboundmy
resources organised by the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) at Durham
University in April 1994 (Blake et al 1995). Most of the papers addressed issues
related to the problems emerging from unequal distribution of natural resources. Since
'most international boundaries have been delimited without taking into account the
location of natural resources' (Blake et al 1995, p.xiii), conflicts between states are
likely to arise unless suitable arrangements are designed to solve these problems.
Collaborative arrangements are held to be the best way to manage those resources.
Based on this theme, the papers are organised into four main areas: hydrocarbons and
minerals; water resources; environment and conservation, and fisheries. Some
examples of each area are given below.
Robson (1995) revealed that the 'effective and efficient exploitation of a single
petroleum reservoir which straddles an international boundary requires cooperation
between the states concerned' (Robson 1995, p.3). He also discussed the legal issues
raised by transboundary petroleum resources and he classified them into two main
types. First, issues raised when the delimitation of the international boundary is carried
out at a time when significant resources have not been identified. Second, issues raised
when a specific potential petroleum resource has been identified (Robson 1995).
Caponera (1995) discussed the legal bases of transboundary water resources
whether they are rivers or underground resources. He showed the available sources of
international law to regulate water resources usage and management. The point he
made is that there is no one law applies to manage such resources.
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Hearns and Tyedmers (1995) clarified how the creation of a marine protected area
would not just enhance and promote a substantial fishery, but could also help to reduce
the potential for conflict, for example in the South China Sea.
Hayashi (1995) discussed the problems of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks and the role of the United Nation in managing those stocks.
The second work is a paper on the objectives of land boundary management (Blake
1998). In fact, this paper represents the first attempt to tackle the issue of boundary
'management' as such on a systematic typological basis. Blake suggested a model of
peaceful boundary management, and discussed the factors that affect boundary
management: boundary history, legal status, type of boundary line, physical geography,
human geography, and access. He also suggested that any good boundary management
should achieve the following goals: 'international peace, local and national security,
borderland prosperity, and effective local government' (Blake 1998, p.56). Blake also
discussed different types of boundary management which are management of the
boundary line, access management, security management, transboundary resource
management, environmental management, and crisis management. Blake's paper is
important to this thesis, and was the inspiration for its basic structure.
In spite of the new emphasis on management of boundaries, the old fundamental
questions of delimitation and demarcation have not gone away. As territorial changes
continue to emerge in the world today, such as the new states formed from the break-
up of USSR, and as states are still competing for territory especially where there are
valuable resources at stake (see Chapter 2), some longstanding aspects of international
boundaries remain of interest to scholars.
From the above review of all the general works, one might suggest the following.
First, concepts relating to, and the significance of, boundaries have changed through
time. Second, current studies on boundaries focus more upon issues of boundary
functioning and of transborder co-operation, whether between local authorities or
national governments, and this co-operation is perceived to be a means toward
maintaining peace and stability between neighbours. Third, there is a surprising scarcity
of studies on boundary management despite the fact that boundary management affects
interaction across borders either positively or negatively. Nevertheless, this study
benefited from some earlier authors, especially Boggs (1940), Jones (1945), Pearcy
(1965) and Blake (1998) who have helped to construct the theoretical background of
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this thesis. The following section reviews studies undertaken of Saudi Arabia's land
boundaries in particular.
1.3.2 Studies on Saudi Arabia's land boundaries
Several studies have been produced on the boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Below some
of these works will be reviewed and grouped according to the main topic or issue they
tackled. They have been arranged into the following three main groups: neutral and
shared zones, boundary disputes, and boundary functions. This study being limited to
land boundaries of Saudi Arabia, only works that deal with land boundaries have been
included.
The first group of studies, are those examining the former neutral and shared zones
of the Saudi boundaries. Melamid (1955) discussed the Saudi neutral zones with
Kuwait, Iraq and the U.A.E before their dissolution. For example, the neutral zone
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had a unique situation prior to the 1965 agreement
partitioning the zone. The two governments, the Saudi government and the British
government on behalf of the Sheikh of Kuwait, reached several agreements to manage
this neutral area. They agreed on regulating the movement of the Bedouin, the
movement of goods, and the administration ofjustice, while natural resources were not
raised until 1950s when a considerable amount of oil was discovered as will be shown
in Chapter four. The study showed how the sovereignty of the two states over this area
was affected by these agreements.
Brown (1963) discussed in more details the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone. He
showed how the Neutral Zone was established in Uqair Convention in December 1922
and how this zone was imposed by the British High Commissioner in Iraq Sir Percy
Cox as a solution to the dispute between Ibn Saud and the Shaikhdom of Kuwait.
More importantly, he pointed out that Cox insisted to impose a defined boundary
which was not known to the people in Arabia and he succeeded despite the strong
opposition by Ibn Saud to this idea. He also discussed the blockade imposed on
Kuwait by 1bn Saud from 1920 until 1942 when both the Saudis and Kuwaitis signed
three agreements of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations, Trade Agreement, and
Agreement for the Extradition of Offenders which have ended the blockade and
contributed to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Oil
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concessions in the Neutral Zone and how different oil companies won contracts from
the Saudis and the Kuwaitis were described in more details.
Blake revealed in three separate papers (Blake 1991; 1992; 1994b) how the neutral
zones between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq, as well as the shared maritime zones
with Sudan and Bahrain, were peacefully resolved, concluding that neutral and shared
zones 'represent peaceful solutions to potentially serious boundary conflict' (Blake
1991, p.163). For the seabed formerly disputed between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over
the two islands of Qaru and Urnm al Maradim which formerly lay within the realm of
partitioned zone, Blake suggested, as a peaceful solution to the dispute, to share any
revenues from the exploitation of hydrocarbons resources found within this area (Blake
1992).
The second group of studies are those considering boundary disputes between
Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. Many of the studies were concerned with the Buraimi
dispute. Melamid (1965), after giving a brief description the dispute, showed how the
ethnographic composition of the population affected the definition of Saudi
international boundaries.
Kelly (1967) also discussed this dispute in a more detailed way. After describing the
disputed area in terms of its geographical, historical, economic, and social structures,
he examined the development of the dispute during all its stages from 1949-1954,
when the negotiations were held. This study, despite the useful information it provided
on this dispute, depended largely on British government memoranda on this issue. This
study was described by one scholar as biased, representing British interests in the Gulf
region (Alshamlan 1987, p.16).
Two studies have addressed the Buraimi issue from a less prejudiced viewpoint:
those of Alshamlan (1987) and Wilkinson (1991). Alshamlan historically analysed the
Saudi south-eastern boundaries, and discussed the development of the Buraimi dispute.
He successfully demonstrated, with admirable fairness, the views of both the Saudis
and the British. Wilkinson (1991) also addressed the issue of Buraimi, and clarified the
role of Britain in delimiting most Arabian Gulf' states' territories. He concluded that
* There has been a very long debate over whether 'Persian' or 'Arabian' Gulf is the correct term.
Historically, the name 'Persian Gulf dates back as early as 150 AD. The ancient Greek and Roman
geographers used two terms. 'Arabian Gulf which refers to the modern Red Sea, and 'Persian Gulf
which refers to the modern Persian/Arabian Gulf (Al-Qasimi 1999). Moreover, Arab historians used
the term 'Bahr Faris' which means 'Sea of Persia' in reference to the Persian/Arabian Gulf. The
Ottomans, after occupying Iraq and Eastern Arabia in the 1540s, used different terms for the Gulf
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international law could not give an answer as to how to draw the limits in the desert, or
what is called res nullius areas. Thus, territorial disputes in the southern and south-
eastern parts of Arabia faced several problems in this respect.
The third group of studies are those concerned with boundary functions, as shown
in Abu-Daoowd's (1984) study. He first examined the evolution of Saudi boundaries,
and then analysed the functions of all the land boundaries of Saudi Arabia. He meant
by the function, the boundary as a barrier to human movement. In order to determine
this function, he studied patterns of human movement across the official check-points
along the land boundaries in terms of their volume and some characteristics of
travellers such as nationality, age, education, income, purpose of travelling, and
frequency of travelling. Moreover, he interviewed travellers to determine their
perceptions of the boundary. He concluded that 60% of travellers across the Saudi land
boundaries perceived the boundary as a bather to human movement, and by using
regression analysis, he found that difficulty and distance were the most important
factors that affected the perception of the travellers. In addition, he discovered that the
size of population of the travellers' origin countries and distance influenced the number
of travellers.
AI-Ghamdi (1999) also studied some functional aspects of the Saudi boundary with
Yemen. Although the aim of his study was mainly to suggest a logical boundary line as
a solution to the former boundary dispute between the two countries, he analysed the
interaction between the borderlanders along the boundary on both sides. He found
from a sample of travellers at Allchadra Saudi check-point along the western section of
the boundary, which is adjacent to the Taif Treaty line (see figure 3.6), that the main
purpose of travellers is visiting relatives followed by visiting their properties and
shopping. He also discovered that most of the Saudis crossing the border weekly,
while the Yemenis crossing on a monthly basis. But along the middle section of the
such as 'Gulf of Basrah', 'the Gulf of Qatif, and 'the Gulf of Arabia'. In the same period, some
Italian cartographers called the Gulf 'Golfo de Persia', but influenced by the Ottomans they added the
term 'Mare Elcatif thus becoming 'Mare Elcatif Golfo di Persia'. From 1712 onwards, English
cartographers started to use the term 'Persian Gulf' and all other names disappeared (Al-Qasimi
1999). However, some English politicians and travellers used the term 'Arabian Gulf' such as Charles
Belgrave in his book The Pirate Gulf(Amin 1981).
In 1958, Iraq started to use the term 'Arabian Gulf' in its media and was followed by other Arab
countries such as Egypt and Syria. Amin writes: "By 1968, all Arab States, including the Gulf
Emirates, passed laws and issued decrees making the use of the term 'Arabian Gulf compulsory in all
communications with the outside world." (Amin 1981, p.37). The author has thus opted to use the
term 'Arabian Gulf in his thesis bearing in mind that it is a contemporary and not historic study.
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boundary he found that there was no interaction because there was no check-point as a
result of the tense relations between Saudi Arabia and the former South Yemen.
However, the eastern section of the boundary has an informal Saudi check-point called
Alkirkeer, which he studied the interaction of people along it. He found that at this
check-point most of the crossings are made by the Emirats because they are from
certain tribes and do visit their folks in Yemen, so this check-point is closer to them
when they come from the U.A.E. Al-Ghamdi also studied the time consumed by
travellers at the two previous check-points. Ile discovered that at Alkhadra check-
point the time ranged from 10-30 minutes for people travelling alone. But those who
are accompanied by their families or friends spent from 1-2 hours. At Allcirkeer
informal check-point he found that travellers are spent less time than the first one
which is from 5-10 minutes for people travelling by themselves, and from 15-30
minutes for people accompanied with families. The previous time ranges were
undertaken for travellers from the Saudi side to the Yemeni side.
From the foregoing review of the materials on the Saudi boundaries, several points
can be concluded. First, the majority of those studies focused on boundary disputes,
especially on the Buraimi case. Second, studies which tackled neutral and shared zones
focused on those forms of territorial arrangement as solutions to boundary disputes in
Arabia. These two groups are important in understanding the evolution of the Saudi
boundaries up to their present shape. Third, Abu-Daood's study focused on the
function of the boundary as travellers perceived it as a human barrier, but he did not
examine the functions applied by the Saudi government at international boundaries.
Neither did he investigate the time spent by travellers at the check-points which is an
important factor in evaluating those functions. While Al-Ghamdi was focusing on
interaction between population on both sides of the border as evidence to be used for
proposing a logical boundary as a solution to the dispute between the two sides, and he
did not examine other aspects of management such as security management or
management of access for goods. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to bridge the gaps
found in empirical studies about the Saudi boundaries, and it is hoped by studying the
management practices at the Saudi boundaries a better understanding of the functions
of the boundary can be reached.
Chapter 1	 29
1.4 Research objectives and questions
There are two main objectives of this study. First, to describe and analyse the Saudi
government's management practices. Second, to see how these practices are affected
by the GCC's policies and objectives, and how in turn these practices affect the degree
of openness at the borders. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the following
questions will be addressed:
1. Are the selected Saudi boundaries managed in ways that are consistent with the
GCC's long-term objectives of political unity? (Chapters five, six, and seven).
2. To what degree are the selected Saudi boundaries 'open'? Is there a trend towards
more openness, and what are the differences between them in this respect?
(Chapters five, six, and seven).
3. What types of factors account for differences in openness? Are the influences local
or national or both? (Chapters five and six).
4. How are illegal movements of people and goods monitored and controlled, and
with what success? (Chapter seven).
5. How successful is the management of these boundaries in allowing access and
maintaining peace and security along the borderline? (Chapters five, six, and
seven).
There are four obvious limitations of this study. First, only three boundaries have
been selected from five Saudi-GCC boundaries. Those chosen are the boundaries
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia and
the U.A.E. Each of these boundaries has characteristics that distinguish it from the
others. They differ in length, number of crossing points, and geographical environment
(see table 1.1). Furthermore, along those chosen boundaries, only three crossing points
were selected for analysis. As seen in figure 1, they are A1lch4i (with Kuwait), King
Fahad Causeway (with Bahrain) and Albateha (with the U.A.E.). The reason for
choosing these three crossings is because the number of people entering and leaving is
greater at the selected points than at other crossing points.
Second, the author is a Saudi national and can be expected to obtain better data
from the Saudi side than from the neighbouring countries. Thus, the material collected
is liable to be biased, in terms of quantity and substance, in favour of Saudi Arabia.
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Figure 1.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries with its GCC neighbours
Source: Farsi (no date).
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Table 1.1: Some characteristics of the selected boundaries.
Saudi Arabia
/
Boundary Length
(km)
Crossing
Points
Remarks
Kuwait 220 3 2 formal + 1 informal *
Bahrain 174 1 1 formal
U.A.E. 456 3 1 formal +2 informal
* Those informal crossing points are used for Bedouin movements and have special regulations.
Third, management practices along maritime boundaries clearly differ from those
along land boundaries, which include marine operations such as fisheries management,
safety of ships and, pollution control. This type of management is not included, rather
the focus here is on management along land boundaries not least because the
movement of people and goods between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours are
more salient and dense on land boundaries than on maritime boundaries. Although the
boundary between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is a maritime boundary, it has been
chosen because the construction of King Fahad Causeway (KFC) in 1987 has created a
type of land boundary management along the Causeway. In addition, management
practices at airports and seaports are not included in this thesis despite the fact that a
rather large number of people travel through airports and a large amount of goods are
checked through seaports. The author believes that these are important areas of
research which deserve separate studies.
Finally, because of obvious limitations of time and word-length this study covers
only four aspects of boundary management. These are: political and legal management,
management of access for people, management of access for goods, and security
management. Other important aspects, such as transboundary resources management,
environmental management and crisis management have been excluded because of
limitation of time and word length.
Notwithstanding the limitations noted above, it will be shown that the selected cases
are sufficient to reveal marked regional contrasts in the four aspects of boundary
management between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours.
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1.5 Study methodology
It is important to assert that because of the lack of general theories in boundary
management studies, as revealed by the foregoing literature review, this study is an
empirical one. Therefore, the inductive approach was used to answer the basic research
questions. The author used different methods to collect and analyse the data for this
study. In respect of data collection, there were three main sources of information. First,
primary sources that include treaties and agreements between the Saudi government
and its neighbours. Secondly, secondary sources that include maps, statistics, and
official material — published and unpublished. In addition, library sources in the form of
books, articles, and reports, were used to develop theoretical and regional background
for this study. Finally, fieldwork was conducted to collect data unavailable from other
sources. More details of the fieldwork are given below.
1.5.1 Fieldwork
Different types of information were gathered from the field, using a variety of
techniques First, there is the data regarding the physical features of the boundary area
and its topography. For this type of information the author used the simple technique
of direct observation with the assistance of topographic maps of three scales,
1:4,000,000, 1:500,000 and 1:250,000. Larger scale maps, such as 1:50,000, are
available for officials use only, for example the Border Guards officials, and the author
did not have access to this type of map. Key reference books about the geography of
the Arabian Peninsula were used as supplementary sources such as The Atlas of Saudi
Arabia (Bindagji 1978) and Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Bindagji
1981). Moreover, some official statistical books also have been used, as will be shown
in Chapter three. Second, the physical situation of the boundary markers and posts,
their position and distances between them were observed and recorded. In addition to
that, the man-made features such as trenches, sandbanks, barbed wire fences and the
like, were also observed.
Third, information about the movement of people and goods through the selected
Saudi check-points was gathered from official statistics and a questionnaire designed
for this purpose. Finally, official views regarding policies and regulations applied at the
crossing points were gathered through interviews with senior officials. The following
sections provide more details about the questionnaire and interviews.
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1.5.2 Questionnaire
To collect information from the people crossing the borderlines it was necessary to
design and administer a relatively short questionnaire. People travelling across the
border do not favour a long wait at crossing points. For this reason, the author
designed a questionnaire to be handed out to the travellers, arrivals and departures, at
the three selected Saudi crossing points with Kuwait, Bahrain and the U.A.E. This
questionnaire contained the necessary questions to obtain the information needed for
this research. For example, the traveller's reason for travel, his/her frequency of
crossing the border, the time consumed at the check-points and the like, as can be seen
from Appendices I, II, DI at the end of this thesis. It is worth mentioning here that
there were few female responses to the questionnaire, as discussed in Chapter five.
Three forms of questionnaires were designed, one for the arrivals (Appendix I), one
for the departures (Appendix II), and one for truck drivers (Appendix III). Samples
from both travellers and truck drivers were drawn, as discussed in greater detail in
Chapters five and six. The questionnaire forms were given to respondents to fill in by
themselves, except in a few cases where the selected respondent was unable to read
and write. In such instances, the author undertook to complete the questionnaires.
As traveller numbers crossing the borders vary from day to day and thus there was
no framework for the research population (i.e. travellers), on advice, the author opted
to use the table in appendix XII which is designed to determine the sample size for any
population (Krejcie and Morgan 1970). In addition, the author decided to select
samples based on the total numbers of travellers crossing on a specific day at each
check-point (see Chapter 5). The total thq sample size at the three selected check-
points was 597 travellers of which 90% (remarkably) responded to questionnaires.
This figure is regarded as ample in statistical terms; the larger the number of sample the
more accurate the generalisation derived from it to the research population will be
(Kitchen and Tate 2000).
1.5.3 Interviews
Two categories of official personnel were interviewed using open-ended questions.
The first category was those senior officials who are responsible for supervising and
controlling border matters according to the overall policy adopted by the government.
For example, the General Director of the Border Guards and the General Director of
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Customs Department were interviewed, except from the General Director of Passport
Control, as will be explained below.
The second category was those officials at the crossing points who are directly
controlling the border activity on a day-by-day basis, e.g. Border Guards, Passport
Officers, and Customs Department Managers. The author had a different response
from each group of officials mentioned above.
The Border Guards and the Customs Department officials were very helpful and co-
operative, whether in interviews or in supplying the requested data to the author.
Unfortunately, some of the officials from the Passport Department were not very co-
operative in interviews and providing the requested data. The General Director of the
Passport Department refused to be interviewed, and instead he referred the author to
his adviser to answer the questions. However, most of the Passport officers at the
border check-points were very helpful and co-operative.
1.6 Data analysis
After collecting all the data required for the study, the author has applied different
analytical techniques. First, the data collected from the questionnaire forms have been
coded and inputted on to a personal computer by using Excel Software (MS Office97
version). Following that, the data have been analysed and frequencies and percentages
were calculated and used in this analysis.
Second, by the use of different techniques, such as maps, graphs and tables, the
author analysed results from his survey and fieldwork. Cross-tabulation was also
employed wherever necessary to see if there is any apparent association between
different variables. Third, qualitative technique has been employed to analyse the
interviews with the Saudi officials.
1.7 Study difficulties and constraints
The author faced a number of difficulties during data collection. The most important
difficulty, as the search on theoretical materials concerning boundary management
shows, was that there is a great lack of research on this subject. The dearth of research
makes this study a pioneering one. Some comment on the theoretical background for
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boundary management may be added to the vitally important field of international
boundary studies.
Among the other difficulties that deserve to be mentioned here, is the confidential
nature of the information needed for this research. In addition to that, some officials
were hesitant about co-operating with the author. The harshness of the terrain and the
remoteness of most of the parts of the boundary line with the U.A.E., which hindered
the author from observing those parts, was another difficulty.
Some further constraints were encountered in this study. First, some departments,
such as the Border Guard, provided only limited statistics and there are no other
sources that can be accessed. For example, the information regarding illegal crossing
and smuggling are not detailed in terms of all the Saudi boundaries with the GCC
neighbours, where the figures of some boundaries, such as the one with the U.A.E.,
have been added to the figures for the boundary with Qatar and Oman (except from the
years 1997 and 1998 where those figures have been individually detailed for the
boundary with the Emirates). This constraint makes the temporal trend for illegal
crossing and smuggling hard to follow. Second, some of the respondents (lesser than
5%) from the people selected for the questionnaire did not answer all the questions on
the form, leaving some answers blank. However, the proportion of those respondents
is not large enough to affect the result significantly.
In spite of the difficulties discussed above and the limitations mentioned on pages
30 and 32, the author hopes he achieved some significant research which will be of real
practical and academic value.
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Chapter Two
Theoretical Studies on International Boundaries
2.1 Introduction
Studies in political geography in general and those on international boundaries in
particular are characterised by two distinct approaches. On one hand, there is the
traditional trend, which is more concerned with practical rather theoretical aspects of
politics. The (post)modem trend, on the other hand, is more interested in constructing
theories and models about political phenomena which are suitable for generalisation and
prediction (Prescott 1988; Newman and Passi 1998).
Many attempts have been made by scholars from different disciplines to produce
theories and models to explain variously: territoriality, the behaviour of states, and human
interactions across international boundaries. Such theories can be categorised as: theories
about state territoriality, theories about boundary conflicts, and theoretical models of
trans-boundary interaction.. These three main areas are of great importance and are of
course closely related to each other. Some of the most significant theories and models
will be discussed below.
2.2 Theories on state territoriality
The link between the state and its territory is obvious because the state is generally
regarded as a territorial organisation (Spykman 1942). However, what makes a territory
so important to a state needs more exploration and analysis. Several scholars have tried to
explain the significance of territory in different ways. Ratzel explained the state's
territorial growth by two laws. The first is what he called the law of the evolution of
boundaries which "can be defined as a striving towards simplification and in this
simplification is contained a shortening of borders" (Prescott 1987, p.9). The second law
is "the borders of the larger areas embrace the borders of the smaller one" (Prescott 1987,
p.9). Later, the German Karl Haushofer adapted Ratzel's theory and added the two
concepts of cultural boundary and military boundary. By the first concept of cultural
boundary, Haushofer meant any territory that encompasses ethnically and culturally
homogeneous people. He claimed, that this territory of homogeneous people needs a
military boundary to extending beyond the cultural boundary to protect it from any attack
or threat (Prescott 1987).
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Unfortunately, these views led to disastrous consequences, for instance when the Nazis
used these theories as a pretext to expand and occupy more territory, which precipitated
the Second World War. Besides, these perspectives are deterministic in nature and do not
take into account the role of human behaviour as an influential factor. More recent studies
(Goertz and Diehl 1992; Forsberg 1995), however, suggest that the significance of
territories to states lies in two other characteristics: the intrinsic value of the territory, and
the relational value of the territory.
2.2.1 Intrinsic value of territory
Any territory possesses certain embedded characteristics that make it valuable. Those
characteristics include natural resources, land productivity, and the population (Goertz
and Diehl 1992). In respect to the first aspect, the availability of natural resources such as
hydrocarbon resources, minerals and water resources, make states try vigorously, often
violently, to gain control over territory that contains these resources. Oil resources in the
Arabian Gulf region have made the region very important, not just to the Gulfs states but
to the major industrial nations around the world as well. The hydrocarbon resources in the
Arabian Gulf have been a catalyst for many affairs, including territorial disputes, that
have taken place in the region over the past six decades. Some lands are important not
just as a source of certain resources, but also as a market for industrial and agricultural
production (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Some argue, however, that this economic value of
territory is decreasing in the contemporary world of interdependent economies and free
trade markets (Forsberg 1995).
The second aspect is land productivity, which concerns land fertility and how far it is
suitable for agricultural production, and this in turn:
"could greatly enhance the food production or export capacity of the state that
rules it." (Goertz and Diehl 1992, p.16).
Moreover, land can provide not just food production, but also additional space for
economic development in general.
Thirdly, a territory can be intrinsically important because of the people who live there.
If the population is large, and the people are skilled and well educated, this may improve
the ability of the state to manage its economy, defence and the like. A state will be thc
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weaker if its population is small, and the people are unskilled and poorly educated
(Goertz and Diehl 1992). States may vary in their perceptions of the value of a territory,
for a varied reasons and this is what is called the relational value of territories, which is
discussed next.
2.2.2 Relational value of territory
This aspect is more subjective than the concept of intrinsic value of territory discussed
above. Different states may have different evaluations for the same territory, because a
complex set of factors moulds these differences, such as religion, culture, ideology,
geography, and history. Goertz and Diehl identified three groups of the relational
significance of territory: the geographical location of territory, ethnic composition of a
territory's population, and historical importance of territory (Goertz and Diehl 1992). A
fourth type may be identified which is the psychological or emotional value of territory.
As to the first relational value, which concerns the geographical location of territory,
the closer a territory is to a state's main land the more significant it lands to be especially
in terms of security. Goertz gave the example of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, when the Communist regime in Afghanistan was threatened by the Afghan rebels.
The Soviet response was swift and dramatic, Goertz argued. In contrast, the Soviets did
not respond in the same way when the Marxist government in Chile was overthrown in
1973. Goertz maintained that a state is likely to be more eager to fight for a territory in
close proximity than for a distant territory (Goertz and Diehl 1992).
The ethnic composition of a territory's population may encourage a bordering state,
with the same ethnic group, to claim that territory and seek control over it. It goes without
saying that too many boundaries in the world have divided ethnically homogeneous
people between different states (Goertz and Diehl 1992). This situation was and still is a
major source of conflict between states as will be shown below.
A state may also seek control over a territory because of its historical importance. A
good example is Palestine, which has a great historical value to the Muslims and Jews
beside its value as a homeland for its Arab people. The historical importance has been
often used by states, as Alexander Murphy argued, as an argument to justify their claims
of a territory although there may be underlying motives:
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"Government leaders rarely make speeches declaring that they are seeking to
incorporate a neighbouring territory into their domain because there is a valuable
bauxite deposit in the area or because the territory would provide better access to
the sea or because the state is too small to compete effectively with its neighbour.
Rather, the public discourse of territorial expansionism is essentially a call for
restitution of that which was improperly taken away." (Murphy 1990, p.533).
Finally, the psychological value of territories and boundaries and how people perceive
them is still of great importance today. Palestine, as mentioned above, is of great religious
and cultural value not just to the Muslims and Jews live in Palestine but also to the
Muslims and Jews all around the world. The two holy cities in Saudi Arabia, Makkah and
Medinah, are also of great religious and cultural value to all Muslims. Another celebrated
example is Australia where the land has great religious and emotional value to the
aboriginal Australian people.
Territories and boundaries have been perceived in different ways by different groups of
people. Although boundaries are losing some of their importance in parts of the world
today, they are still perceived as an important symbol of nationalism as well as an
important source of security from external threats. For local people they may be
perceived as a source of anxiety and insecurity. Falah and Newman (1995) showed how
Palestinians and Israelis perceived the boundary of their states in diasporas. The pre-state
Zionists perceived that "such boundaries could territorially extend up to the biblical
boundaries of a Greater Israel (Eritz Ysrael) from the Euphrates to the Nile..." (Falah and
Newman 1995, p. 692). On the other hand the Palestinians' perception of Palestine:
"consists of the whole of Palestine, including all the area within which Palestinian
villages were to be found prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and the
exodus of Palestinians refugees" (Falah and Newman 1995, p. 692).
They also pointed out how these perceptions changed after the establishment of the
Israeli State and how they became related to security issues more than any thing else.
Passi (1996) in his study to the Russo-Finnish border showed how after the Finns gained
independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1920 they considered the boundary as an essential
element in social integration of their country. Passi demonstrated how the Finns
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perceived the task of the border area and how it was "interpreted as a crucial one: to stand
as a 'defensive wall' against armed attack and spiritual plague" (Passi 1996, p.176).
Interestingly enough, Passi demonstrated how the perception of the borders differed
between the local people who live near the border, and those who live in different parts of
the country. For instance, the people from western or southern Finland perceived the
border zone as "a mysterious place" throughout the period of the existence of the Soviet
Union (Passi 1996, p. 274). Whereas local people perceived it differently. One of them
expressed the view that "we live in 'Western Russia' and another one said "I do not
regard this boundary as a boundary between east and west..." (Passi 1996, p.2'74).
Miles (1998) showed how some archipelago people perceive their territory and gave an
example of West Indies where the people there "do not view themselves as belonging to a
territorial whole or unifying archipelago but rather to separate island nations and
cultures..." (Miles 1998, p. 11).
In Arabia, despite the people sharing the same religion, language and culture they still
perceive boundaries to be barriers. Abu-Daood (1984) revealed that 60% of the people he
interviewed at the Saudi borders of different nationalities perceived the Saudi boundary
as barrier to human movement. He pointed out that the most important factor which
influenced the peoples' attitude was difficulty at check-points (including visa acquisition,
time of travel, and treatment at the check-point). He also cited other factors including
distance between point of origin and the nearest boundary crossing-point, and frequency
of travelling. Al-Ghamdi (1999) also studied peoples' perception of the boundary at the
Saudi-Yemeni border. For example, he found that 83% of the people crossing at Al-
Khadra check-point felt that they had reached the Saudi border when they saw the road
which is being used by Saudi Border Guards' patrols. Only 17% recognised the border
area when they saw the Al-Khadra check-point. On the Yemeni side, 50% of travellers
recognised the border when they saw Abbassa Yemeni check-point, and about 70%
recognised it when they saw Mount Al-Buq'a
The previously mentioned values of territory have played a key role in causing many
territorial and boundary disputes between states. Some of the major theories regarding
boundary conflict are discussed below.
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2.3 Theories on boundary conflict
Before discussing 'boundary conflict', it is worth considering some of the important
general causes of conflict between states, and the likelihood of development into
diplomatic or military conflict. Holsti (1995) pointed out that when there are parties
(which are normally governments) seeking to achieve some or other objectives, taking
incompatible positions over certain issues, holding hostile attitudes toward each other,
and conducting diplomatic or military action, then conflict is likely to occur. This general
statement requires explanation. A government may be involved in attempting to achieve
specific objectives, such as gaining additional or more secure territory, control of
valuable resources, access to markets, and unification with a neighbouring ethnic group.
In its endeavour to achieve these objectives, a government may encounter the interests
and objectives of another government. Then both parties may take incompatible positions
over certain issues. At this point, any move by one party is explained by the other as at
their expense, or what is called "a zero-sum situation: one's gain is the other's loss"
(Holsti 1995, p. 328). Hostile attitudes, such as suspicion and distrust, may develop.
Finally, one party takes an action, diplomatic or military, which results in conflict
between the two sides. Figure 2.1 may illustrate this process more clearly.
Boundary conflict, in its broader sense, means that there are incompatible demands of
two states regarding their boundary's location, its significance or regarding the value of
the territory encompassed by the boundary (Tagil et al 1977), or they use the boundary to
symbolise aggression. Several theories have been developed to explain these conflicts in
terms of the 'causes' that generate them, and in terms of their 'genesis' or why they
develop into diplomatic or military confrontations (Tagil et al 1977; Prescott 1987;
Goertz and Diehl 1992; Huth 1996). Generally speaking, two main types of boundary
conflict theory can be distinguished. First, there are theories concerned with conflicts
between states where boundaries are used as a pretext and there are underlying motives
other than the boundary itself. The second type comprises theories concerned with
conflicts between actors where the boundary's location, significance or the value of the
territory is the main cause of the conflict.
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Figure 2.1 Process of conflict development
Party's Objectives
1.
Incompatible position
Hostile attitudes
Diplomatic/Military actions
Conflicts
Source: Based on Holsti (1995).
It is often stated that boundaries may be nsed as a pretext by one state to engage in a
conflict situation with its neighbours, and this takes place when political relations
between two states deteriorate and they fail to reach a common understanding. The Iran-
Iraq conflict over Shatt el-Arab is a good example of this situation. Longstanding
animosity and rivalry between the two countries played a major role in this dispute
(Prescott 1987).
A number of scholars have affirmed that a conflict or dispute between two neighbours
may arise over the exact location of the boundary line that separates their territories.
Presoctt (1987) called them 'positional' disputes, pointing out that this type of dispute
often arises "because of incomplete boundary evolution" (Prescott 1987, p.115). He
added that most positional disputes arise during the demarcation process when the
demarcation commission finds it difficult to match the definition of the borderline in the
treaty text to the landscape. Jones (1943) also asserted that most of the serious cases of
positional boundary disputes have been caused by "unintentional ambiguities in the
description of boundaries in formal documents" (Jones 1943, p.99). In addition, Adler
(1995) suggested some general principles to be followed in treaty making which might
help avoiding conflicts between states, as will be discussed in Chapter four. Tagil (Tagil
et al 1977) also mentioned that E. Luard studied boundary conflicts over a fifty year
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period and found out that usually those conflicts took place where no demarcated
boundary has existed.
Boundary functions may also be a source of conflict between neighbours. It should be
stated here that the major function of international boundaries is to mark the limit of state
sovereignty (Prescott 1987). Thus, 'functions' here refer to government practices at the
boundary. Prescott suggested that disputes over state functions arise:
"when one government believes that it has been adversely and unfairly affected by
the functions of a neighbouring government along the boundary." (Prescott 1987,
p.122).
This type of dispute is common, and can be easily resolved without any change in the
boundary location (Prescott 1987). For example, in 1999 Georgian Customs officers
refused to allow the duty-free importation of potatoes into Georgia from Armenia
because the Armenian government decided to tax the import of Georgian citrus (IBRU
Database 1999). Another example is trade dispute between Mexico and USA over tariffs
imposed by both countries on certain goods such as citrus fruit from Arizona, California,
and Florida, and over US embargo of tuna. However, the two sides reached an agreement
in 1997, during President Bill Clinton's state visit to Mexico, to solve some of those
pending problems (IBRU Database 1997).
Conflicts over the value of the territory seem to be more serious than the two previous
types. Rivalry between states over strategic territories or over valuable resources are still
influencing international politics today. Hence, more efforts have been made by scholars
to understand those conflicts and predict their development into diplomatic or military
conflicts. This type of conflict is more evident in three main areas. There are conflicts
associated with international politics, conflicts associated with ethnic and religious
factors, and conflicts associated with historical legacy. Each of these areas will be
explored below in more detail.
2.3.1 Conflicts associated with international politics
Two recent studies of conflicts (Goertz and Diehl 1992 and Huth 1996) attempted to
draw generalisations based on empirical cases to explain territorial conflicts between
states. First, Huth (1996) argued that the realist model, which explains international
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conflicts as a result of clashing interests of states, and considers the military strength of
states as "the critical determinant of their relative influence and power" (Huth 1996,
p.15), is not enough to explain conflicts between states. This is because, according to
Huth, this model does not take account of domestic political factors and their impact on
foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Huth proposed a model which:
"incorporates in a coherent and generalizable way the impact of both domestic and
international level variables on the foreign policy decisions. " (Huth 1996, p. 16).
To apply his model, he studied 129 cases of territorial conflicts from 1950-1990 and
used statistical measures to test his results. The major finding of his study was that,
regarding the issues at stake, there is a high tendency for states to become involve
themselves in disputes over strategically located territory. Yet, this issue accounted for
about 20% of the territorial dispute cases he investigated. He found also that there is a
high probability of a state's involvement in a dispute over the economic value of territory
and over the ethnic and cultural association between the population of the challenger and
the claimed territory. Huth discovered that the military strength of the challenger was a
poor predictor of whether a state would became involved in a dispute, which the realist
model regards as a major factor.
Regarding domestic factors, Huth suggested that domestic politics played a major role
in many cases of dispute he studied. For example, the decision to contest a territory could
be linked to:
"political benefits of increased popular support and legitimacy when claims were
directed to achieving national unification, the recovery of lost national territory or
gaining access to valuable economic resources." (Huth 1996, p.183).
Goertz and Diehl (1992) studied territorial conflicts at two levels. First they studied
state formation, and attempted to explain how conflicts arise at this level, and secondly,
conflicts between two or more established states, which is of greater concern here. They
criticised the realist model and proposed another model for explaining conflicts between
states. They examined 160 cases of exchanges of homeland territories between states for
two periods, before 1914 and after 1914. They statistically tested the relationship between
the outbreak of military conflict and three main sets of variables, which are the relative
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capabilities of states (i.e. the ratio of iron/steel production and energy consumption), the
relative importance of territory (the size of contested territory), and the expansionist
pressures within states (population growth, economic growth, and prior territorial
expansion). They discovered that for many conflicts which occurred before 1914, the
relative capabilities of states (the ratio of their iron/steel production and energy
consumption), and the expansionist pressures (here population size and economic growth)
played a major role in the outbreak of conflicts between states during this era. In the post-
1914 period, however, they found that two factors are significant in causing conflicts: the
expansionist pressure (here population pressure and prior territorial expansion), and the
importance of territorial size.
From the previous two studies, we can summarise the most important factors that may
influence states to dispute territory. First, strategic location of the contested territory.
States are still concerned about their national security, therefore the more important a
territory is from the strategic point of view the more likely a state will be involved in a
dispute or conflict with its neighbour over that territory. For example, Iran's occupation
of the Tumbs and Abu-Musa islands in 1971 was allegedly for purposes of national
security.
Second, disputes can occur when valuable resources are available in the contested
territory, such as hydrocarbons, water, and fisheries. These resources have played a
prominent role in many current disputes. For instance, the dispute between Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over the Fasht Abu-Safah hexagon (settled in 1958). The Hawar Islands
dispute between Bahrain and Qatar is another example of dispute over what is sometime
believe to be economically valuable seabed (Anderson 1993). Third, domestic factors
within a state, such as seeking internal political support, play an important role, especially
when there is a prior dispute over a specific territory or when the challenger has lost
territory to another party. Several disputes that have arisen in South America, as Huth
(1996) concluded, support this argument. The territorial disputes between Argentina and
Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Bolivia and Chile are prime examples. All had a prolonged
period of dispute inspired in part by domestic politics:
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"The failure to maintain a claim to territory would have been portrayed by political
opposition as a major foreign policy setback for the current regime in power."
(Huth 1992, p.95).
As to the loss of territory by a challenger state, a good example is Argentina's dispute
with Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982. Island disputes often serve
as symbolic of national or regional rivalries. Conflicts may arise not just from the above
factors but from other factors, such as the ethnic and religious compositions of the
population of the claimed territory and their link to the population of the challenger state.
2.3.2 Conflicts associated with ethnic and religious factors
Hartshorne's classification of boundaries (Hartshorne 1936) into antecedent,
subsequent, and superimposed boundaries, represents a good framework to explain
territorial conflicts that relate to ethnic and religious divisions of a population. With a
superimposed boundary, the boundary line is laid down on an existing population and
divides them between two political entities. In this case, conflicts may arise between the
two neighbouring states over the territory that encompasses such a population. In fact,
since the Second World War, most international boundaries have been created "in spite of
ethnic distributions" (Pounds 1972, p.96). Some scholars suggested that as a solution to
boundary disputes involving ethnic groups, states should co-operate and reduce the
significance of their boundaries (Tagil eta! 1977, p. 166).
In the world today, many examples can be found of disputes involving ethnic factors.
Most states south the Sahara in Africa, although freed from colonial rule, had their
boundaries laid down by imperial powers without precise knowledge of the geographical
and cultural features of those areas. Consequently, once the imperial powers had
withdrawn from the area conflicts arose, even though the African Heads of States had
declared their willingness to accept the boundaries and territories they had inherited at the
time of independence (Griffiths 1995). One of many examples is the Horn of Africa
(Allcock eta! 1992). Irredentist movements represent a good example of ethnic conflicts,
when a group of people "trying to unite under one flag all districts where any particular
language is spoken" (Griffiths 1995, p.136). Somalia is a clear example of this
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movement. Conflicts associated with religion also exacerbate many territorial struggles
today as in Kashmir, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland (Anderson 1993).
2.3.3 Conflicts associated with historical legacy
In some parts of the world, colonial powers have withdrawn leaving behind boundaries
in areas amply endowed with natural resources. The former neutral zones between Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait represent a good example. Both zones were created between the
Saudi government and the British government on behalf of the Iraqis and Kuwaitis in
1922. As to the former neutral zone with Iraq, a diamond shaped area was created
between the two sides. The Uqair Convention stated that the two parties will enjoy equal
rights in that area for all purposes except using water resources for military purposes
(Melamid 1955). After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, "the question of the delimitation of
the neutral zone remained a potential source of dispute between the two states" (Allcock
et al 1992, p. 392). Later, in December 1981, the two governments signed an agreement
in Baghdad, defining and fixing the boundary line, and at the same time providing for the
equal division of the neutral zone (Allcock et al 1992) following a 1975 treaty to partition
the neutral zone.
The second neutral zone, between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was also created in 1922
by the Uqair Convention. This zone remained neutral for a period shorter than the first
one due to reports of oil discoveries in Khor Maqtah. This led the two sides to agree in
1965 to partition the zone equally. Each state's sovereignty was divided by an
international boundary over land territory only, while natural resources discovered in the
land territory of the former neutral zone were shared equally. In July 2000, the two sides
agreed to settle the disputed offshore territory of the former neutral zone. The previous
two example shows how these inherited boundaries were settled peacefully between the
two sides and, in fact, they may represent a model for solving disputes over territories
with similar characteristics: territories rich in natural resources and a scarce population.
One of the prime objectives of studying border conflicts is to explore the best practice
for resolving them peacefully. Scholars have therefore made almost as much effort to
understand the nature of peaceful interaction between neighbouring countries. Anything
which might enhance co-operation between adjacent countries may help prevent potential
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conflicts or resolve existing ones. In the following section, some theoretical models about
interactions between states are discussed, with particular focus on what they have to tell
us (if anything) about management objectives.
2.4 Theoretical models of trans-boundary interaction
Trans-boundary interaction is affected by various factors: geographical, political,
social, economic, and even psychological. The interaction also may take place at different
scales such as national government, local government, and individuals. Different types of
interaction have been studied by scholars to produce generalisations, but arguably the
three most prominent studies undertaken are: House's study of cross-frontier interaction
(1982), Soffer's study of interaction in hostile areas (1994), and Martinez's study of the
dynamics of the border interaction (1994). Each is examined below.
2.4.1 House's model
In an effort to explain cross-frontier interaction, John House produced an operational
model derived from approaches in international relations studies such as conflict in power
interaction, social communication, and systems analysis and linkages (House 1981,
1982). The model is empirical in nature and House attempted to apply it on the US-
Mexican border on the Rio Grande. This border is a unique case study of great economic
and social gradients across the border.
The main aim of this model is to understand how asymmetrical relationships between
two neighbouring countries affect all forms of interaction across the international
boundary. Therefore, this model is based on a thorough analysis of a wide range of
transactional flows of people, goods, services, capital, ideas, and policies across the Rio
Grande. These flows are aggregated and integrated in terms of structure, space, and time.
At the same time, House used a framework of perceptions, attitudes, policies and politics
to interpret the resulting flow patterns. Figure 2.2a illustrates the structural and temporal
dimensions of the model. The model starts with the evolution of the US-Mexican
boundary during different periods and how this evolution affected the characteristics of
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the land, people and economy. The differences in perceptions and attitudes of the three
major ethnic groups of people (Americans, Mexicans, Mexican-Americans or Chicanos)
who live on both sides of the border have been analysed. As House maintained, these
differences:
"affect the ways people think, act, identify with or against one another, and provide
the ground swell of continuity which politicians and policy-makers must take into
account. " (House 1982, p.11).
The major patterns of transaction flows are thoroughly discussed, such as water
management of the Rio Grande in terms of water allocation and pollution control.
Moreover, migration of people whether they are daily, weekly or seasonally and whether
they are legal or illegal have also been analysed. In his discussion of each pattern, House
explained how government policies and plans on each side of the border affected the
resulting patterns of transaction flows. He argued that all these transactions and policies
must be set within the political system of each country at all scales: federal, state and
local. The total interactions between all the elements of the model can be set within a
form of tension management which can have two behavioural results, conflict or co-
operation between the two countries involved. This result in turn has spatial and
structural impacts that may feed back into each element of the model as figure 2.2a
clearly illustrates.
The spatial dimension of this model, as shown in figure 2.2b, demonstrates the spatial
interaction of all the elements of the model at three levels: national or federal (A, B),
regional or provincial (Al, Bi), and frontier or local (Az, Bz). For example, House
analysed the trade patterns first at the national level, then at the regional and local levels
(House 1982, pp. 199-208).
House's ingenious model, however, has a limited application to our study of the Saudi
boundary management for three obvious reasons. First, the model is based on the
principle of asymmetry between two adjacent states as House stated himself (House
1981, p. 296; 1982, pp.8-9). This asymmetry is reflected in different fields: political,
economic, social and cultural, whereas the Saudi-GCC relationships, despite some
differences, share a high degree of symmetry. Second, the model is based on a frontier
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with a high-density population on either side, but the Saudi boundaries with its GCC
neighbours are characterised by a low-density population. Finally, this model is more
comprehensive in nature taking into account all transactional flows at all the scales of
federal (national), regional (provincial), and local (frontier), while this study is mainly
concerned about the forms of management practices that take place at the boundary line
itself.
2.4.2 Soffer's model
In his paper, Safer (1994) has examined the connections along the border between
adjacent states with a history of conflict between them. He used House's model as a tool
for examination, but he did not follow him in including all aspects of transaction flows
for there was insufficient data about those flows for his study area on the Israel-Lebanon
border. However, he selected the Israeli de facto border with Lebanon including the then
Israeli-occupied 'Security Zone', as the focus of his study. He also briefly examined the
Israeli de facto borders with Jordan and Syria. Soffer discussed the interaction of people,
trade, the use of infrastructure, and the government contacts across the border. The main
concept in his model is:
"Where there is a minority living on both sides of the border, ties should be
expected even if the border is sealed and hostile. " (Soffer 1994, p.188).
By this concept, he challenged Minghi (1991) who stated that interaction does not exist
along boundaries under threat of conflict or under stress of confrontation (Soffer 1994).
Soffer also explained that the connection along the hostile border is mainly based on
family ties and local trade. Moreover, he maintained that governments on both sides may
establish connections between them even if the situation at the border was violent, and
eventually this will prepare the ground for peace. He concluded in his paper that there is:
a correlation between the strength of the transborder connections and the size of
the minority population which lives on both sides of the border." (Safer 1994,
p.190).
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Figure 2.3: Soffer's model
Source: Soifer (1994).
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As figure 2.3 (a,b) illustrates, the interaction at the border with Syria within the
occupied Golan Heights as well as with Lebanon is limited because the size of the Golan
Druze minority group and the size of the Lebanese minority groups (i.e. Christians,
Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze) are relatively small on both sides. At the border with Jordan,
Soifer claimed that the connection there is greater because the size of minority groups,
which includes 1.5 million Palestinians on the West Bank and 1.5 million Palestinians on
the East Bank, is bigger (see figure 2.3c). Finally, Soffer also maintained that if a
Palestinian state is established in future, the connection between the Palestinians on the
Israeli side, which he estimated as one million, and the Palestinians in the future state,
which he estimated as one and a half million, would be greater than the previous three
cases (see figure 2.3d).
Soffer's model is difficult to apply to the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours for
it is based on hostile relations between the two neighbours, with substantial minorities on
either side, which is not the case here.
2.4.3 Martinez's model
Martinez (1994) argued that environmental and human conditions existing on both
sides of the border of any state either promote or inhibit cross-border ties. Based on this
premise, Martinez categorised borderland interactions into four progressive scenarios:
alienated borderlands, coexistent borderlands, interdependent borderlands, and integrated
borderlands (see figure 2.4). In the first scenario, alienated borderlands, the general
conditions of both neighbouring states are characterised, among other things, by political
disputes, ideological animosity, intense nationalism or even warfare, and thus this tense
atmosphere leads both countries to "militarisation and the establishment of rigid controls
over cross-border traffic." (Martinez 1994, p.2). The outcome of this condition makes
cross-border interactions of people and goods very difficult (see figure 2.4a). As an
example, Martinez mentioned the US-Mexico border during the nineteenth century.
In the second scenario, co-existent borderlands, the two antagonist neighbours reduce
the tension between them to a degree that allows a minimum level of border interaction to
take place (see figure 2.4b). Domestic conditions, such as regional fragmentation, may
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Figure 2.4: Martinez's model
a) Alienated borderlands b) Co-existent borderlands
c) Interdependent borderlands	 d) Integrated borderlands
Source: Martinez (1994).
e) Eliminated borderlands
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also limit the cross-border interactions. In this situation, Martinez maintained, a state will
be involved in a unification process for all its territory, thus it will not encourage
substantive interactions at the border to occur until the unification process is completed.
He gave examples of this borderland model as Ecuador-Peru, and the former USSR-
China. Both cases significantly reached peace agreements in recent time Equador-Peru in
1998 and China-Russia in 1999.
In the third scenario, the interdependent borderlands, the two states maintain good and
stable relationships to a degree that the economies of their respective borderlands are
'symbiotically' linked (see figure 2.4c). In this situation the two states will allow more
interactions and flow of people, capital, and goods across their borders and:
"the greater the flow of economic and human resources across the border, the more
the two economies will be structurally bonded to each other. " (Martinez 1994, p.4).
The ideal situation is when the two states are symmetrical in their social, political, and
economic systems, so they both get equal benefits from each other. US-Mexico
borderland perhaps represents a good example of this model.
In the fourth scenario, the integrated borderlands, the two neighbouring countries:
"eliminate all major political differences between them and existing barriers to
trade and human movement across their mutual boundaries." (Martinez 1994, p.5).
Cross-border interaction increases and the two economies become integrated. This
stage cannot be reached, as stressed by Martinez, until both states willingly relinquish a
significant degree of their sovereignty (see figure 2.4d). Martinez pointed out that for lack
of data it is difficult to give a good example of this model, but he suggested that Western
Europe is most likely to represent such a situation.
A fifth scenario may be proposed, which Martinez did not mention, which is the
eliminated border. At this stage, two or more neighbouring countries find themselves
sharing common objectives, cultures, and national aspirations and decide to join together
in a form of political unity. Therefore, they diminish their common international
boundaries and the two states become one political unit (see figure 2.4e). Of course, new
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borderlands may emerge at the fringes of this new state with its neighbours. Arguably
some states in the European Union are heading in this direction.
Other authors have similarly identified progression from closed to integrated
borderlands, although their terminology differs from Martinez, including Momoh (1989),
Suarez-Villa et al (1992), and Goonerate and Mosselman (1996). All share the view that
it is most desirable to achieve integrated borderlands (see table 2.1), and the assumption
is made that management is primarily designed to move boundaries towards this status
(Hocicnell 1998). Beyond this, no theories appear to have been formulated concerning
boundary management. This is primarily because this subject is new and unexplored, and
requires more empirical study in order to make some generalisations about management
practices. This study is a step along this long road.
2.5 Conclusion
Although conflicts may arise between neighbouring states for a variety of reasons, there
is still a great opportunity for co-operation between countries, provided good well is
existed, and the interactions across international boundaries represent not just a good
example but a desirable one. Martinez's model is probably the most useful in relations to
boundary management. It suggests that there is a clear connection between each of the
four scenarios he proposed and the most important management activities discussed in
this thesis (see table 2.2).
An interesting question is how far the requirements of good management can be used to
bring states from the alienated borderland scenario to the integrated borderland scenario.
Most boundaries seem to be making the journey slowly and painfully from one to the
other, and the more they progress the more the management tasks will multiply.
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Table 2.2: The connection between Martinez's model and management activities
..
Management Tasks
-a4)
74aa
..a4)
-2
u
....
=4)
.0
aa
.a
...a
'U44
v4)
aa 
a
la'
I . •
.0Q
Irs
a
1
Political and legal management X 1 1 / X
Access for people and goods / 1. 1 I X
Security management 1 I I I X
Resources management* X X 1 1 X
Environment management* X X I 1 X
Crisis management* X X X / X
* Not studied in this thesis.
Source: The author.
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Chapter Three
Geographical Setting and Historical Background
3.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies first the significant geographical features of eastern Saudi
Arabia, such as climate, topography and population. Such factors are of fundamental
importance to boundary definition and management. Then the chapter examines the
major historical events of the earlier decades of the twentieth century that are pertinent to
the shaping of the present Saudi state and its boundaries with its GCC neighbours.
Saudi Arabia is a vast country with an approximate area of 2.5 million square
kilometres (772,200 square miles), which represents about 80% of the total area of the
Arabian Peninsula. At its furthest extents, the country lies between the latitudes 32° N
and 18° N, and between the longitudes 35° E and 55° E (approximately 1800 km (1100
miles) North-South; and 2100 km (1300 miles) East-West). In terms of climate, the
Kingdom is located within the tropical dry region, as can be seen in figure 3.1, the Tropic
of Cancer (23.5° N) passes approximately through the middle of the country. Indeed this
location has a conspicuous effect on climate, soil and vegetation.
On the other hand, the relative location of Saudi Arabia has given it a great importance
in the past as well as at present. The Arabian Gulf to the East was important in the past as
it is today, for it was a main route for trade from India to the Arab countries, Iran and
Turkey. Today, of course, its importance mainly lies in the hydrocarbon resources
embedded on the two sides of the Gulf. The Red Sea to the West was, and still serves as,
a main route for international trade via the Suez Canal. This location has affected the
political, economic and social positions of Saudi Arabia for over 60 years from its
creation in 1932 until present.
3.2 Geographical setting
As mentioned above geographical features have a prominent impact on land boundary
definition process as well as their management. Classic boundary experts, such as
Holdich (see Chapter 2), preferred boundaries that follow physical features such as
mountains and rivers. This view seems to have been agreed by the British Commissioners
in the Arabian Gulf area who were responsible for drawing most of its boundaries in the
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early twentieth century. However, the only boundary that can be regarded as a natural
boundary is that section between Iraq and Kuwait which follows Wadi Al-Batin bed (see
figure 3.5). Another shorter boundary section which is the western sector of the Kuwaiti-
Saudi boundary which follows a shallow depression called Al-Shaq. The Iraq-Saudi
boundary line, although it does not follow physical features like wadis or mountains, was
defined as straight lines linking some prominent physical features such as wadis and
rocky hills (Schofield 1994,p. 16). Most other boundaries in Arabia are in fact artificial,
and due largely to the topographic character of the region which mainly consists of sand
dunes and low lands.
It is not just topography that affects boundary making but also climate, population and
settlement can have a clear impact on boundaries, as will be shown in more details below.
3.2.1 Climate
The location of Saudi Arabia on the Tropic of Cancer has sharply affected its climatic
conditions, which is generally characterised as a hot and dry climate. An examination of
temperatures in some selected cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia (see figure 3.2a),
shows that the average maximum temperature during the summer (from May-August)
exceeds 40°C in Hafar Albatin, Dhahran and Al Hasa. The temperature in Dhahran tends
to be lower than in the other two cities due to maritime effects.
During winter (December-March), the average maximum temperature in the three cities
ranges between 19°C and 27°C. The lowest temperature is in Hafar Albatin which is 19°
C, because it lies at a higher latitude than the other two cities, besides its inland location
and distance from maritime effects (see figure 3.1). Comparison of these temperature
patterns with the temperature patterns in some selected GCC cities (see figure 3.2b),
shows that almost the same pattern prevails in Kuwait City, Manama, Abu Dhabi and Al-
Ain, except in Manama where the average maximum temperature during the summer is
below 40°C. This can be attributed to maritime effects, for Bahrain is an island and its
total area is very small (about 700 square km = 270 square mile.).
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This overall pattern of temperature has its effects on human activities in the Gulf area.
For example, it has affected agricultural activity in terms of types of crops suitable for
cultivation. Historically, dates have been the most suitable crop. However, developments
in agricultural technology have made it possible to overcome climate constraints and
plant a number of other crops such as vegetables, some grains, and fodder, especially in
Saudi Arabia.
In respect to rainfall, the eastern part of Saudi Arabia receives much of its rain from
January to April. This can be attributed to the effect of a Mediterranean regime of rains,
which prevails during the winter and affects most of the northern and eastern parts of
Saudi Arabia (Bindagji 1981). The amount of rain can reach as high as 53 mm in Hafar
Albatin in April (see figure 3.3a). Scattered rainfall in November and December in Hafar
Albatin does not exceed 24 mm. However, the rainfall pattern is not constant every year,
and periods of drought occur from time to time (Bindagji 1981). The rainfall pattern in
the selected GCC cities is almost the same with a few exceptions (see figure 3.3b). Most
of the rainfall occurs from January to March, and the amount reaches as high as almost 80
mm in Al-Ain city in U.A.E in April. In the same city, little rain falls between June and
August, not exceeding 12 mm. The average annual rainfall in the eastern part of Saudi
Arabia is about 85 mm in Dhahran and about 105 mm in the interior parts of the eastern
Saudi Arabia (Bindagji 1981). The average annual rainfall in Kuwait is about 130 mm, in
Bahrain about 22 mm and in U.A.E is about 70 mm (KMP 1998; BCSO 1991; ADP
1996).
A result of this pattern of rainfall is that there are no permanent surface streams in any
GCC country, which impacts significantly on water resources. Demand for water for all
purposes are met from two main sources: underground water and desalinated seawater.
Another effect of this pattern is on grazing activities in the area. Bedouin have long
depended on rain for pasturing their livestock, moving their flocks considerable distances
to where there is grazing. Thus, several arrangements between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Oman, and the U.A.E have been undertaken to regulate the movements of Bedouin across
the international boundaries. The Oman-Saudi 1990 treaty was regarded as somewhat of a
landmark for the way in which boundary movement for watering and pasturage were
facilitated (The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990). Accordingly, following the
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rainy season when there is plenty of natural grass in Saudi Arabia, Bedouin from Kuwait,
Oman and the U.A.E. are allowed to cross the border to pasture their animals. Specific
check-points have been designated for this purpose, as shown in Chapter seven.
Moreover, as a result of this pattern of rains, ephemeral flows of wadis became a
feature of this arid region. Thus, any constructions of dams on those wadis, especially if
they are near the borders, could have a great effect on ground water aquifers which
straddle the boundary between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, and on surface water
resources further downstream.
3.2.2 Topography
The western littoral of the Arabian Gulf is generally low altitude land: 0-300 metres
(see figure 3.4). The relief consists mainly of sand dunes, such as Al-Jafurah, which lies
west of Salwa, and some marsh lands such as Sabkhat Matti which lies east of the
northern sector of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary. Security management at the border is
powerfully influenced by topography. As interviews revealed with some Saudi Border
Guards officials, they regarded sand dunes as a negative factor that affecting their patrols
and operations along the borders (see Chapter 7 for more details).
3.2.3 Population and settlement
Although the population of Saudi Arabia is dispersed, a large proportion is concentrated
in the main urban centres such as Riyadh, the capital, Jeddah and Makkah in the western
part, and Dammam in the eastern region (see table 3.1). The total population of Saudi
Arabia estimated at the last census in September 1992 was about 16,900,000 people, of
whom about 4,600,000(27%) are non-Saudi (see table 3.1). The population of the eastern
part of Saudi Arabia is estimated at about 2,600,000 people, 15% of the total population
in 1992, which ranked third among the provinces. Most of them are concentrated in the
northern part of the eastern province, north of Salwa Gulf (see figure 3.1).
The following border cities rank amongst the highest in terms of population
(100,000): Dammam (19%) of eastern province population, Al-Khubar (6%), Hafar
Albatin (5%), as shown in table 3.2. The remaining Saudi border towns and cities have
populations smaller than 100,000. Those cities are as follows from the north at the border
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with Kuwait to the south near the border with U.A.E.: Al-Rigai, Alkhafji, Dhahran, and
Salwa (see figure 3.1 and table 3.2). These figures indicate that although the border areas
tend to be less populated, especially the border with the U.A.E., the border cities with
Bahrain are the most populous, the major cities Dammam and Al-Khubar having
populations greater than 100,000.
Table 3.1: Population in Saudi Arabia's main provinces in 1992
Provinces Saudi Non-Saudi Total
Makkah 2,780,458 1,683,676 4,464,134
Riyadh 2,613,228 1,217,694 3,830,922
Eastern 1,898,462 670,094 2,568,556
Other Provinces 5,013,743 1,053,270 6,067,013
Total 12,305,891 4,624,734 16,930,625
Source: The Saudi Ministry of finance and National Economy, The Preliminary Results of
Population Census in 1992.
Table 3.2: Border cities and towns in the eastern province in 1992
City Saudi Non-Saudi Total
Dammam
-
303,535 178,786 482,321
Al-Khubar 55,838 85,845 141,683
Hafar Albatin 102,539 35,254 137,793
Dhahran 52,523 21,168 73,691
Alkhafji 40,872 8,857 49,729
Salwa 3,334 903 4,237
Al-rigai 2,480 254 2,734
Source: The Saudi Ministry of finance and National Economy, The Preliminary Results of
Population Census in 1992.
Dammam alone has a population of about half a million, most of them Saudi nationals.
This is because Dammam is the capital of the Eastern Province, and most businesses and
services are concentrated there. Together, the population of Dammam, Al-Khubar and
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Dhahran totals approximately 700,000, which represents about 27% of the population of
the Eastern Province.
3.3 Historical background
From the ninth century through to the middle of the eighteenth century, the Arabian
Peninsula was politically unstable. Despite the fact that the Ottomans were able to gain
control over the western and eastern fringes of the Peninsula from the fifteenth century
onwards (Goldberg 1986), the inner part of the Peninsula, which is Najd, was largely
autonomous except from some nominal allegiance to the Ottomans from time to time
(Leatherdale 1983). During the early eighteenth century, the general situation in Najd was
characterised by a disintegrated tribalism, hostility and antagonism prevailing in the
relationships between tribes. Moreover, poverty, illiteracy and superstition determined
and dominated the lives that people led, not just in Najd, but throughout most of Arabia
(Bindagji 1981). In a small town in Najd called Uyainah, a man called Shaikh
Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab (1703-92), a religious reformer, was resentful to the
situation and started to preach to his people the teachings of Islam as revealed from its
original sources, such as the Koran and the Hadith. In the beginning, his townspeople
confronted him with displeasure, and in 1745 he was compelled to leave the town and
headed to Dariyah, south of Uyainah (see figure 3.1), where its emir Mohammed Bin
Saud welcomed him and offered him hospitality. Shailch Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab
was able to convince Mohammed Bin Saud about his mission, and the latter made a
covenant with the Shaikh to support him and to carry out his mission. This alliance
between the two men marked the creation of the first Saudi state in 1745 (Al-Othaimeen
1995). This new state started to expand gradually, and by the end of eighteenth century, it
was able to control almost all Arabia, and for the first time for centuries, the Arabian
Peninsula was again under one central authority.
The Ottomans were unhappy about the Saudi control and saw it as a threat to their
empire, especially when this control extended beyond central Arabia and reached
territories under their control such as Iraq, Syria and Hijaz. Therefore, they started to
fight against it, and :
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"Accordingly, Sultan Mahmud II requested Muhammed Ali, the newly rising viceroy of
Egypt, to undertake the expulsion of the Wahhabi invaders from Hejaz. The first expedition
left Egypt for Arabia in 1811 under the command of Tuson, Muhammed Au 's son. In
October 1812 the Egyptian force astonished the Wahhabis by conquering Medina and
killing more than 1500 people. Three months later, Mecca, Jidda, and Taif were also
recovered..." (Goldberg 1986, p.14).
The Ottomans continued their efforts to demolish the Saudi state and in 1818, Ibrahim
Pasha, another son of Mohammed Ali, reached Dariya and after a six-month siege he
destroyed it completely using artillery. At the same time, he captured Abdullah Bin Saud,
the Saudi leader and a grand son of Mohammed Bin Saud, and sent him to
Constantinople where he was beheaded (Goldberg 1986). The fall of Dariyah marked the
end of the first Saudi state.
Six years later, in 1828 Abullah's cousin Turki Bin Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud
(see Appendix XVI) regained control over Najd, and his son Faisal succeeded him after a
few confrontations with Mohammed Mi. By 1843 he had gained control over most of the
peninsula. After Faisal's death in 1865, his son Abdullah succeeded him. However,
Abdullah's rule did not last for long, because his brother Saud contested his authority.
The quarrels between the two brothers led to the disintegration of the second Saudi state.
Another son of Faisal, Abdulrahman, ruled after the death of his brother Saud for a short
period. Under his rule, in 1891, Riyadh the Saudi capital fell into the hands of
Mohammed Bin Rasheed, a leader of the Slunmar tribe in Hail, and this marked the end
of Al Saud's reign again. Bin Rasheed appointed a man called Ajlan to govern Riyadh in
his name. Abdulralunan chose voluntarily to leave Riyadh with a number of his family
among whom was his son AbdulAziz (Ibn Saud) who was ten years old. They went first
to Bahrain and Qatar, before settling in Kuwait, where its Emir Shaikh Mubarak Al
Subah welcomed his guests and offered them a safe refuge in Kuwait (Almana 1980).
It should be noted that during the first and second Saudi states the Islamic concept of
state predominated the expansionist process of those states. Unlike the Western concept
of state, the concept of state in Islam does not entail a defined territorial limit. However,
the two Saudi states could not expand any further because, among other factors, they
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were confronted by foreign powers, such as the Ottomans, which blocked their progress.
The third Saudi state confronted almost the same situation, as will be discussed below.
3.3.1 Creation of Saudi Arabia
The aim of this section is not to give a full account of historical events, but rather to
shed some light on how the territory of Saudi Arabia expanded gradually until it reached
its present shape and size. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Arabian peninsula was
ruled in its western part or Hijaz by the Sherif Husain, while the eastern part, or Al Hasa,
was under direct Ottoman control. Najd and northern Arabia were under the rule of the Al
Rasheed family. The south-western parts of Arabia, or Asir and Jizan, were under the rule
of two families called Al Aidh and Al Adarisah respectively. Abdulaziz Bin
Abdulrahrnan (Ibn Saud) decided to leave Kuwait in 1902, telling nobody except his
father about his objective. Accompanied by sixty men on whose loyalty he could trust, he
headed towards Riyadh. His objective was to recapture the capital of his ancestors' state
from the Al Rasheed family. In mid January 1902, Ibn Saud was able to gain control of
Riyadh and killed Ajlan its Emir (Almana 1980; McLoughlin 1993). The capture of
Riyadh was so important because of its strategic location in the centre of Najd, and also
for its historical importance to Ibn Saud himself; as it was the capital of the second Saudi
state. The area of Riyadh at the time was not more than 650 metres by 650 metres (700
yards by 700 yards) (McLoughlin 1993).
Ibn Saud used Riyadh as his base and started to expand the territory under his control.
First he headed south of Riyadh and seized control over Al-kharj, Al-hotah and Wadi
Addawasir (see figure 3.1). In 1903, Ibn Saud with the assistance of the emir of Kuwait,
Shaikh Mubaralc, started an expedition to Al-Qasim region north of Riyadh, a region rich
because of its agricultural resources. By the summer of 1904, Ibn Saud controlled most of
Al-Qasim. Between 1904 and 1913, Ibn Saud fought several battles, amongst which the
battle of Rawdat Al-Muhanna against his adversary Abdulaziz Al Rasheed is the most
important, and which ended in victory for Ibn Saud and the killing of Bin Rasheed in the
spring of 1906 (McLoughlin 1993). During this period, Ibn Saud was able to control most
of the Najd region except Hail, which lies north of Al-Qasim (Almana 1980).
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On 8 May 1913, Ibn Saud with a force of about 300 men, most of them from Ilchwan,
attacked Al Hufuf (centre of Al Hasa region) which had a Turkish garrison with 1200
men. The attack was sudden and at night, and the Turks surrendered without resistance.
The fall of Al Hufuf led to the fall of all Al Hasa region and left territory "from south of
Kuwait right down to the north of Qatar" (Almana 1980, p. 56) under Ibn Saud's control.
In fact, seizing Al Hasa gave Ibn Saud access to the Arabian Gulf for the first time, and
the Najd was no longer landlocked. Moreover, this victory drew the attention of Britain to
Ibn Saud (McLoughlin 1993).
The period from 1913 to 1919 witnessed several important events such as World War I,
the Anglo-Ottoman convention in 1913, and the Anglo-Saudi treaty in 1915. However,
Ibn Saud gained no more territory until 1921 when he conquered Hail after a bloodless
siege. In the following year, Ibn Saud was able to capture Al-Jawf, which lies north to
Hail, and by 1922, Ibn Saud's territory reached north as far as Wadi Sirhan (the southern
fringes of Transjordan), north east to Iraq and Kuwait, and south down to the northern
fringes of Rub Al-lchali. After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, Britain gained
control over most of the Gulf from Kuwait down to the Trucial coast, as well as over Iraq,
Jordan and Palestine. This new geopolitical setting of the region was crucial in defining
the territorial limits of Saudi Arabia with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and U.A.E..
Between 1920 and 1932, Hejaz, Asir, Jezan, and Najran all fell under Saudi
sovereignty. In September 1932, the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was
declared, and Ibn Saud was announced as its King. In 1934, King Abdulaziz signed the
Taif boundary agreement with Yemen, the third boundary agreement that he reached with
his neighbours. The first boundary agreement was in 1922 between him and Britain on
behalf of Iraq and Kuwait, as will be discussed in the following section, and the second
was in 1925, which partially defined the Kingdom's northern limits with Transjordan.
The following sections will discuss the development of the three Saudi boundaries with
Kuwait, Bahrain, and U.A.E, but before proceeding, two important treaties need a brief
discussion. These two treaties, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention in 1913, and the Anglo-
Saudi Treaty in 1915, were important in the Saudi eastern frontier disputes with its GCC
neighbours, especially the one with U.A.E.
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3.3.2 The 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention
Before World War I, Turkey controlled Mesopotamia, Palestine, Kuwait, Al Hasa
region in the eastern Saudi Arabia, and Hejaz region on the west and Yemen. At that
time, Turkey was also discussing with Germany the idea of establishing a railway line
from Basra to Berlin, which was known as the "Baghdad Railway". This matter was a
source of much concern to Britain, which was worried about two main issues, her trade
interests, and her strategic position in the Gulf area which it wanted to protect as a
"British Lake" in Curzon's famous words. Therefore, the British government engaged in
a series of negotiations from 1911 to 1913 with the Ottomans to settle various
outstanding problems between them (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia 1955;
Schofield and Blake 1988; Wilkinson 1991). On 29 July 1913, they reached a final
agreement, when the two parties signed three draft conventions accompanied by several
declarations. The three drafts concerned three main questions: the Baghdad Railway, the
situation in the Arabian Gulf; and navigation on the Shalt al-Arab (Wilkinson 1991).
Although the three issues were interrelated, the second one, which is related to the
situation in the Arabian Gulf; is the most important one to our study.
In the draft convention related to the Arabian Gulf; the two sides agreed to 17 articles
on three main areas. They defined territorial limits for Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain as well
as some other issues pertinent to these three entities. Second, they agreed on measures
concerning navigation, maritime police, and quarantine measures in the Arabian Gulf.
Third, they agreed on the provision of a committee for the settlement of boundaries.
In Part I of the Convention, which is concerned with Kuwait, the two sides agreed to
define the territorial limits for Kuwait as stated in Articles 5, and 7. In Article 5, they first
defined a territory where the Shaikh of Kuwait exercised direct control within a semi-
circle with the town of Kuwait in the centre, and called the Red Line (see figure 3.5). The
northern extremity of this limit is Khur al-Zubair, and at the southern extremity is al-
Qurayyin. The Article also included the islands of Warbah, Failkah, Awhah, al-Kubr, al-
Magta, Qaru and Unun al-Maradim together with the adjacent islets and waters within the
previous limit.
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Figure 3.5: Kuwait limits according to the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention
Source: After Schofield (1993), with some modifications.
Chapter 3	 83
In Article 7, they defmed an outer limit to the previous one, which was recognised as
within the dependence of the Shaikh of Kuwait who could collect zakat or tribute from
the tribes lying within this limit which starts from Khur al-Zubair in the northwest and
ends at a point on the Gulf. This line was marked on the map as the Green Line (see
figure 3.5). The course of the line as stated in Article 7:
"Article 7: The limits of the territory referred to in the preceding article are fixed as
follows: The demarcation line begins on the coast at the mouth of Khur-al-Zubair in the
north west and crosses immediately south of Umm-Qasr, Safwan and Jabal Sanam, in such
a way as to leave to the vilayet of Basrah these locations and their wells, arriving at the al-
Batin, it follows it towards the south west until Hafr-al-Batin which it leaves on the same
side as Kuwait, from that point on the line in question goes south east leaving to the wells
of al-Safah, al-Garaa, al-Haba, al-Warbah and Antaa, reaching the sea near Jabal
Munifa." (from Schofield and Blake 1988, p.390).
In fact, the Green Line was to become a source of dispute between Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, as will be shown below.
Part II of the Convention was dedicated to Al-Qatar (Qatar) and discussed, among other
matters, the limit of what was called the Ottoman Sanjak of Najd. In Article 11, the two
sides agreed that the northern limit of the Sanjak is indicated by the defined line in the
previous Article 7, and it ends in the south on the Gulf at a point facing al-Zakhnuniah
Island. A straight line beginning from this point runs directly southwards until it reaches
Rub Al-Khali (see figure 3.6). This line, which was called the Blue Line would:
"separate the Najd from the peninsula of al- Qatar. The limits of the Najd are indicated by
a blue line on the map annexed to the present convention." (from Schofield and Blake
1988, p. 391).
The Blue line was later (1934-1955) used as a legal argument by the British in the
territorial disputes between Saudi Arabia and Britain on behalf of the Shaikhs of the
Trucial Coast, as will be discussed in more detail below.
In Part ifi of the Convention, the two sides agreed matters on Bahrain Islands,
important among which was the renouncing of the Ottomans of their claims to the islands
of Bahrain, including the two islands of Lubaynat al-Aliya (al-Kabirah) and Lubaynah al-
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Safliya (al-Saghirah). It is notable that no maritime limit was defined precisely at this
time between Bahrain and the said Sanjak of Najd.
It is worth mentioning here, that this convention, as well as the remaining two
conventions, were never ratified as agreed. This non-ratification affected the legal
soundness of the convention. Also, as revealed in the previous section, Ibn Saud in May
1913, three months before the signing of the convention, was able to evict the Turks from
Al Hasa region and created, a new de facto situation which affected the British attitude
towards Ibn Saud and made them adopt a new policy towards him (Wilkinson 1991). Ibn
Saud was anxious that the Turks might take revenge and attack him from the sea. He was,
therefore, eager for a treaty with the British offering him the protection he desired.
Equally, Britain needed the assistance of Ibn Saud to participate in the war efforts against
the Ottomans (Troeller 1976). These factors, among others, contributed to the signing of
the first Anglo-Saudi Treaty at Darin in December 1915.
3.3.3 The 1915 Darin Anglo-Saudi Treaty
In an oasis called Darin, south of Al Hasa region, on 26 December 1915, Ibn Saud and
Sir Percy Cox signed a treaty with seven articles. In Article I of the treaty, Britain
recognised the sovereignty of Ibn Saud over Najd, Al Hasa, Qatif, and Jubail and their
dependencies as follows:
"The British Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, El Hassa, Qatif and Jubail,
and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed later and determined
hereafter, and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the countries of Bin Saud
and of his fathers before him, and do hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the
independent Ruler thereof and absolute Chief of their tribes..." (from Troeller 1976, p.
254).
The above Article was the most important one in the treaty. The remaining articles are
also important but they covered issues such as defending Ibn Saud from any aggression,
alienation of territory, and renunciation of relations with foreign powers. Moreover,
Wilkinson noted that the treaty illustrates:
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"how the nature of the territorial understandings was reached, and how wording arose that
was later to become of fundamental importance in the frontier dispute.." (Wilkinson 1991,
p.134).
Regarding of its wording, two main phrases can be highlighted from the above Article,
which are that the mentioned territories will be "determined hereafter", and the other
phrase that those mentioned territories are "of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him".
The first phrase is very general and does not defme any limits of those territories, leaving
that for the future. The second phrase tacitly accepts the territorial limits of the past two
Saudi States. The importance of this will be shown later when discussing the Buraimi
dispute. The 1915 Treaty was presumed to have superseded the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman
non-ratified Convention.
The Saudi boundaries with Kuwait, Bahrain and U.A.E. developed gradually through
time from 1922 to 1974. In the following sections, a brief discussion of these boundaries
traces their development.
3.3.4 Development of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary
People in the Arabian Peninsula never knew the western-style of defined territory until
1922, although there were some concepts of territoriality among the Bedouin tribes called
in Arabic dira which means 'home land'. In this concept, each tribe has an area where it
can graze its herds of livestock (Wilkinson 1994). The territorial arrangements that were
agreed in 1922 were preceded by several events, among which were tensions in relations
between Ibn Saud and the Shaikhs of Kuwait, and Ikhwan raids on Kuwait and Iraq. A
dispute arose between Ibn Saud and Shaikh Mubarak when the latter gave sanctuary to
the Ajman tribe, which was inimical to Ibn Saud at that time. The dispute worsened when
Salim, Mubarak's son, succeeded him in 1917 and started to claim all the territories
within the Green Line, which had been defined by the Anglo-Ottoman 1913 Convention.
Ibn Saud counterclaimed all the territory up to the walls of Kuwait City on the grounds
that:
"he had no cognizance of the 1913 Convention and that the tribes in the Southern region
had, since 1914 or thereabout, been under his control, not under that of the Shaikh of
Kuwait." (from Schofield 1990, p.618).
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Friction occurred between the two sides, and Ikhwan raided Kuwait and inflicted heavy
losses on the Kuwaitis in Al-Jahra, west of Kuwait City (Wilkinson 1991). The Ikhwan
also raided Iraq several times. Sir Percy Cox, British Commissioner in Iraq, decided to
put an end to these troubles and invited Ibn Saud to attend a conference in Muhammarah
(a town near Basrah, south of Iraq) on 5 May 1922. The two sides, Ibn Saud and Percy
Cox on behalf of the Iraq government, signed the Treaty of Muhammarah, which:
"allocated the tribes as Cox decreed and agreed to form a commission to determine
ownership of resources in order to fix a frontier." (Wilkinson 1991, p.134).
At another conference in Uqair in December 1922, Ibn Saud was invited again by Cox
to the conference and the two parties, after a long discussion, concluded an agreement
which was considered as a protocol to the Muhammarah Treaty. The protocols of Uqair
defined for the first time boundary lines between Najd and both Iraq and Kuwait, and
created the two famous neutral zones between Najd and Iraq and Kuwait (see figure 4.2).
These newly introduced territorial arrangements, especially the one with Iraq, had
significantly affected tribal mobility in the area. These arrangements were criticised by
Dickson, a British politician who attended the conference, who said:
"without them [i.e. the boundary lines] the friction with Iraq culminating in the Ikhwan
rebellion might have been avoided, as too the fourteen years' agony of the Kuwait
blockade." (Wilkinson 1991, p. 145).
He also added that those boundary lines:
"restricting the annual natural migrations of Najd tribes towards the north...diverting his
people from their old and time-honoured communication with Iraq and Kuwait, trying
instead to force them to get their necessities of life and daily requirements from Uqair,
Qatif and Jubail his ports on the Persian Gulf" (Wilkinson 1991, p. 145).
Therefore, as there was no consideration the tribal realities of the desert, tensions
continued to arise between Ibn Saud and his neighbours, especially Kuwait. It is worth
noting here that after the 1922 agreement, relations between the two sides worsened
especially after the 'blockade' exercised by Najd over Kuwait. Until 1922, Najd
depended mainly on Kuwait to import most of its necessary and luxury goods, and there
were only a few imports coming through the Najdi ports of Uqair, Qatif, and Al-Jubail.
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When the hijra's of the Ikhwan scattered in the territory near Kuwait, the Najdi
government could not establish checkpoints to collect duties on the goods brought from
Kuwaiti ports. Therefore, Ibn Saud requested from the Shaikh of Kuwait to agree on
establishing a check-point at the new borders between the two countries to collect duties,
but the Shaikh refused the request as it would affect the autonomy of Kuwait. Ibn Saud
found himself in a position to ban trade with Kuwait, and transferred all import
transactions to his ports in Uqair, Qatit and Al-Jubail. These ports flourished after this
action, and Kuwait suffered as a result (Zirkely 1997, footnote p.472). The blockade
started in 1920, but in 1942 the two countries decided to resolve their outstanding
problems and signed three agreements in Jeddah 011 20 April 1942. The agreements were
called the Friendship and Neighbourly Agreement, the Trade Agreement, and the
Extradition of Offenders Agreement (Brown 1963). The first two agreements regulated
the movement of people and goods, especially the Bedouin, across the boundary and
ended the economic blockade of Kuwait. The third agreement regulated matters
concerning the extradition of criminals, and stated in its Article 8 that the provisions of
the agreement shall apply to the Neutral Zone and stipulated in Paragraph 1 that:
"Where an offence, as defined in Article 3 of this agreement, has been committed in either
of the two territories and the offender has fled to the Neutral Zone, the offender shall be
deemed to be still within the territory in which the offence was committed, and may be
arrested and tried by the Government thereof" (from Schofield and Blake 1988, p. 256).
The remaining two Paragraphs of Article 8 stipulated the conditions which decided
when an offence has been committed within the Neutral Zone. From this period on,
relations started to improve between the two sides, and in 1965, the two countries decided
to partition the Neutral Zone (see Chapter 4) in terms of sovereignty, but each side would
retain half of the net revenue of the extracted hydrocarbons.
3.3.5 Development of the Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary
Disputes arose between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the late 1930s with the negotiation
of oil concessions. Saudi Arabia protested against Bahrain for erecting some marks on the
two islands Lubayna Al-Khabirah (Greater Lubaynah) and Lubaynah Al-Sagherah
(Smaller Lubaynah), which lie half way between the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain main Island, and claimed sovereignty over these islands (see Schofield and Blake
Chapter 3	 88
1988, pp.3-74 and Schofield 1990, pp.107-237). In addition, in 1941 the Bahrain
Petroleum Company was granted a concession for oil exploitation in several areas, among
which was Fasht Abu-Safah. Saudi Arabia remonstrated against this action, and drilling
was suspended (Amin 1981).
The two parties began a series of negotiations. The first round was held in London in
August 1951 between the then Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal and the British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to discuss three main issues, the south-east land
boundaries of Saudi Arabia with its adjacent states, the division of submarine areas and
the ownership of islands, reefs and shoals between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and Saudi
Arabia-Kuwait islands (Schofield 1990, pp.153-154). Saudi Arabia's claims over the two
islands and Fasht Abu-Safah were based on the principle of the proximity of those areas
to the Saudi coastline, whilst the British side based their claims on the principles of
historical ownership and traditional usage. In the negotiation, Saudi Arabia proposed that
"Bainah-as-Saghir [Lubaynah Al-Sagherah] Island and Fasht- al-Jarim and Rennie shoals
should be acknowledged as the property of Bahrain, while the Bainah-al-Kabir [Lubaynah
Al-Kabirah] and Fasht-bu-Sa fa shoals should be acknowledged as the property of Saudi
Arabia." (from Schofield 1990, p. 217).
The British side rejected this proposition and suggested that both islands and Fasht
Abu-Safah should go to Bahrain, but Saudi Arabia also rejected this offer and
negotiations ended without reaching an agreement. In 1954, the two sides agreed to
divide the Fasht Abu-Safah into two parts, a western part belonging to Saudi Arabia and
an eastern part to belong to Bahrain (Amin 1981), and each party having 50% of the oil
revenue extracted from the area (Schofield and Blake 1988). However, this agreement
later failed because the two sides declined to "agree on a principle for drawing the
dividing line of the Fasht" (Amin 1981, p.100). Eventually, on 22 February 1958, the two
sides signed an agreement defining the limit of their maritime boundary. In this
agreement, discussed in detail below in Chapter four, Lubaynah Al-Kabirah Island was
given to Saudi Arabia and Lubaynah Al-Sagherah was given to Bahrain. Sovereignty
over Fasht Abu-Safah was assigned to Saudi Arabia, but at the same time the revenue of
the extracted oil in the Fasht triangle would be divided between the two countries.
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3.3.6 Development of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary
The saga of the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and the imperial power of
Britain on behalf of its protégés in the south-western coast of the Arabian Gulf was one
of the most dramatic in the history of boundary drawing in Arabia in the first half of the
twentieth century. It took from 1934 to 1974 before it was settled, and witnessed intense
events between 1949 and 1956, from the use of force by Britain in 1955, to the break
down of Anglo-Saudi relations in 1956 following the triple-invasion of Egypt. Many
works have been written about it, among the best known are those of Kelly (1964), Al-
Shamalan (1987), and Wilkinson (1991). The last two works are more balanced in their
accounts than Kelly's, which proved to be largely biased to the British point of view.
However, such sensitive issues seldom escape bias of any sort. The aim of this section is
not to give a detailed account of the boundary dispute in south-eastern Arabia, but rather
to show how the boundary, especially the Saudi-IJ.A.E. boundary, was developed until it
has reached its present shape.
The territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Britain on behalf of the Shaikhs of its
protégés started in 1934 when the US Government made an enquiry to the British
Government in London based on the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company
(CASOC) oil concession in eastern Saudi Arabia regarding the frontier limits of Saudi
Arabia in that area. The British reply was that the Blue and Violet Lines represented
those limits. In their reply to both the Americans and the Saudis, they referred to those
lines as marking the limits of Britain's 'sphere of influence' in south-eastern Arabia
(Wilkinson 1991). Saudi Arabia remonstrated at this statement, and King Abdulaziz (Ibn
Saud) sent a cable on 7 October 1934 to London saying:
"As for Muscat and Oman and Qatar, we know no boundaries for anyone there, since they
formed part of the dominions of our forefathers, and no one questioned this. All of them
have been under our hand from that day to this, especially the deserts and the Bedouins, for
whom we are responsible. No-one has opposed us in this, and no-one - either Arab or
foreigner - has shared with us in this, so we might know recognised boundaries for these
lands. But now the people of Muscat, Oman and Qatar are our brothers and our adherents,
and there is no dispute between them and us." (Memorial of the Government of Saudi
Arabia 1955, Vol. I, p. 404).
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The main British argument was that Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the
Ottomans, and thus the 1913 and 1914 conventions devolved upon Saudi Arabia, and the
Blue Line represents her limit to the east, and the Violet Line represents her limit to the
South (see figure 3.6). The Violet Line was agreed in the 1914 Convention between the
British Government and the Ottomans to separate Yemen (vilayat) from the nine cantons
of the Aden protectorate. It starts from a point at the south-western corner of Arabian
Peninsula west of Aden (see figure 3.6), and runs north-eastwards to the desert of the Rub
Alkhali at an angle of 45° until it reaches the Blue Line agreed in the 1913 Convention
between the two powers. The British at that time knew that this argument was unsound in
terms of international law (Wilkinson 1991, Schofield 1994). The term 'sphere of
influence' meant nothing in international law, because any territory should be either
under effective occupation or it is res nullis. None of the areas east of the Blue Line,
except coastal areas, was under effective control of the Shaikhs of the coastal Gulf, from
Qatar to Oman (Wilkinson 1991).
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia based its arguments on the fact that, since the first and
the second Saudi states, the tribes in the hinterlands of the areas east of the Blue Line, had
been allegiant to the Saudi rulers (see Memorial of the Saudi Government 1955), paid
zakat (tribute) to them, and were obedient to the calls of the Government to jihad (war).
What strengthened the Saudi position was that in all the Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915,
1922, and 1927 the Blue and Violet Lines were never referred to at all. Moreover, when
King Abdulaziz asked the British, following the 1927 treaty, to provide him with all the
treaties regarding the Shaikhdoms of the Gulf; the British declined, deliberately or
otherwise, to do so.
Several discussions took place between the two sides, and in 1935 Fuad Hamzah, the
Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, produced the first Saudi frontier claim, which was called
the Hamzah Line or the Red Line (see figure 3.6). In the same year, the British offered
several frontier lines but they finally produced what was called the Ryan Line or Riyadh
Line. The Hamzah Line starts from a point south of Qatar Peninsula on Khur Al-Udaid
and eventually goes round to Aden. The Ryan Line starts from Salwa, at the base of
Salwa Gulf; and surrounds the Hamzah Line from the south and continues south-west
until it reaches Aden (see figure 3.6).
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The two sides basically retained their positions until 1949, when the Saudis were asked
for a written statement of clarification. The Saudis laid a new territorial claim, further
north than the Hatnzah 1935 line. The new claim gave Qatar the whole Qatar peninsula
but kept its base for the Saudis, and with Abu Dhabi the boundary starts from a point east
of Bandar Mirfa and ends to the north of Burairni oasis (see figure 3.6). This claim left
Abu Dhabi with about the third of its current territory. By this new claim, a new phase of
dispute began and Buraimi entered the dispute for the first time. This time, the Saudis
based their claim on the fact that Buraimi area belonged to "Shaikdoms which were not in
treaty relations with Britain." (Wilkinson 1991, P. 288). It is worth noting here that the
Aramco legal team, especially Judge Manely Hudson and his assistant Richard Young,
played a major role at this stage in advising the Saudi government in their territorial
disputes (Wilkinson 1991). The British rejected the Saudi 1949 statement, and at the
same time insisted that two thirds of Buraimi villages belonged to Abu Dhabi and the rest
to the Sultan of Oman (Wilkinson 1991).
As the two sides continued to hold firmly to their positions, it was obvious that
reaching a settlement would be very difficult. The British suggested a fact-finding
commission, which was accepted by the Saudis. The British later retreated from the idea
when Prince Faisal, the then Saudi Foreign Minister, visited London in the summer of
1951, to discuss frontier problems with the British (see the previous section). The Prince
suggested holding a conference between Saudi Arabia and Britain with the attendance of
the Shailchs of Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and even Oman. The British agreed on the conference
and abandoned the idea of a fact-finding commission (Wilkinson 1991).
The conference was held in Dammam between 28 January and 14 February 1952. The
British delegate was accompanied by the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Qatar, but the Sultan of
Oman did not attend. In the conference, Britain laid a new claim on behalf of the Abu
Dhabi Shaikhs and offered a frontier line starting from a point at the base of Qatar south
of Salwa, and going southwards, turning south-east until reaching Quraini, then turning
north-east to reach Unun al-Zamul as a tripartite junction between Saudi Arabia, Abu
Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman (see figure 3.6). Buraimi was not mentioned in the
conference, and Saudi Arabia rejected the new British line. The conference ended once
again in deadlock.
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Mier the conference, the Saudis moved forwards on the ground and sent Turki Ibn
Utaishan to Buraimi on the basis that several tribal chiefs appealed to the Saudis to
intervene after a visit made by a British officer. In March 1952, Saudi Arabia complained
to the British Embassy in Jeddah about the British activities, and the reply was that:
"the visit made by a British political officer to Buraimi had been in the course of
"administrative duties" such as were permitted under the London Agreement to continue in
the disputed .Area." (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia 1955, p. 444).
In August 1952, the Saudis sent Ibn Utaishan "to take up the duties of Amir of Buraimi,
responsible to the Governor of Hasa." (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia,
1955 p.444). This action caused what was called the `Buraimi Crisis'. Tensions started to
rise between the two sides, and several negotiations took place. They first agreed on what
was called the 'Standstill Agreement' in October 1952. The Saudis proposed a plebiscite
in the area but the proposal was rejected by the British. In 1954, the two sides agreed to
recourse to arbitration, and signed an arbitration agreement on 30 July 1954 (Kelly 1964).
In 1955, the two parties exchanged their Memorials for the arbitration, and the British
gave the Saudis their unilateral declaration of frontier in August 1955 as shown in figure
3.6 (Wilkinson 1991). However, the agreement could not stand for long and collapsed
when the British accused the Saudis of bribing certain tribal chiefs and the British
members of the tribunal resigned. On 26 October 1955, the British took military action to
remove the Saudis from Hamasa, one of the Buraimi villages. The situation remained the
same, with several attempts to negotiate, but Anglo-Saudi relations broke down in the
wake of the British aggression towards Egypt in 1956. The Saudi government decided to
negotiate her frontier problems directly with the Shaikhs of the Gult first with Qatar in
1965, and then subsequent to British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. The settlement
successfully reached, and agreement signed, with Qatar defined their boundary from
Salwa on the east to Khur Al-Udaid in the west. In 1974, the Saudi government reached
an agreement with the Emirates to define their common boundary, which in fact did not
differ much from the British 1955 unilateral declaration of frontier, with some
exceptions. In the 1974 Agreement, the Saudis were able to achieve access to Khur Al-
Udaid for its strategic importance (Schofield 1994), but conceded the Buraimi oasis to the
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Emirates and Oman. In 1990, they signed an agreement with Oman, which settled their
frontier problems.
3.4 Conclusion
The geographical setting of Saudi Arabia, as well as almost all the GCC countries, is
characterised by a hot and dry climate that has, for many centuries, impacted on the
human activities in the region, particularly agriculture and nomadic movement.
Moreover, populations at the border areas are sparse and concentrated in major cities
such as Dammam, Al-Khubar and Dhahran. The population is sparsest along the border
with the U.A.E.
The climatic condition mentioned above which affected natural resources in the
Arabian Peninsula was crucial in determining spatial economic patterns. Mobility was
always the key to survival in the traditional Arabian economy. Therefore, grazing rights
and the need of Bedouin tribesmen to control access to the scarce resources of grazing
and water contributed to develop some sense of territorial space called dira which mean
'home land' (Wilkinson 1994; Firmie 1992).
As the historical background showed, the Islamic concept of the border-less state,
prevailed during the first and second Saudi states. In the 1922 Uqair Convention, the
people in Arabia were confronted by the Western concept of the territorial limit of states.
Ibn Saud was persuaded by the British government to accept this new concept, despite
strong opposition from his army, the Ikhwan. These new territorial arrangements were for
some time a source of friction between the Ikhwan and neighbouring countries such as
Kuwait and Iraq. The concept of the 'boundary' was rejected not only because it
contradicted the Islamic concept of the state, but also because it interrupted the free
movement of Bedouin across what they considered their dira. However, the concept of
boundary has become gradually accepted, and Saudi Arabia has been able to define and
settle almost all land boundaries with neighbouring countries, and most of the maritime
boundaries with the Gulf states. Historical arguments were used heavily in the territorial
disputes, especially the one with the Emirates and Oman, along with the allegiance of
tribes and their payment ofzakat and obedience to the government call tojihad.
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The recent agreements between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours (1992 and 1998)
gave much attention to Bedouin movement across the boundaries, and therefore bilateral
regulations were set up to manage their movement. Some of these regulations will be
discussed in Chapter seven. Against this geographical and historical background, the
Saudi foreign policy towards its GCC neighbours can be best appreciated, which will be
discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter Four
Political and Legal Management
4.1 Introduction
International relations have a great impact on boundaries, indeed, according to Stephen
Jones (1945) there is no intrinsically bad or good boundary, rather it "depends much upon
the general situation" (Jones 1945, p.3). What he meant by general situation encompasses
a wide range of matters, such as state policies and the attitudes of the people. But the
most important of all is the international relations between two neighbouring countries.
Based on this premise, if the relations between two neighbours deteriorates this could in
turn have its impact upon the boundary between them as well, particularly management
practices at the border area.
Since "the objectives of any boundary management strategy will be determined initially
by national foreign policy objectives" (Blake 1998, p.56), a brief discussion of Saudi
foreign policy objectives toward its GCC neighbours will first be introduced. The legal
status of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours will be discussed next.
Before discussing Saudi foreign policy, it is appropriate to give a brief description of
Saudi governmental bodies involved in the process of boundary management. There are
four main governmental institutions directly responsible for managing boundary matters
(see figure 4.1). First, the Ministers' Council (MC), i.e. the Cabinet, which is responsible
for formulating and supervising all public policies. King Fahad is the President of the
Council and has, as the King, very wide powers at his disposal. All the decisions made by
the Council are binding on other bodies of government (Al-Qabba 1986).
Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is mainly responsible, in co-ordination
with the MC, for planning and implementing Saudi foreign policy (Al-Qabba 1986).
Among the Ministry's wide range of departments and sections a number of 'regional'
sections are concerned with a particular geographical region of the world. These sections
are essential to the decision-making process, for they provide the necessary information
about each country or group of countries before any crucial decision is made. One of
these is the Arabian Peninsula Section, whose main concern is the Arabian Gulf countries
and Yemen. Some of the officials working in this Section participate in negotiations
between the Saudi government and the other governments of the Arabian Peninsula,
especially over boundary issues.
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The third important government body with respect to boundary matters is the Ministry
of Interior (MI), which has two main divisions directly responsible for managing access
for people, and security matters at the borders. One of them is the Passport Control
Administration (PCA), with its subsections at all border checkpoints - land, seaports and
airports. The PCA is responsible for applying immigration policy to all people entering or
leaving Saudi territory. The other division is the Border Guards Administration (BOA),
which is mainly responsible for protecting the entire Saudi land and maritime boundaries
from illegal crossings and smuggling.
Finally, there is the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) which,
through its Customs Department, has three main responsibilities (see figure 4.1):
• managing the access of goods and vehicles;
• preventing smuggling through the official checkpoints; and
• collecting duties on imported goods.
These four institutions have a co-ordinating function in terms of negotiations with
foreign governments over any boundary issue that may rise, as well as exchanging
information between them regarding boundary management matters. Together, they
represent a potentially very effective border management apparatus. Nevertheless, the
government bodies described above do not have a monopoly over all boundary-related
issues. The role of senior Saudi princes, such as the Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince
Sultan (the Minster of Defence) is of crucial importance, because they can make decisive
decisions in boundary matters. A good example of this is the boundary dispute with
Yemen, in which Prince Abdullah played a major role to put this dispute to an end
(Roberts 2000).
4.2 Saudi foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is affected by several
factors. It is first necessary to stress the similarities between the countries, in terms of
political system, religion, language, historical background, economic structure and the
same strategic concerns (Wilson 1994). Despite dissimilarities in legislation as well as
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controversies over some boundary issues, Saudi foreign policy toward the rest of the
GCC countries has long been characterised as an amicable one.
Moreover, the Saudi elite gives the Arabian Gulf region particular importance for the
following reasons. First, Saudi Arabia considers itself to be one of the main powers in the
region, and regards it as a priority to keep the region secure from any disturbances.
Second, the familial ties between the ruling families of the GCC states as well as
historical relationships between them facilitate collaboration and solidarity in the face of
external threats. Thirdly, the hydrocarbon reserves in the region require protection and
good planning to utilise them for the best interests of the people (Al-Qabba 1986).
Therefore, Saudi Arabia finds itself obliged, not just to defend her territory but to:
"provide security to the smaller and more vulnerable neighbours like Bahrain and Kuwait,
and for the waters of the Gulf and Gulf of Oman." (Cordesman 1997, p.9).
On the grounds mentioned above, the objectives of Saudi foreign policy towards its
GCC neighbours can be classified into three main goals: achieving and maintaining
security, attaining welfare, and preserving autonomy (i.e. preventing foreign
interference). Saudi decision-makers believe that these goals can be fulfilled best through
the GCC. King Fahad's statement following the Fourth GCC Summit held in Dawha,
Qatar in November 1983, affirms these objectives:
"We are proud of what has been achieved regarding security and military matters which aim
to enhance the self-reliance and self-capabilities of the GCC states to preserve their security
and independence... We hope that this benevolent procession of co-operation continue its
constructive process until the aims of the GCC, which are the unity of positions and
decisions, security, stability, and the welfare of its people, are fulfilled." (Unun Al-Qura
1983, p.24).
The later events revealed how these goals, especially the security ones, became very
prominent in Saudi policy. For example, Saudi Arabia suggested, in late 1981 and early
1982, a security agreement and encouraged the other GCC's Member States to support it
(Nakhleh 1986). By 1994, this agreement had been signed by all the GCC states except
Kuwait, which had some reservations about it as contradicting their constitution (Nakhleh
1986; Al-Mihairy 1999). Another example, in the aftermath of the second Gulf War
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(1990-1991), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began, as Cordesman described it, to conduct
more realistic military exercises (Cordesman 1997).
The good-neighbourly foreign policy defines the way the Saudi government handles its
boundary issues with its GCC neighbours. Saudi Arabia has been largely successful in
resolving boundary disputes peacefully and fairly with its GCC neighbours as will be
shown below. There have been some exceptions such as the incidents with Qatar in
September 1992, but they have been rare.
4.3 The Saudi boundary treaties
Generally speaking, there is no standard model on how a treaty on international
boundaries should be drafted. Rather, as Ron Adler (1995) suggests, there are some
essential features which it is desirable for a good treaty to include. In particular:
" • A statement regarding the principle of mutual consultation.
• A detailed description of mutual accommodation- withdrawals, exchange of territories
etc.
• A definition and description of the agreed boundary.
• The treaty delimits the boundary and also specifies the provisions for its demarcation."
(Adler 1995, p.6).
In Addition, an ideal treaty will provide for some kind of joint commission or will
specify who is to deal with boundary problems as they arise, and how they are to keep in
touch.
Several good examples of an existing boundary treaty embodying these features can be
found. One example will be given here which is the boundary treaty between Ethiopia
and Kenya signed in 1970 (Brownlie 1979, pp.775-825). This treaty contains thirteen
articles, two schedules, and one annex. The points suggested by Adler and mentioned
above can be recognised very clearly in the treaty. First, it emphasises in its preamble that
peace between the two parties is part of the peace and security of the African continent as
a whole. Second, there is a statement (Article VII paragraph b) laying down the principle
of consultation between the two parties in respect of possible future deviations in the
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course of the River Dawa. It also describes in detail how resources, such as fresh waters
near the borders between the two states should be shared (Articles VIII and IX and the
Annex 1). Moreover, a clear definition of the boundary line is stated in precise terms,
leaving little scope for ambiguity or misinterpretation. For example, in Schedule I it
describes the starting point of boundary line as follows:
"The boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya starts from a point on the lowest point of the
course of the DAWA River opposite Boundary Pillar No. 1 of the boundary between Kenya
and Somalia, situated on the right bank of the river about 650 metres north-west of the Police
Post on the MANDERA-DOLO GEDO road of the MALKA RIE area." (Brownlie 1979, p.
797).
Finally, the treaty determines the provisions for the demarcation of the boundary line,
and lays down principles of joint maintenance of the different sectors of the boundary
line (Articles X, XI, and XII). For example, Article XI paragraph 2 says:
"Such maintenance shall include the following obligation:
N the maintenance in good repair of the boundary pillars and also the reference pillars
constructed on the banks of any watercourse whose bed is followed by the boundary line;
(ii) the clearance of trees or bushes growing up on the cleared width of four meters of the
boundary line which render one pillar invisible from the next, or growing up in the bed of any
small watercourse followed by the boundary line;
(iii) in the event of a boundary pillar or reference pillar having been completely destroyed or
having disappeared without leaving marks enabling the exact site to be found again, the
Contracting Party responsible for the maintenance of that sector of the boundary shall,
before undertaking the reconstruction of the pillar inform the other Contracting Party so that
the pillar can be jointly re-sited... " (Brownlie 1979, p. 794).
This quality of detailed information leaves little room for ambiguity or disagreement
between the two parties. Schedule I contains a very detailed description of the boundary
demarcation in terms of type of pillars, their dimensions, and their physical structures. A
very extensive and detailed table containing information such as the altitude, bearing to
the next pillar and distance to the next pillar for each pillar is also supplemented. For
example, it describes pillars 1 and 2 as follows:
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Type Altitude (m) Bearing to the next Distance to the next
pillar r 9	 Pillar (in)
Pillar No.
ETHIOPIA	 KENYA
Description No. of Pillars
	 km	 No. of Pillars km
Pillar No. 1 (Malka Man) up to and
including Pillar No. 72
From Pillar No. 72 (El Mole) up to and
including Pillar No. A.102
140	 128
etc.
Source: (Brownlie 1979, p. 821).
72	 74- -
Table 4.1: A sample from Schedule I of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty
1 P	 315 264 16 274
2 S	 318 251	 14 134
etc. ...
Source: (Brownlie 1979, p. 797).
The type of pillar indicated in table 4.1 as '13' refers to 'rectangular pyramid' and 'S'
refers to 'triangular pyramid'. Schedule II specifies the sectors that will be maintained by
each party with their length in kilometres as well as the number of pillars in each sector.
For instance, it describes the maintenance of boundary sectors from Pillar No. 1 up to
Pillar No. A 102 as follows:
Table 4.2: A sample from Schedule II of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty
Table 4.2 ends up with a total of 372 pillars and 295 km, responsibility for the
maintenance of which belongs to Ethiopia, and 280 pillars and 321 km, responsibility for
the maintenance of which belongs to Kenya. Annex I of the agreement contains six
Articles determining the protocol for trans-frontier watering and grazing rights between
the two countries (Brownlie 1979). Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the 1970
Ethiopia-Kenya Treaty was before the days of GPS and the universal use of geographical
coordinates.
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Table 4.3: Significant figures in coordinates of latitude and longitude
Coordinates given Implied accuracy On the ground
35° N, 55° E ±0.50 ±50km
35° 20' N, 55° 10' E ±0.5' ±900m
35° 20' 24" N, 55° 10' 17" E ±0.5" ±15m
Source: Adler (1995, p. 61).
It should be emphasised that, according to Adler (1995), co-ordinates considerably vary
in their accuracy. For example, if a co-ordinate is given to the nearest 'minute' the
implied accuracy is ±-half the last significant figure (i.e. ±0.5') representing ±900m on the
ground. But if a co-ordinate is given to the nearest 'second' then the accuracy will be
±0.5" or ±15m on the ground which means greater accurate (see table 4.3). In recent
boundary treaties co-ordinates are given to the nearest fraction of a second (see for
example Appendix VIII).
The boundary agreements between Saudi Arabia and the three selected GCC
neighbours, Kuwait, Bahrain and U.A.E. will be discussed below to see how far those
boundary treaties conform to the general principles mentioned above.
4.3.1 The Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary agreements
The boundary between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was agreed and delimited, as
mentioned in Chapter three, at the Al Uqair Convention in December 1922. The
agreement described the starting point of the boundary line (see Appendix VI) as follows:
"The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi al Awja
with Al Batin, leaving Riqai to Najd..."
This description is very ambiguous, because the word 'junction' has two possibilities. It
could refer to the middle of the wadi junction, or it could refer to the bank of wadi Al
Bain at the junction. Another ambiguity lies in the description of the southern limit of the
neutral zone, which states:
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"The portion of territory bounded on the North by this line [the red semi-circle] and which is
bounded on the West by a low mountainous ridge called Esh Shiq and on the East by the sea
and on the south by a line passing from West to East from Esh Shig to Ain at Abd and hence
the cost north of Ras al Mishab..."
It did not say from where exactly this southern line should start and where exactly it
should end. Although this agreement stated that both countries would share equal rights
over the neutral zone, it did not explain precisely what are those rights should be and how
they might be shared. This imprecision in determining the boundary line and ambiguity in
stating the shared rights did not cause any problem in 1922 because:
"the zone was mainly unpopulated, visited only by tribes from the two countries, and since oil
had not yet been discovered there." (A1-Mayyal 1986, p. 304).
This state of affairs however caused several practical problems and disagreements
between the two parties especially after the discovery of oil in the area in 1953. Al-
Mayyal described the situation as follows:
"When oil was discovered in the zone, life there changed greatly. The exploitation of oil in
the region required a string of development which brought with it oil companies, workers,
settlements, shops and social amenities. All this needed management and administration, and
it was principally this which brought the Kuwaiti and Saudi authorities face to face. Chaos
resulted in the zone where bilateral authorities were operating at the same time, with the
differing laws of two separate countries. There were grave difficulties in applying law and
order, not to mention the lack of any co-ordinated management." (Al-Mayyal 1986, pp. 304-
405).
Therefore, the two sides decided to resolve these problems and subsequently reached a
new arrangement that define their rights with more precision. In July 1965 they signed a
new agreement (see Appendix VII) which divided the neutral zone area between them in
terms of administration, sovereignty and defence but at the same time agreed to retain an
equal share of natural resources found in the whole area (see figure 4.2). The agreement
stressed in its Article IV that each party shall respect the rights of the other party in
respect to the shared natural resources found in its annexed territory. Natural resources
here, include all types of natural resources whether they are hydrocarbons, minerals or
underground water resources.
Chapter 4
	 110
This latter agreement (1965) resolved the problem of sovereignty and administration as
well as how to exploit the natural resources in the area. However, the boundary line to
divide the area into two parts was precisely defined in a subsequent agreement in
December 1969 (see Appendix VIII). In this agreement, which was regarded as an annex
to the 1965 agreement, co-ordinates for each pillar along the line were defined. Generally
speaking, the 1965 and 1969 agreements were good in the sense that they laid down
several principles relating to co-operation, consultation and set out conflict resolution
mechanisms (Articles VI, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII). Interestingly enough, this
agreement in its Article XVII sets out a joint permanent committee to administer the
exploitation of natural resources, and its powers were determined in Article XVIII as
follows:
Article XVIII: The Committee shall have the following powers:
(a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary Companies and ancillary
companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than the citizens of the two
Parties.
(b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.
(c) To study the new licenses, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural
resources and submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to who should
be done in this respect.
(d) To discuss whatever items the two competent ministers refer to it.
Despite Article VII of this agreement which states that the two parties shall exercise the
same rights over territorial waters adjoining the Partitioned Zone, the boundary line
which divides the territorial waters was not agreed even in the 1969 agreement. This was
a source of disagreement between the two sides, especially in respect of the disputed
sovereignty of the two islands, Qaru and Umm Al Maradim.
Nevertheless, the two countries have finally agreed on these issues, and signed an
agreement on 2 July 2000 delimiting the boundary lines of the offshore area and
determining the sovereignty of the two disputed islands (see Appendix IX). Article 1 of
this agreement describes the line dividing the offshore area as follows:
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Article I: The line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, which
constitutes the dividing line between the area of each of the two states, runs from the land
point on the shore (point Z) [which determined according to 1969 agreement, see Appendix
VIM with the geographical co-ordinates (28° 32' 2.488" north and 48° 25' 59.019" east)
and runs through four points with the following co-ordinates:
Point	 Latitude North	 Longitude East
I	 28° 38' 20"	 48° 35' 48"
2	 28° 39' 56"	 48° 39' 50"
3	 28° 41' 49"	 48° 41' 18"
4	 28° 56' 06"	 49° 26' 42"
And from point No. 4, the line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone
extends to the end of this line in an easterly direction. (Boundary and Security Bulletin
2000, p.70).
The northern boundary line of the offshore area has been described in Article 2, which
starts from the point on the land where the red circle ends with geographical co-ordinates
28° 49' 58.7" north and 48° 17' 00.177" east. They delimited this line according to the
principle of equal distance from the low-tide line on the coast, without taking into
consideration the locations of islands, shoals, and semi-submerged rocks. It is obvious
here that Kuwait abandoned its position, since she originally wanted to use the islands of
Miskan, Filaka and Auha as the base to calculate the equidistant line (Al-Mayyal 1986).
The southern line of the offshore area has been described in Article 4. Regarding the
ownership of natural resources in the offshore area, the agreement states in its Annex 1
that:
The two contracting parties have agreed that their ownership of the natural resources in the
offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone shall be jointly shared, and this includes the
islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim and the area lying between the northern line
mentioned in Article 2 of the agreement and the adjusted course of the northern boundary,
pursuant to Article 3 of the agreement.
Although sovereignty over the disputed islands Qaru and Umm el-Maradim was not
mentioned explicitly in this agreement, it is tacit in Article 1 which divided the offshore
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area and as can be seen from the sketch map (figure 4.3) that these islands go to the
Kuwaiti side. One issue remained undetermined in this agreement, namely that regarding
measures and arrangements related to recreational fishing in the offshore area. Article 8
of the agreement states that an agreement over this issue shall be reached between
specialist bodies in the two countries, but no action was taken.
4.3.2 The Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary agreement
On 22 February 1958 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain signed an agreement delimiting their
offshore boundary. The agreement fmally resolved the territorial disputes between the
two countries over the two islands Lubaynah al-Kabirah and Lubainah al-Saghirah, and
over the Fasht Abu-Safah hexagon as well (see Chapter 3). By this agreement, Bahrain
relinquished its claims over Lubaynah al-Kabirah island and the hexagon (see figure 4.4).
The agreement was "the first formally concluded agreement concerning the delineation of
offshore boundaries in the Arabian Gulf' (Albaharnah 1975, p.306). It also represents a
model in terms of achieving a peaceful solution to a territorial dispute. It contains six
articles. Article 1 includes 16 paragraphs which delimits the maritime boundary line
between the two countries (see Appendix X).
The agreement used three methods to delimit the boundary line. First, the agreement
applied the unusual method of the 'middle line' by using headlands as starting points for
the divided lines from points 1 to 7 and points 10 to 11 (see figure 4.4). This method is
stated in Article 1 paragraphs 1 to 7 and paragraphs 10 to 11. The method of the 'middle
line' is, however, extremely unusual nowadays, where more advance methods are
available to delineate the maritime boundary using GPS, Delmar software or even the
simple and much-favoured arcs of compass. The second method used in the agreement, is
between the points 8 and 9 (see figure 4.4). In this method, they did not apply the 'middle
line', instead they drew a line arbitrarily designed to solve the dispute over the two
islands mentioned above. Therefore, the line from point 7 to point 8 is designed to assign
Lubainah al-Saghirah island to Bahrain, and the line connecting point 9 to 10 is designed
to assign Lubaynah al-Kabirah to Saudi Arabia. This is evident in paragraphs 8 and 9.
The third method was to select points 12 to 14 as stated in paragraphs 12 to 14, to define
the formerly disputed area, given in the treaty as co-ordinates of latitude and longitude.
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Figure 4.4: Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary 1958
Paragraph 16 in Article 1 stated that in respect of the resulting line from point 1 on the
map to point 14 what ever lies on the left (west) of this line belongs to Saudi Arabia, and
whatever lies to the right (east) of the line belongs to Bahrain.
Article 2 in the agreement defined the six sides of the Fasht Abu-Safah hexagon, and
stated that the sovereignty of this area as well as the administration rights will belong to
Saudi Arabia. It also stipulated half of the net revenue of oil exploitation in this area
should be granted to Bahrain:
This area cited and defined above [Fasht Abu-Safah] shall be in the part falling to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the
agreement ofH.M. the King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area
will be carried out in the way chosen by His Majeso, on the condition that he grants to the
Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of Saudi
Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the understanding that this does not
infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the right of
administration over this above-mentioned area.
The construction of the King Fahad Causeway in 1987, resulted in a unique political
landscape in which a maritime boundary passes through a small artificial island built in
the middle of the causeway to contain the necessary services as a crossing point between
the two countries (see figure 4.5).
4.3.3 The Saudi-U.A.E. boundary agreement
The territorial dispute over the Buraimi Oasis was finally resolved when Saudi Arabia
and the U.A.E.. reached a binding agreement on 21 July 1974 (see figure 4.6). The
dispute, which had lasted more than forty years, was between Saudi Arabia and the
British authorities on behalf of the Sheikhs of the Trucial States. Resolution of the dispute
was enabled by the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in 1971, and the agreement was
registered with the United Nations in 1995 (Finnegan 1997).
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The boundary line was determined in Article 2 by using co-ordinates for each turning
point (see Appendix XI). However, the points from F- L were cancelled after signing the
boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and Oman in 1990. That is because the
Oman-Saudi boundary line starts from a point northeast of the point (E) of the Saudi-
U.A.E. boundary line (see figure 4.7). This has caused some overlapping between the two
boundary lines and, in fact, some problems between the Saudis and the Emirates.
A beneficial aspect of this agreement lies in defining the boundary line with co-
ordinates and in specifying the provisions for its demarcation. The agreement also sets
out the way in which transboimdary hydrocarbon resources should be allocated, as Article
3 states:
Article 3:1. Hydrocarbon material located in Al-Shaibah-Zararah field shall be owned by the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree to, and observe its obligation, not to carry out any
search, drill for, invest or to profit from the hydrocarbon material, or give permission to do
so, in the part of Shaybah-Zararah field which lies north of the border line.
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or any company or establishment working under its name,
shall be authorised to carry out search and drilling operations and invest and profit from the
hydrocarbon material in that part of Al—Shaibah-Zararah field which lies north of the border
line. Any agreement regarding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's carrying out such operation
shall be agreed upon at a later time.
Thus, according to this unusual agreement, the Shaibah-Zararah oilfield should be
allocated in total to Saudi Arabia, because the majority of it lies within Saudi territory
(see figure 4.6). Moreover, Article 4 stated that the two sides should apply the same
principle to any oilfield of similar situation:
Article 4: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall observe their
obligation of stopping any drilling and investing or granting permission to do so the
hydrocarbon material in that part of their territories in which the hydrocarbon field primarily
extends inside the territory of the other state.
Chapter 4	 117
Chapter 4
	
118
Chapter 4
	
119
This Article has continued to cause controversy in recent years. For example, the
U.A.E. oil minister refused to attend the opening of Shaibah oilfield in March 1999
presumably because the U.A.E. has always regarded the 1974 treaty as having been
imposed (EIU 1999).
Although the first paragraph in Article 5 (Appendix XI) determined the sovereignty of
each State over some of the offshore islands, and even though paragraph 3 in the same
article stated that both parties shall defme the maritime boundary as soon as possible, this
maritime boundary is still not precisely defined and remains a bone of contention
between the two neighbours, especially with regards to what is mentioned in paragraph 3,
which states that the territorial waters off Al-Hawaisat Island (see figure 4.8) should have
free access to high seas. Another bizarre facet of the agreement was that upon certain
islands (described as belonging to the U.A.E.), Saudi Arabia was allowed to erect
"general purpose installations" (see Paragraph 2 of Article 5, Appendix XI).
Despite some of the ambiguities in the previous agreements, they were successful in
setting out several rules and principles between the contracting parties and maintaining
peace between the neighbouring states. Moreover, the impact of Saudi foreign policy was
obvious on those agreements. For example, Saudi Arabia ceded the Buraimi oasis (see
figure 4.6) to the Emirates after a prolonged claim of that area. Another example is the
Bahrain-Saudi agreement in which Saudi Arabia agreed to give Bahrain half the net
income of oil revenues extracted in the Fasht Abu-Safah hexagon (Blake 1991). We
should also mention that Saudi Arabia kept this agreement secret and it was not released
until registered with the UN in 1995. It is worth mentioning here that the Saudi
government decided in 1991 to release boundary treaty texts with its neighbours (oral
communication with Ewan Anderson 2001).
As stated in the text of two of the previous agreements, with Kuwait and U.A.E., the
boundary lines between Saudi Arabia and the two neighbours were demarcated on the
ground over different periods, as will be shown below.
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4.4 Demarcation of the Saudi boundaries
Demarcating a boundary on the ground is very important for a number of reasons. First,
by establishing the agreed boundary on the ground, it makes it less likely that any
territorial disagreement will occur in future between the neighbouring countries. Second,
the physical existence of the boundary line makes border management activities easier
and more effective. For example, regarding security management, border guards on both
sides can more easily plan and carry out their tasks along the border. Third, people on
either side of the boundary, especially in densely populated areas and/or in areas where
nomads are routinely crossing the border for grazing, a well-marked boundary makes
those people aware of their location while moving. It should be noted, however, that
boundaries in Arabia are usually demarcated every 2 or 3 km. Nowadays, the
demarcation process is far more accurate than it was in the past. It involves much basic
survey work, often including photogrammetry and the extensive use of global positioning
(GPS).
An example of durable and accurate modem boundary demarcation will be presented
before dealing with the Saudi boundaries. This example is the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary
demarcation which started after the 1991 Gulf War when the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 689 on 9 April 1991 (Schofield 1993). Based on that
resolution, a five-member boundary demarcation commission was established in May
1991 and called the United Nations Iraq Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
(UNIKBDC). This commission immediately started its work to demarcate the boundary
line precisely between Iraq and Kuwait based on 1963 Agreed Minutes between the two
parties (see figure 4.9).
Using state-of-the-art surveying and mapping, the UNIKBDC undertook one of the
most intensive demarcation yet. The outcome of their efforts was an accurately
demarcated boundary line with all the necessary documentation and references that leave
no room for any ambiguities or misunderstandings between the two neighbours. For
example, the commission, besides locating the boundary pillars for boundary engineers to
construct, documented them in different ways. First, they calculated the co-ordinates for
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Figure 4.11: A sample record of pillar 106 of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary
UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT BOUNDARY DEMARCATION COMMISSION
RECORD OF BOUNDARY PILLAR
PILLAR NO :1 06	 REFERENCE MAPS:	 IKBDC Series 3 Sheet 14
GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES
LATITUDE	 LONGITUDE
.	 .	 .
PILLAR	 N30 00 31.8988	 E47 57 15.8470
WITNESS MARK	 106 K	 N 30 00 31.7136	 E47 57 15.0797
WITNESS MARK . 	 106 I	 N 30 00 32.2919	 E47 57 16.4299
WITNESS MARK	 106A	 N30 00 32.1758	 E47 57 15.6768
WITNESS MARK	 106 B	 N 30 00 31.2472	 E 47 57 16.2245
GEODETIC DATUM:	 Iraq Kuwait Boundary Datum 1992 (IKBD-92)
ELLIPSOID:	 World Geodetic System, 1984 (VVGS-84)
UTM COORDINATES: Zone 38
'
METRES NORTH	 METRES EAST
PILLAR	 3323443.97	 784983.48
WITNESS MARK	 106 K	 3323437.73	 784963.06
WITNESS MARK	 106 I	 3323456.48	 784998.79
WITNESS MARK	 106 A	 3323452.38	 784978.70
WITNESS MARK	 106 B	 3323424.16	 784994.12
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Source: UN, EKBDC (1992).
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each pillar precisely with the use of GPS. Second, they numbered each pillar on the
ground very clearly. Third, they drew those pillars with their numbers on maps (see
figure 4.10). Finally, each pillar has a single record showing information such as the
reference map of that pillar, co-ordinates and geodetic datum. Moreover, the record
contains co-ordinates for the witness marks for that particular pillar as can be seen from
figure 4.11, which represents a sample record for pillar No. 106. In addition, it contains
two photographs of the pillar showing the surrounding area and views towards the
preceding and succeeding pillars. With such detailed documentation, any pillar destroyed
in future could be easily and accurately relocated. The cost of the work of UNIKBDC ran
to millions of dollars, equivalent to colossal sums for each pillar. Nevertheless, it is a
model for modern boundary delimitation and demarcation.
Because access to meeting minutes of demarcation commissions of the Saudi
boundaries with its GCC neighbours was not possible, the author cannot judge the work
undertaken by those commissions to make a valid comparison with the example given
above. However, the three selected boundaries have co-ordinates for major turning points
in the agreement texts. Moreover, those boundaries are not following a physical feature,
as is the case of the western part of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq. Rather, they
are artificial lines, i.e. they consist of straight lines connecting specific turning points.
4.4.1 Demarcation of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary
Surprisingly, neither the 1922 nor the 1965 agreements included any clauses regarding
boundary demarcation between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Nevertheless, in 1982 the two
countries decided to demarcate their shared boundary. The length of the line is about 220
kilometres (137 miles). It starts from a point at the seashore of the Arabian Gulf north of
Alkhafji city (see figure 4.2) and ends up at the conjunction point of the boundaries
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998 revealed that each mark used is
made of 8 cm. wide (3 inches) steel tube erected in a square-shaped concrete base about
40 cm above the ground (see plate 4.1). Each tube is sealed with a plate showing the
number of that particular mark (see plate 4.2). Beside each pillar, there is a witness mark
also made of concrete, but as shown in plate 4.1, both the base of the pillar and the
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witness mark have been severely affected by weathering. Moreover, those pillars and
marks are not high enough off the ground, so they are not easy to see from a distance. In
addition, the distance separating each pillar from the next one is about 700 metres.
4.4.2 Demarcation of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary
Articles 6 and 7 of the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. (see
Appendix XI) provided for the demarcation of the boundary. Five years later (in 1979),
the boundary line of about 500 kilometres was demarcated from point A to point E.
During fieldwork, the author saw that two types of demarcation markers were
established. The major boundary points from point A to point E (see figure 4.7) are made
of pyramid-shaped concrete pillars about one metre above the ground. Beside each of
these concrete pillars is a witness post (see plates 4.3 and 4.4) showing the pillar number
(A) or (B) as well as the direction of the previous and next pillars. A second type of
marker intermediates the major points A-E. These intermediate markers, each a kilometre
apart, are concrete pillars set on a round concrete base with a height of about one metre
above the ground (see plates 4.5 and 4.6).
There is no intervisibility between pillars, partly because of the topography of the
border area, and partly because of the physical construction of the pillars, especially the
intermediates. The physical condition of the pillars is reasonable but, as can be seen from
plates 4.3 and 4.5, weathering is proceeding. In some other places, especially where sand
storms occur, the marks may disappear under the sands, after which they cannot be seen.
However, a Border Guard official told the author that there are unpublished agreements
between the Saudi government and the governments of Kuwait and U.A.E. to renew
those boundary marks in the near future and replace them with modem and more
enduring types of pillars and marks.
4.5 Cartographic records of the Saudi boundaries
Adler (1995) emphasised the importance of maps, especially after demarcating the
boundary line on the ground, for two purposes: to show the public the boundary line, and
as an aid to boundary management and maintenance. One of the important elements of
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Plate 4.1: Point 0-3 of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary line.
Plate 4.2: Point D-3 of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary line.
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.
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Plate 43: Point A of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.
Plate 4.4: Point B of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.
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Plate 4.5: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.
Plate 4.6: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.
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maps is scale. Therefore, as Adler stated, the best map scale after demarcating the
boundary is 1:250,000 or larger, he wrote:
"Map scale permitting, all demarcated boundary points ought to be shown, joined by a line
symbol representing the exact course of the boundary between the points. One could say that
a 1:250,000 and larger scale map would usually be able to show the demarcated points as
well as the line." (Adler 1995, p.33).
Only two of the three Saudi boundary agreements have made provision for maps. The
first, is the Bahrain-Saudi agreement in Articles 3 and 5, but it does not specify the scale
of those maps. The second is the Saudi-U.A.E. agreement, which states in Article 2 that
all the agreed boundary points should be depicted on a map with a scale of 1:500,000.
However, this map shows only the major boundary markers from A-E as explained
above, and the intermediate markers between the major points are not depicted on the
map (see figure 4.12).
In their management practices, the Saudi Border Guards uses larger scale maps to
1:50,000 showing boundary lines very accurately. Those maps are heavily used in
planning and conducting management tasks.
4.6 Conclusion
From the above discussion, several observations can be made. First, the friendly Saudi
foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours has played a major role in resolving boundary
disputes peacefully. Despite some of the ambiguities in the boundary agreements and the
fact that demarcation of those boundaries has sometimes taken place years after signing
the agreements, especially with Kuwait, no major dispute has arisen between those
countries regarding the exact position of the boundary line. However, the 1974 agreement
with U.A.E. left some dissatisfaction among the Emirates because of the unusual
arrangements regarding oilfields which straddle the border between the two countries.
Second, the boundary lines are straight lines connecting points determined by co-
ordinates, and in terms of boundary management, it is relatively easy to follow these lines
on the ground and maintain their course. Third, the low intervisibility between boundary
marks has had no serious effect on management practices or on the people crossing the
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border, such as nomads. The Saudi Border Guards has utilised techniques on the ground,
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter seven, that make the boundary line a
very prominent feature. These techniques are building a sand-bank and a steel pipe along
the border on the Saudi side to prevent vehicle intrusion and smuggling.
Fourth, the Saudi government practice of keeping boundary treaties secret for long time
can be regarded as an unusual practice. Fifth, it is been noticed that there is an absence of
institutional arrangements between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, except the
committee mentioned above (the Kuwaiti-Saudi Joint Committee) to manage the
exploitation of natural resources in the Partitioned Zone between Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. The ongoing political management needs a framework for both routine
management purposes, as well as crisis management and friction over practical issues that
may occur at the border. These institutions would discuss such matters and help resolve
problems efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere without having to take those issues to
higher authorities. Such institutions exist for several borders in the world. For example,
there is the International Boundary Commission between Canada and USA, which
consists of two members, one from each country. The main tasks of this commission
include:
"periodic inspection of the boundary, repairing and replacing damaged boundary markers,
maintaining a cleared vest through the vegetation along the line and helping in the resolution
of disputes that involve the boundary as they arise." (Biger 1995, p.144).
Finally, several positive aspects can be emphasised. The political atmosphere between
Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is enormously encouraging where political
goodwill is present and stable relations are prevailing. The delimitation documents of the
Saudi boundaries are generally good, and the demarcation complete and legally effective.
However, in the boundary treaties and agreements, there is no provision for trouble-
shooting and dealing with what Jones (1945) has called 'friction'. Moreover, there is no
permanent body to be pro-active in encouraging transboundary initiatives, such as
environmental and protected amenities for tourists and visitors.
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Chapter Five
Management of Access for People
5.1 Introduction
The movement of people across international boundaries is affected largely by
governments' management practices at their boundaries as well as by the international
relations between neighbouring states. If the relationship between two neighbouring
states is amicable then the governments' policies toward each other are likely to be
more co-operative and their boundaries are likely to be more open. Consequently, the
regulations and restrictions at the check-points are at a minimum level, which means
reasonably easy access and flow for people.
This chapter will examine the management practices regarding the access for people
between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, and how those practices have been
affected by the GCC's general policies. It will also answer the question as to what
degree those boundaries are open. Several variables have been used to evaluate the
degree of open-ness, such as the time consumed by travellers at the selected check-
points and the frequency of crossing the border.
Although the GCC was established seventeen years ago, which is a reasonable time
in which to make significant progress in the course of regional co-operation, the
member states have reached only one multilateral agreement on economic matters,
which is the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA). The agreement was signed and
ratified in 1981 and released to the public. There are bilateral agreements, such as the
Security Agreement, which will be discussed in Chapter seven.
5.2 The Unified Economic Agreement
The UEA is wide ranging in scope, and includes issues of trade, customs, movement
of capital and individuals, and development. However, the important principles, which
are relevant to this study, are those stated in Articles 1-6, Articles 8 and 18 (See
Appendix V). In Article 8, the Member States have agreed upon:
Executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall grant the citizens of all other
Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens without any discrimination
of dflèrentiation in the following fields:
1- Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2- Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3- Freedom of exercising economic activity.
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4- Free movement of capital. (GCC no date, p.6).
Article 18 states that means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to
citizens of the Member States should be accorded equally when transiting or entering
territory of those States, including exemption from all duties and taxes. To evaluate
those principles it is important to review the progress made since 1981, especially on
the movement of people on the Saudi side.
The GCC States have made a little progress in respect of the free movement of
people across the border, as stated in the above-mentioned Article 8. Although citizens
of the GCC do not require a visa to enter Saudi Arabia and are exempted from having
permission to stay and work in the Kingdom as required from all foreigners (Interview
with Aldawsary, 1997), they still have to present their passports at the check-points as
the only accepted document for passage. It seems that the Saudi authorities are not
keen to apply the ID as an accepted document for travelling, perhaps for 'security
reasons as the interview with the legal advisor of the Director of Saudi Passport
Control revealed:
"There were some technical aspects regarding how to deal with the computer systems
available to the other GCC states before applying the ID cards as a valid document for
travelling, and because recently there is a new technology in using electronically read
passports, which is far better than the ID cards practised bilaterally by some of the GCC
Members. With the electronically read passports one can read all the data related to travellers,
and even travellers can use it to travel abroad Moreover, there is a multilateral agreement
between the GCC members to use the electronically read passports, therefore the General
Directorate of Passport Control is now undergoing a project to put the electronically read
passport in progress" (Interview with Aldawsary, 1997).
However, this project has still not been put in motion yet. It is worth mentioning here
that some GCC countries have bilaterally agreed to accept the citizenship ID as an
accepted document for crossing their borders. Citizens of Oman and U.A.E can now
cross their shared boundaries without passports. In addition, citizens of Qatar, Bahrain,
Kuwait and U.A.E can do the same. These bilateral agreements between these
countries have been blessed by the Supreme Council of the GCC in the Communiqué
of the last Summit in Riyadh in November 1999:
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"The Supreme Council has blessed the agreements between Oman and UAE, Qatar and
UAE, and Bahrain and Kuwait regarding the movement of their respective citizens between
their countries by using the ID, and has regarded this as an important step towards enhancing
the co-operation between the GCC states, deepening the bonds between their people, and
representing a progress in relationships to the level that fulfils the aspirations of the GCC 's
people." (Al-Jazeerah 1999, p.1).
Nevertheless, the volume of people moving between Saudi Arabia and its GCC
neighbours has noticeably increased after the UEA, especially between Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain and Kuwait, as figures 5.1 and 5.2 show. The number of Saudi people
travelling to Bahrain increased from 94,000 in 1982 to about 1.6 million in 1996. This
increase in travellers can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the establishment
of the Causeway and its opening in 1987 greatly facilitated the movement of people
from the Saudi side to the Bahraini side and vice versa. Before the opening of the
Causeway, people were travelling by sea and air, but air transportation captured more
than 70% of travellers (Aljarad and Black 1995). Second, the geographical proximity
of Bahrain Island to the eastern part of Saudi Arabia as well as the rest of the Gulf
States has made it easier for people to travel. More detailed analysis for these reasons
will be attempted later in this chapter. Whilst the number of Saudi travellers to Kuwait
was about 270,000 in 1982, it dropped markedly to 88,000 in 1991. This decline was
mainly due to the second Gulf War (1991). However, the number of Saudi travellers
started to increase gradually when the war ended, from about 430,000 in 1992 to
approximately 460,000 people in 1996. Saudi travellers to the rest of the GCC, like
U.A.E, Qatar and Oman have never exceeded 200,000 (see figure 5.1). Nevertheless,
travelling to the Emirates has increased from around 33,000 in 1982 to about 189,000
in 1985. The increase of traveller numbers began after the second Gulf War from 1992.
The two most important factors contributing to this increase are the flourishing tourism
industry, and business events, such as conferences and exhibitions, that take place
occasionally in the Emirates.
Far fewer GCC nationals travel into Saudi Arabia, in general, than the number of
Saudi nationals going out to the GCC States, as figure 5.2 illustrates. This is largely
because of differences in population size between the Member States, although some
additional factors are discussed below.
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The number of Bahraini travellers increased from 47,000 in 1982 to around 760,000
in 1987, due to the opening of the Causeway in 1987. In 1991, the Gulf War caused the
number to drop to about 380,000. Numbers rose again in the following years, reaching
approximately 880,000 in 1996. The number of Kuwaiti people entering Saudi Arabia
increased gradually from 22,000 in 1982 to about 270,000 in 1990, but because of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the number jumped dramatically in 1991 to over one million
people as refugees displaced by the conflict flooded into Saudi Arabia. Afterwards, the
number dropped to 650,000 in 1993 but started to increase at a steady pace until 1996
when the travellers' numbers reached 775,000. For other GCC nationals, the number of
arrivals has never exceeded 270,000. The effect of the Gulf War is very clear on those
travellers in 1991 as figure 5.2 shows.
The analysis above shows that the movements of people between Saudi Arabia and
the rest of the GCC's members are varied. To understand those movements in more
detail, a survey was undertaken along the three selected check-points with Kuwait,
Bahrain and U.A.E. A thorough analysis of those movements is presented below.
5.3 Access for people
The characteristics of the people travelling across the border, such as their age, sex,
occupation, as well as some other variables such as the time consumed at check-points,
are sometimes unobtainable from official statistics. Thus, a survey to obtain this type of
information about travellers was necessary for this study. A sample of 597 people (265
arrivals and 332 departures), was randomly chosen. The sample size was determined
according to the number of people crossing the check-points on selected days of the
week (see the table in Appendix XII). However, some travellers (about 10% of the total
sample size) did not respond as shown in table 5.1. The total outcome of the survey
was 535 people responded (90%), 244 arrivals and 291 departures (see table 5.1). The
author spent two weeks at Alkhafii and Albateha check-points, and 10 days at KFC to
administer questionnaires according to the required sample size. As argued above, the
total sample size is believed to be large enough to represent the population (i.e.
travellers).
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The random sample was set up according to the situation at a particular time at each
check-point. For example, if there was a heavy movement of people during one day,
the author selected every fifth person coming through the check-point. However, if the
movement was low with few people coming through, the author selected every third
person. This difference in the range of the sampling was to gather sufficient data to
achieve the required sample size, and to minimise delay at the check-point.
Table 5.1: The sample size for each check-point
Check-Point Alkhafji (K.F.Causeway) Albateha Total
Arrivals
Sample Size 103 86 76 265
(Responded) 103 75 66 244
(%) (100%) (87%) (87%) (92%)
Departures
Sample Size 92 127 113 332
(Responded) 84 107 100 291
(%) (91%) (84%) (88%) (88%)
Total
Sample Size 195 213 189 597
(Responded) 187 182 166 535
(%) (96%) (85%) (88%) (90%)
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998. The sample size is
based on the table in Appendix XII.
Each selected individual was given a questionnaire form to fill in. The form in
Appendix I was given to the departures, and the form in Appendix 11 was given to the
arrivals at each check-point. In a few cases the respondent was unable to fill in the
questionnaire form himself, and so the author undertook to fill in those forms.
5.3.1 General characteristics of the travellers
Travellers' characteristics such as age, sex, occupation, and mode of transportation
will help to analyse access for people, especially whether there are any apparent
associations with patterns of time consumed at check-points. Before going into details
about those characteristics it is important to explain the following point. The author
was eager to include a question about gender in the questionnaire, but unfortunately,
there was an apparent bias in the results. The survey results revealed that a very small
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fraction of the respondents chose the 'female' box, which contradicts the answers of
the question number six (see Appendix I) about the companions of the travellers. Table
5.3 shows that the percentage of people who are travelling with their families for all
departures is 28%, and the percentage for the same category for all arrivals is 39%. The
proportion of females for all departures was only 2%, and for arrivals 1% (see table
5.2). To explain this bias in the survey results, the author believes that all male
respondents accompanied by their families filled in the questionnaire themselves and
this is why they chose the 'male' box.
The other characteristics of travellers, such as their companions, age, occupation and
mode of transportation are set out below. First, regarding the travellers' companions,
the survey revealed that for all the arrivals at the three check-points about 39% of them
were accompanied by their family, 31% accompanied by friends, and 28% were
travelling on their own. For all the departures, about 41% travelled with friends, 30%
by themselves, and 28% with families (see table 5.3).
The situation differs for each check-point. At Alkhafji, 36% of arrivals travelled with
friends, and 35% with their families, whilst 46% of departures were accompanied by
their families and 30% travelled by themselves (see figure 5.3 a, b). For KFC, 51% of
arrivals were accompanied by their families and 32% of them were accompanied by
friends, whilst 49% of departures travelled with friends and 34% of them travelled by
themselves (see figure 5.3 c, d). At Albateha check-point, 39% of arrivals travelling by
themselves, and 32% of them travelled with their families. For departures, 48%
travelled with friends and 27% by themselves (see figure 5.3 e, f).
Table 5.2: Sex of groups according to the travellers' answers
Arrivals Departures
Male Female Male Female
Alkhafji 101 98% 2 2% 83 100% 0 0
KFC 70 97% 2 3% 105 99% 1 1%
Albateha 63 98% 1 2% 96 99% 1 1%
Total	 ' 234 98% 5 2% 284 99% 2 1%
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
Chapter 5
	 144
Figure 5.3: Travellers' companions
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At Alkhafii, the check point with Kuwait, the majority of departures are travelling
with their families. For the arrivals the pattern is rather different. The majority of
arrivals at Alkhafii were with friends, at KFC most of them were with families and at
Albateha most of the arrivals were by themselves. This can be better appreciated when
contrasted with the following results of other characteristics.
Table 5.3: Travellers' companions
Arrivals
Check-Points By himself With family With friends	 — Other
Alkhafji 29 28% 36 35% 38 36% 1 1%
ICFC 13 17% 38 51% 24 32% 0 0
Albateha 26 39%	 21 32% 13 20% 6 9%
Total 68 28%	 - 95 39% 75 31% 7 3%
Departures
Alkhafji 25 30% 38 46% 20 24% 0 0
KFC 36 34% 17 16% 53 49% 1 1%
Albateha	 27 27% 25 25%
.
47 48% 0 0
Total	 -88
-
30% 80 28% 120 - 41% 1 1%
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
Table 5.4: Nationalities of travellers
Arrivals
Cheek-
Points
Saudi Kuwaiti Bahraini Qatari Emirates Omani Other Arab Non-Arab
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Alkhafji 0 0 89 86 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 2 2
KFC 0 0 9 12 52 70 2 3 0 0 0 0 9 11 2 3
Albateha 0 0
r
3 5 10 15 4 6 20 30 4 6 22 34 3 5
Departures
Alkhafji 67 80 0 0 8 10 1 1 2 2 0 0 3 4 3 4
KFC 81 77 5 5 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 6 6 10 10
Albateha
-
55 55 2 2 2 2 13 13 0 0 2 2 23 23 2 2
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
Second, regarding travellers' age groups, the survey showed that the predominant age
group of travellers, both arrivals and departures at the three check-points, is 20-40
years (see figures 5.4, a-h) and they represented no less than 68% at any check-point.
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Then come the people between 40 and 60 years. The remaining two groups, which are
less than 20 and over 60 years, formed not more than 2% and 9% respectively. This is
explained by regulations in Saudi Arabia forbidding people under 18 years to travel on
their own, regardless of gender. Young people must be accompanied by one or both of
their parents or close relatives, or in exceptional cases with written consent from a
guardian in loco parentis.
Third, in respect to travellers' occupation, there are four main occupations which are:
students; government employees; private employees; and self-employed. For all the
arrivals, 49% are government employees, 19% are private employees, 15% are students
and 13% are self-employed. For all the departures, 34% are privately employed, 32%
are government employed, and 15% are self-employed and students (see figure 5.5 g,
h). For the Allchafji check-point the major category for arrivals are government
employees, which forms 65%. For departures at the same check-point the major
category is private employees, which makes 31%, followed by government employees
forming 30% of travellers (see figure 5.5 a, b). At KFC, the main group among the
arrivals are government employees, while private employees form the major group
among the departures, forming 44% and 48% respectively (see figure 5.5 c, d). Finally,
the government employed group forms 29% of the arrivals at Albateha, and the same
group constitutes 36% of the departures (see figure 5.5 e, f).
The fourth characteristic of travellers, which the survey revealed, is the mode of
transportation. The survey showed that 41% of all arrivals travelled in small cars and
the same percentage travelled by mini bus. For all departures, 66% travelled in small
cars, and 28% by mini bus (see figure 5.6 g, h). For all the three check-points, as
figures (5.6 a-f) show, small cars and mini buses are the predominant mode of
transportation for travellers, except for the arrivals at Albateha, where 33% of the
people travelled by bus.
The final characteristic is the nationality of travellers, and here it should be noted that
the author used a method to avoid selecting respondents more than once at every
check-point as follows. For both departures and arrivals, the returning home
respondents in one direction were not selected for the fear that they might have been
chosen in the other direction. For example, among the departures at KFC all nationals
were selected except from Bahraini nationals, because possibly they might be chosen
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when they arrived at the Saudi side. While among the arrivals at KFC, all nationals
were selected except from Saudi nationals, for the same reason, i.e. they could have
been selected among the departures. The result of the survey showed the following
composition of nationality.
Table 5.5: National and non-national population in Saudi Arabia and its GCC
neighbours (1000s people)
Country National Non-national Total
Number % Number °A
Bahrain * 363 66 187 34 550
Kuwait ** 656 42 920 58 1,576
Saudi Arabia *** 12,306 73 4,625 27 16,931
U.A.E. **** 228 12 1,672 88 1,900
Source: * 1992 estimates, Library of Congress Country Studies. ** 1995 census preliminary
results, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstracts, 1998. *** The Saudi
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Preliminary results of 1992 Census. **** 1991
estimates, Library of Congress country studies.
At Alkhai, 86% of arrivals were Kuwaiti and 10% other Arabs (see table 5.4).
Bahrainis and non-Arabs formed 2% each. At KFC, 70% of arrivals were Bahraini,
12% were Kuwaiti, and 11% other Arabs, while non-Arabs formed only 3%. At
Albateha, 34% of travellers were other Arabs, and 30% Emirates. Other nationalities
including Bahraini 15%, Qatari 6%, Omani 6%, Kuwaiti 5%, and non-Arabs 5%. From
table 5.5 one can notice that non-nationals representing more than 50% in Kuwait and
more than 80% in U.A.E. For departures at Alkhai, 80% were Saudi, 10% Bahraini,
4% other Arabs and non-Arabs each. At KFC, 77% of departures were Saudi, 10%
were non-Arabs, 6% other Arabs, and 5% Kuwaiti. At Albateha, 55% were Saudi, 23%
other Arabs, and 13% were Qatari. There were some Omani, Bahraini, Kuwaiti, and
non-Arabs formed 2% each. The above composition shows that most of the departures
were Saudi at all the three check-points, and most arrivals were the nationals of the
original country except at Albateha where most of them were other Arabs. The author
observed that at Albateha, most of the other Arabs were employees in the Emirates and
going to their home countries, the majority from Syria, for a holiday.
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Figure 5.5: Travellers occupations
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5.3.2 Check-Point infrastructures
Infrastructure here means the formalities, facilities and amenities available at each
check-point. Infrastructure is very important in studying any border, for it affects the
access for people and goods, either positively or negatively. The three selected check-
points vary in their infrastructures, especially facilities and amenities as illustrated
below.
The first check-point is Alkhai, which is one of two official Saudi check-points
with Kuwait. The other one is Alriqai, which is located near the hipoint of the Iraq-
Saudi Arabia-Kuwait boundaries, designated for pilgrims during the Haj or for
travellers from Kuwait to northern Arab countries such as Syria. Alkhafji is designated
for travellers from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia or to the other GCC countries. However, the
Alkhafji check-point lies about 6 kilometres north of Alkhafji city on the western shore
of the Arabian Gulf The government authorities responsible for managing this check-
point are the Customs Department and Passport ControL The Customs Department is
responsible for checking (the people's) vehicles as well as commercial vehicles; (i.e.
trucks), for both arrivals and departures. For the departures, they check the registrations
of cars to verify their ownership. This procedure takes a few minutes, and the drivers
pass through certain booths, which are equipped with modern computers. However, for
the arrivals the checking procedures are more time consuming, where travellers have to
stop their cars in designated areas. At this point, the Customs officials check not just
vehicle registration, but also travellers' bags and belongings, even in some cases the
car bodies, to make sure that there are no illegal materials being smuggled. There is a
wide range of materials which are considered as illegal or prohibited, such as drugs, all
types of weapons and explosives, alcoholic beverages, pornographic materials and
certain types of publication. These illegal materials will be discussed in detail in
Chapter seven.
Passport Control takes care of checking travellers' passports and identities. For
departures, the travellers have to stop their cars and go inside the building where the
Passport officials work. The time consumed here varies according to different
situations. For example, during holidays the movement of people is greater than on
normal days, or during some special occasions such as a sports tournament, as
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illustrated in the following sections. Adding to these situations, the computer systems
of Passport Control sometimes experience technical problems or break down. In such
circumstances, additional delays will occur. For arrivals, the same previous procedures
exist.
In respect to the available facilities and amenities at this check point, the author has
observed the following. First, although there are some amenities such as toilets and a
mosque available for travellers, other types of amenities, such as a medical care centre,
a bank and restaurant or cafeteria, are not available (see table 5.5). Second, the working
area for Passport Control is rather small and when many people come to check their
passports, the place becomes very crowded and, even though it is air-conditioned,
during summer when the temperature is 40°C or more, travellers suffer.
The second check-point is that at the King Fahad Causeway (KFC). This check-point
is located at a point at the Causeway where the maritime boundary line between Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain intersects. The formalities at KFC are almost the same as at
Alkhafji except that outgoing travellers do not have to leave their cars to complete the
procedures for crossing the border. There is only one exception which is after checking
ladies' passports by male personnel, their identities have to be checked at a private
office by female personnel, because women in Saudi Arabia according to Islamic
teachings wear veils to cover their faces. The author observed that this process takes no
more than 5 to 10 minutes at most. For departures, all cars pass through a number of
booths distributed along different lanes, so each lane can receive as many cars as
possible. All the booths are equipped with modem computer systems. For the arrivals,
there are booths for checking passports but after passing through them, the travellers
have to stop their cars for Customs clearance. This check point is well equipped in
terms of its facilities and amenities. A wide range of amenities are available at KFC, as
can be seen from table 5.5, except for petrol stations.
The Albateha check-point is the only official check point along the border between
Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. This check-point is located about 270 kilometres to the south
east of Al Hufuf, the administrative centre for Al Hasa district. The formalities there
are much the same as the previous check-points. As at Alkhafji check-point, travellers
at this check-point have to leave their cars to complete the necessary regulations for
their passage, in both directions, arrival and departure. There are some amenities within
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the check-point area (see table 5.6), such as a mosque, toilets and a cafeteria. However,
other types of amenities, such as a medical centre, a bank, and a petrol station are
located within walking distance outside the check-point area. The author observed that
there are no restaurants or sunshades, especially for departures. Officials at Albateha
told the author about the major problems faced at this check-point. For instance,
because of the relative remoteness of this check-point from the urban centres, there was
a lack of some vital infrastructures, such as no connection with national electricity
grids, no wired-communication available, and no water networks. With regard to
electricity, for instance, the check-point is powered by petrol operated generators, and
interruption in power supply is common. This has tremendously affected the
operational aspect in this check-point, which in turn affects the movement of people
especially during the busy periods and in summer.
Table 5.6: Amenities available at every check-point
Check-
Point
Mosque Petrol
station
Bank Restau
-rant
Cafe-
teria
Medical
centre
Waiting
area
Sun
shades
Toilets
Alkhafji V X X X V X V V V
ICFC V X V V V V V V V
Albateha V V V X V V V X V
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
An important aspect regarding infrastructure are the main roads that connect Saudi
Arabia with its three GCC neighbours. As shown in figure 4.2, there is a good network
of roads that connect the major cities in Saudi Arabia with the GCC countries. They are
all in good condition, except the one connecting the Al Hasa region with Qatar and
U.A.E. The author travelled along this road, which is about 300 kilometres (186 miles)
from Hafuf to Albateha check-point, and found that it is so narrow and in poor repair
that road traffic accidents often occur on this road. The other roads, especially the one
connecting Al-Khubar with Manamah, through the causeway (see figure 5.7), are
excellent. The one connecting Alkhafji check-point with the rest of the eastern cities in
Saudi Arabia is in good condition.
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5.3.3 Monthly movement of people
The volume of people travelling through the three check-points varies from month to
month, and from one check-point to another. This variation can be attributed to several
factors. According to the information gathered from the officials as well as from the
people, the number of travellers tends to increase during holidays, weekends and when
special events are taking place in any of the GCC neighbouring states.
Figure 5.8 shows the monthly movement of Saudi nationals travelling to Kuwait at
Alkhafji for two years, 1997 and 1998. During April and August, especially in 1998,
the numbers of people increased to approximately 26,000 and 24,000 respectively.
These two months, in these two years, coincided with two holidays in Saudi Arabia. In
April was the Haj holiday, and in August was the summer holiday. The same pattern
can be seen in figure 5.9 for the non-Saudi arrivals from Kuwait.
The monthly volume and pattern of Saudi departures to Bahrain differ from Alkhafji.
Figure 5.10 shows that the number of Saudis who departed for Bahrain in 1977
gradually increased from 33,000 in January, to about 160,000 in April, coinciding with
the Haj holiday. In August (summer holiday) the same year, the number rose to around
180,000, then fell in August and after. In the next year (1998), the number of Saudis
jumped from 50,000 in January, to about 210,000 in March, and this month does not
coincide with any holiday. Then it fell in May to about 100,000. In November, the
figure increased again up to around 150,000. Another factor may explain this increase
in the number of travellers at KFC, which is the geographical proximity of Bahrain to
the major cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. The monthly movement of non-
Saudi arrivals from Bahrain is shown in figure 5.11. The rise in travellers' numbers, for
both years, occurred in the months February, April, May July and August. This pattern
emphasises the effect of holidays on the volume of travellers.
The volume of Saudi departures to the Emirates is far less than those to Kuwait and
Bahrain. The geographical distance, where the people from the major Saudi cities have
to travel for a rather long distance to the Emirates, may explain this. For Saudi
departures (see figures 5.12), in July 1997 the number of people reached about 26,000,
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and in April 1998 they reached about 21,000 people. Here both months coincided with
holidays. The number of non-Saudi arrivals (figure 5.13) also witnessed an increase in
two months, April and July, especially in 1998.
5.3.4 Travellers' frequency of crossing the border
It is important to know how many times a traveller crosses to the other side of the
border, for it reflects, to some extent, the degree of flexibility at the check-points. The
easier the crossing, the more people are likely to travel repeatedly to the other side,
especially, of course, borderland dwellers. Table 5.7 shows the number of people who
cross the border in four categories yearly, monthly, weekly and daily. The figures in
this table illustrate that the majority of travellers cross the borders on a yearly basis,
47% for all arrivals and 53% for all departures. Those travellers who cross on a
monthly, weekly and daily basis, for all arrivals, form 35%, 12% and 6% respectively.
For all departures, 26% cross on a monthly basis, 16% and 5% on a weekly and daily
basis.
Table 5.7: Travellers' frequency of crossing the border
Arrivals
Check-
Points
Yearly Monthly Weekly Daily
No. % No. % ,No. 'Yo No.
Alkhafji 32 31 46 45 17 17 7 7
KFC 27 38 29 40 9 12 8 11
Aibateha 53 82, 10 15 2 3 0 0
Total 112 47 85 35 28 12
,
15 6
Departures
Alkhafii 41 49 29 35 12 14 2 2
KFC 36 34 29 27 30 28 11 10
Albateha 74 77 16 17 5 5 1 1
Total 151 53 74 26 47 16 14 5
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
Figure 5.14 (a-c) shows the pattern of the frequency of crossing the border at each
check-point for both arrivals and departures. At Alkh4i, those crossing on a yearly
basis represent the majority of departures (see figure 5.14, a), i.e. 49% of departures
(see table 5.7). Those who cross the border on a monthly bases represent 35%, and the
rest of people, 16% cross the border weekly and daily. Arrivals are rather different,
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where 45% of them cross on a monthly basis, and 31% on a yearly basis, whilst 17%
and 7% cross on a weekly and daily basis respectively. Despite the yearly and monthly
travellers representing the majority, weekly and daily crossings are relatively high
because Kuwait is not very far from some major cities in the eastern part of Saudi
Arabia, comparing the same two categories with Albateha check-point with the
Emirates, as shown below.
At KFC (see figure 5.14, b), the pattern is different and despite the majority of
departures (34%) crossing on a yearly basis, those who travel on a weekly basis
represent 28% of the departures (see previous table). The proportion of people (10% of
travellers) who cross on a daily basis is higher. The greatest proportion of arrivals
(40%) cross the border on a monthly basis, followed by those who cross yearly (38%).
Those who cross on a weekly and daily basis represent 12% and 11%. One can notice
that the weekly and daily crossings at KFC are higher than the other two check-points
because of the geographical proximity of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia.
At Albateh check-point (see figure 5.14, c), the pattern differs from the previous two
check-points. A majority of travellers cross the border on a yearly basis: 82% of
arrivals and 77% of departures. Next are people who cross on a monthly basis: 15%
and 17% for arrivals and departures respectively, whilst those who travel on a weekly
basis represent only 2% of arrivals and 5% of departures. No-one crosses the border
daily as an arrival, and only 1% crosses daily as a departure (see previous table). This
affirms the effect of geographical distance on the frequency of travelling.
5.3.5 People's purpose of travelling
The survey revealed that the travellers using the three check-points have a wide range
of purposes. However, at each crossing-point some types of purpose dominate. At
Allchafji, it is obvious from figure 5.15 (a, b) that 'visiting relations' is the main
purpose for travellers in both directions. It forms about 40% of arrivals, and 70% of
departures. Family ties on both sides of the border can explain this. This boundary, as
are most boundaries in Arabia, was originally a superimposed one, and it has divided
some tribes between the two sides of the border, as Al-Ghamdi (1999) revealed in his
study at the Saudi border with Yemen, that 89% of travellers crossing the border to
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visit their relatives. Therefore, it is not surprising to see this type of familial contact
across the Saudi border with its GCC neighbours.
At KFC on the other hand, the dominant purpose is 'leisure' (see figure 5.15 c, d),
which forms about 35% of arrivals and 50% of departures. A different pattern can be
noticed at Albateha where 40% of the arrivals are travelling to visit their relatives and
39% of departures are travelling for leisure (see figure 5.15 e, f and table 5.8).
For the other types of purpose, from figure 5.15 (a-f) and the previous table we can
notice that 'trading' engages 12% of the arrivals at KFC and less than 10% for the
other check-points, in both directions. The highest percentage for 'study' is at Alkhafji,
which constitutes 5% of travellers. The author discovered that some Saudi students,
most of whom are women, study in Kuwait. This is because Alkh4i City, Kuwait,
which lies about 60 km away, is closer to them than the nearest Saudi university, which
lies about 380 kin away. The travellers for 'work' represent 8% at both Alkhai and
KFC, while at Albateha they represent 12% of the arrivals. For the departures, they
represent 6% of travellers at Alkhafji, 11% at KFC, and 18% at Albateha.
Table 5.8: The purpose of travelling
Arrivals
Check-
Points
Trading Work Study Leisure Visiting
Relatives
Other
No. % No. ')/0 No. % No. % No. % No. %
Alkhafji
,
4 4 8 8 5 5 22 21 46 45 18 17
ICFC 9 12 6 8 1 1 27 36 15 20 16 22
Albateha 3 5 8 12 1 _ 2 12, 18 28 42 14 21
Total 16 7 22 9 7 3 61 25
,
89 37 48 20
,	
Departures
i_ Alkhafji 1 1 5 6 4 5 13 15 59 70 2 2
ICFC 6 6 12 11 3 3 56 53 13 12 16 15
, Albateha 9 9 18 18 2 2 39 39 22 22 10 10
_ 
Total 16 6 35 12 9 3 108 37 94 32 28 10
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
The last category of purposes, 'other', forms 22% and 20% at KFC and Albateha
respectively. More details about other purposes can be found in Appendix (XVI).
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5.3.6 Travellers' trip origin and destination
One of the questions in the questionnaire was about travellers' origin of departures,
and another question about their trip destination. These two questions revealed how far
the travellers were long-distance or borderland dwellers although there problems in
defining `borderlanders'. The distance from the border which may be defmed as
borderland varies according to local geography, population density, and economic
activity. It may be therefore range from one km to 40 or 50 km. First, as to trip origin
of arrivals to Allchafji from Kuwait, 32% of them came from Kuwait City, which lies
about 100 Kilometres (62 miles) from Alkhafji check-point (see table 5.9).
Surprisingly, only 3 people (3%) came from cities or towns which are near the border
namely Saud Port (20 kilometres or 12 miles) and Alwafrah (9 kilometres or 6 miles)
as shown in figure 5.16. The remaining travellers came from cities and towns, such as
Sabah Assalim (6%), Assabahiah (6%), and Aljahra (5%), which lie more than 60
kilometres from Alkhafji check-point. This means that the majority of travellers are not
borderlanders. For the departures from Allchafii to Kuwait, 15% of travellers came
from Allchai city, which lies about 8 kilometres (5 miles) from Allchafji check-point.
These people can be considered as borderlanders. However, the majority of people
came from cities which are far from Allchafji check-point such as Al-Jubail (14%),
Riyadh, the Capital, (13%), and Dammam (11%), all of which are more than 100
kilometres from Allchafji check-point (see table 5.9).
Second, trip origin of arrivals via KFC, as shown in table 5.9, is dominated by the
people who came from Manama (25%), the Bahraini Capital, which lies about 25
kilometres (16 miles) from the KFC check-point. In fact, due to the small size of
Bahrain Island (see figure 5.17) most of its cities can be considered, in effect, as border
cities. The rest of the arrivals came from cities such as Al-Muharraq (13%), Madinat
Hamad (8%), and Ar Refa Ash Sharqi (6%). Madinat Hamad is the closest to KFC,
about 18 kilometres (11 miles) away. For the departures from KFC to Bahrain, most of
the travellers came from border cities, Dammam (29%), Al-Khubar (25%), and
Dhahran (8%). Thus, 62% of departures from KFC were borderlanders. This
emphasises again the effect of geographical proximity of the eastern Saudi cities to
Bahrain.
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Third, trip origin of travellers at Albateha check-point is quite different from the
other two (see table 5.9). For the arrivals, 23% of them came from Abu Dhabi which
lies 350 kilometres (217 miles) from Albateha check-point, and another 23% came
from Dubai which lies 500 kilometres (310 miles) form Albateha, and 11% came from
Sharjah which also lies 500 kilometre from Albateha. Only 3 people came from As Sila
(5%), which is a border town; in fact it is the Emirate check-point at the border with
Saudi Arabia (see figure 5.18). The remaining (38%) came from various other cities
and towns. For the departures, the majority of travellers came from Al Hufuf (23%),
which lies 280 kilometres (170 miles) from Albateha. The remaining travellers came
from cities all of which are far from the border. The previous results show that most of
the travellers are not borderlanders except for Bahrain where most of them are
borderlanders.
In regards to the travellers' destination, almost the same pattern prevailed, with some
differences. First, most of the arrivals to Allchafji check-point (22%) were going to
Allchafji city (see table 5.10), and 15% were going to Bahrain., and 13% were going to
Dammam. For the departures from Allchafji, most of the travellers were going to
Kuwait City (94%), and one person only was going to Aljahra. The rest (5%), were
going to different cities which are far from the border as well.
Second, for the arrivals at KFC, 50% of them were going to Dammam, and 25%
were going to Al-Khubar (see table 5.10). Again, this situation conforms to the
previous one mentioned above where geographical proximity has a far-reaching effect
on the movement of people on both sides. Of the rest of the arrivals, 8% were going to
Kuwait and 17% to different cities in the Kingdom. For the departures, 87% were
going to Manama, and 3% to Al-Muharraq, which is near Manama (see figure 5.17).
The remaining (10%) were going to other cities.
Third, the arrivals to Albateha, the majority of them (22%) were going to Syria, 12%
were going to Qatar, and 9% were going to both Bahrain and Al Hasa. For the
departures, 53% of travellers were going to Dubai, and 19% to Abu Dhabi, while 16%
answered they were going to the Emirates. The remaining (3%) were going to Al Ain,
and the other 3% were going to other cities (see figure 5.18).
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Table 5.9: Travellers' origin of departure
Alkhafji
Arrivals Departures
Origin No. % Origin No. %
Kuwait 32 32 Allchaqi* 12 15
Sabah Assalim 6 6 Al-Jubail 11 14
Assabahiah 6 6 Riyadh 10 13
Aljahra 5 5 Dammam 9 11
Alqurain 4 4 Dhahran 6 8
Alahmadi 4 4 Bahrain 7 9
Alfahaheel 4 4 Hafar Albatin 2 3
Salwa 4 4 Alnoaireeah 2 3
Saud Port* 2 2 Other cities 21 24
Alwafrah* 1 1 - - -
Other cities 33 32 - - -
Total 101 100 Total 80 100
KFC
Arrivals Departures
Manama* 18 25 Danunam* 31 29
Al-Muharraq* 9 13 Al-Khubar* 26 25
Madinat Hamad* 6 8 Riyadh 13 12
Ar Refa Ash Sharqi* 4 6 Dhahran* 9 8
Other cities 34 48 Al-Jubail 3 3
- - - Al Hasa 3 3
- - - Other cities 21 20
Total 71 100 Total 106 100
Albateha
Arrivals Departures
Abu Dhabi 15 23 Al Hufuf 23 23
Dubai 15 23 Dammam 8 8
Sharjah 7 11 Doha 5 5
As Sila* 3 5 Riyadh 5 5
Other cities 24 38 Damascus 5 5
- - - Abqaiq 3 3
- - - Al-Khubar 3 3
- - - Other cities 47 48
Total 64 100 Total 99 100
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
* Border cities.
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Alkhaiji
Arrivals Departures
Destination No. % Destination No. %
Alkhatji 23 22 Kuwait 74 94
Bahrain 15 15 Aljahra 1 1
Dammam 13 13 Other cities 4 5
Alnoaireeah 9 9 -
Al-Jubail 5 5
Riyadh 4 4
Joodah 4 4
Other cities 30 28 -
Total 103 100 Total 79 100
KFC
Arrivals Departures
Darnmam 36 50 Manama 91 87
Al-IChubar 18 25 Al-Muharraq 3 3
Kuwait 6 8 Other cities 11 10
Other cities 12 17
Total 72 100 Total 105 100
Albateha
Arrivals Departures
Syria 14 22 Dubai 52 53
Qatar 8 12 Abu Dhabi 18 19
Bahrain 6 9 Emirates 16 16
Al-Hasa 6 9 Sharjah 6 6
Al-Khubar 4 6 Al Ain 3 3
Jordan 4 6 Other cities 3 3
Other cities 23 36
Total 65 100 Total 98 100
Table 5.10: Travellers' trip destination
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
* Border cities.
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This result conforms with earlier conclusions regarding the purpose of travelling,
where most of the departures at KFC and Albateha were travelling for pleasure. Here,
most of the travellers at KFC were going to Manama the Capital attracted by shopping
centres, restaurants, hotels and the like. The same can be said for departures at
Albateha, most of them were going to Dubai and Abu Dhabi where leisure attractions
are located. Such as shops, casinos, hotels, and restaurants.
5.3.7 Time consumed at the check-points
The time spent at any border post is a crucial factor in determining the degree of
open-ness of the boundary under investigation. Theoretically, if two neighbouring
states decide to open their boundary for people and goods, they have to reduce the
formalities at their check-points to allow people to pass through more easily and
comfortably with minimum delay. Therefore, this study has investigated this aspect by
including a question in the questionnaire forms regarding the amount of time a traveller
has actually spent to complete all the formalities and pass through. The results were
interesting as discussed below. Time here, theoretically, includes both waiting time and
service time combined together. One point should be mentioned before analysing the
results, which is the validity of the answers of travellers to the questionnaire. The
author did his best to verify the answers on the spot, and it was easy to discover if
there was any kind of exaggeration concerning the time consumed. For example, if a
respondent answered the question about how much time he actually spent by putting
unreasonable time, whether more or less, it was possible to confirm this situation by
comparing his answer with the rest of the respondents and by observing the real
situation at the check-point. The author discarded this type of invalid evidence.
However, there were only a few such cases, not more than 1% of the whole sample.
First of all, the time consumed at each check-point for departures from the Saudi side
was analysed and compared to the time spent by departures from the three
neighbouring GCC check-points. It should be noted here that the regulations for the
departures include vehicle and passport checking only, as mentioned earlier in this
chapter. This comparison is important for it illustrates the difference between the Saudi
check-points and those of the GCC States. Figure 5.19 (a, b) shows the time consumed
for departures at Alkhafji check-point, as well as for the departures from the Kuwaiti
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check-point. The diagram shows that 44% of departures from Alkhafji spent 10-20
minutes to complete their processing and 33% of them spent less than 10 minutes,
whilst 64% of departures at the Kuwaiti check-point spent less than 10 minutes and
29% of them spent between 10-20 minutes. Moreover, about 6% of the departures at
Alkhafji consumed more than 50 minutes to complete the process, compared to 1% of
the departures from the Kuwaiti check-point for the same time spent (see table 5.11).
This gives some indication of the degree of flexibility for crossing each check-point on
both sides of the border.
The case at the Saudi-Bahraini check-point is rather different, especially on the Saudi
side (see figure 5.19 c, d.) Only 7% of the departures at KFC spent less than 10
minutes, while 26% of them spent 10-20 minutes. Surprisingly enough, more than 50%
of the departures at KFC consumed 21-50 minutes, and 15% spent more than 50
minutes, which is a quite long time at this check-point. Further discussion is given
below to explain this situation. At the Bahraini check-point the situation is almost the
same as the Kuwaiti post. Almost 60% of the departures consumed less than 10
minutes, while 27% spent 10-20 minutes. A few (9%) spent between 21 and 40
minutes, and 1%, in fact one respondent, answered that he spent more than 50 minutes
(see table 5.11).
At Albateha check-point, 54% of the departures consumed less than 10 minutes,
while 29% spent 10-20 minutes. Those who consumed between 21 and 40 minutes
form 17% of the departures, and no one spent more than 40 minutes. On the Emirate
side, 27% of the departures spent less than 10 minutes and 45% consumed 10-20
minutes. Around 17% of the departures consumed 21-30 minutes, while those who
spent more than 30 minutes represent about 10% and only 2% (one person) consumed
more than 50 minutes (see figure 5.19 e, f and table 5.11).
The result for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points is to some extent disappointing
as figure 5.20 (a-c) demonstrates. At Alkhafji, about 58% of arrivals spent more than
50 minutes to complete the regulations and pass through. Only 14% spent less than 10
minutes, and about 20% consumed 10-20 minutes. The delay at this check-point will be
discussed below. At KFC, 37% of the arrivals consumed less than 10 minutes and 32%
spent from 10 to 20 minutes. Those who spent from 21 to 30 minutes represent about
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19%, and 5% consumed between 31 and 50 minutes. The remaining 7% spent more
than 50 minutes (see figure 5.20, b and table 5.12).
At Albateha check-point, the time consumed by arrivals divided almost equally
between the two ends (see figure 5.20, c). The travellers who spent less than 10
minutes form 6% and those who consumed 10-20 form about 38%, which sum up to
44% of those people consumed 20 minutes and less. At the other end of the scale,
about 35% spent more than 50 minutes and about 12% consumed from 41 to 50
minutes, which adds up to 47% of arrivals spending more than 40 minutes to finish the
necessary regulations for their passage.
Congestion does occur at all check-points, especially during weekend and holidays
(Interview with the General Director of Customs Department, 1998), the author has
noticed this especially at Alkhafji, and this can be regarded as one factor causing the
delay. However, there could be other factors which will be discussed below.
Table 5.11: Time consumed for departures at Saudi and GCC check-points
Check-Points <10 10-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 >50
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Alkhafji 28 33
,
37 44 6 7 6 7 2
,
2 5 6
Kuwaiti-
CHIC
66 64 30 29 5 5 1 1 0 0 1 1
KFC 7	 ' 7 - 28 26 29 27 15 14 12 -	 11	 ' 16 15
Bahrain-
UDC.
47 63 20 27 6 8 1 1
,
0 0 1 1
Albateha 54 54 29 29 11 11 6 6 0 0 0 0
Emirates-
CHIC
18 27 30 45 11 17 1 2 5 8 1 2
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
Table 5.12: Time consumed for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points.
Check-
Points
<10 10-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 >50
, No. % No. % . No. % No.
 % No. % No. %
Alkhafji 14 14 22 21 2 2 1 1 4
,
4 60 58
KFC 28 37 24 32 14 19 3 4 1 1 5 7
Mbateha 4 6 25 38 ,..	 5 8 1 2 8 12 23 35
Total 46 19 71 29 21 9 5
,
2 13 5 88 36 _
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
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A cross-tabulation has been made between the time consumed and travellers'
companions and mode of transportation, and the following conclusions were reached.
First, at Allchafji check-point (see the table in Appendix XIII) a comparison between
the pattern of time consumed and travellers' companions for arrivals shows that most
of the people who spent more than 50 minutes at the check-point were accompanied by
their families or friends, which gives an indication that this category take more time
than the other categories for a variety of reasons. It is possible that this category,
especially when there are more than three people in the car, have several passports to
be processed, which takes more time. It is also possible that Customs officials give the
second category, people accompanied by friends, more attention than the others for
security reasons, e.g. to prevent smuggling. By comparing the pattern of time with
mode of transportation for the arrivals at Allchafji (see the table in Appendix XIII), it
can be seen that most of those who spent more than 50 minutes are travelling by mini
bus, which suggests that this type of vehicle takes longer at the check-point for
Customs procedures.
For the departures at Allchafii (see the table in Appendix XIV), the comparison
between the pattern of time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of
transportation shows that most of the people who spent less than 20 minutes were on
their own or accompanied by families, and that most of them are travelling by small
car. This result conforms to the previous one concerning arrivals.
Second, most of the arrivals at KFC spent less than 20 minutes, most of whom were
accompanied by family and friends, and travelling by small car. This result shows that
this check-point is more efficient than Allchafji in processing arrivals. For the
departures, although about 30% of the travellers spent less than 20 minutes, about 15%
spent more than 50 minutes of which most of them were accompanied by friends and
came by small car (see the table in Appendix XIII) This delay could be due to
congestion at the check-point which occurs occasionally.
Third, most of the arrivals who spent more than 50 minutes at Albateha were
travelling by bus (see the table in Appendix XIII), and the author observed how buses
take a long time to complete the formalities, especially the Customs regulations, when
some of them waited for two hours. Customs officials conduct a thorough check up for
the luggage and belongings of the travellers and they even check the bus itself by using
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trained dogs, all this to make sure that no smuggled materials have been hidden. For
departures at Albateha, most of them spent less than 20 minutes and were accompanied
by their friends and were travelling by small car.
5.4 Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion the following conclusions can be made. First,
geographical distance played a major role in encouraging travelling across the border,
and this was clear at KFC where a large number of people, compared to the other two
check-points, are crossing in both directions. Second, the management of access for
people is good in general, and the time spent is reasonable according to international
standards, always remembering that the overall inconvenience experienced in border
crossings is a product of departure time plus arrival time. For example, Paselk and
Marmering (1994) showed that the average waiting time at the US-Canadian border is
20 minutes, but waiting time could reach 59 minutes, taking into consideration
difference between the two cases. Another example is the Saudi-Yemeni border.
However, for the arrivals, Alkhai showed that there is some delay, and this delay is
attributed to large extent to the formalities at this check-point, by both Passport Control
and by Customs. Comparing the delays for arrivals at Alkhafji to the time consumed
for arrivals at the Saudi-Yemeni border, which is from 1-2 hours (Al-Ghamdi 1999)
makes Allchafji check-point reasonable. Third, congestion occurs occasionally,
particularly in holidays and the weekends, even at KFC which is more efficient than
the other two check-points, and this is due to the volume of people. A point should be
considered here which is there is only one crossing point at each of the three borders,
compared to the US-Canadian border again where there are four crossing points along
the border section in Washington State alone (Pasellc and Mannering 1994).
Fourth, most of the travellers were GCC nationals, which can be explained mainly by
two reasons: GCC nationals can enter any other GCC country without a visa; and
cross-border familial ties. Finally, infrastructures and amenities were insufficient at
Alkhafji and Albateha, as well as the absence of some facilities, even at KFC, that may
reduce monotony, such as souvenirs, newspaper stalls and the like.
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Chapter Six
Management of Access for Goods
6.1 Introduction
Some scholars argue that the regional integration process "exhibits a succession of
oscillations between greater unification and stagnation" (Lawson 1997, p.14). The
GCC as a regional organisation has arguably experienced much the same pattern as
the European Union in which the integration process has undergone different stages,
and each stage of "heightened integrative activity was separated from the others by
periods of dormancy" (Lawson 1997, p. 15). Those periods of stagnation have
affected the pace of economic integration among the GCC's members, which in turn
has its impact on the free movement of goods across their shared borders. The GCC,
nevertheless, is going to take several decades to reach the level of economic
integration achieved in the European Union.
Several factors have contributed to this situation. First, members of the GCC
experienced serious economic difficulties due to the decline in oil prices which took
place in the early 1980s. The second Gulf war (1991) and its aftermath worsened the
economic performance among the member states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
(Nalchla 1986, IlviF 2996, El-Erian & Sassanpour 1997). Second, the issue of
national sovereignty, which remains of great importance to the individual
governments of the GCC, also hindered moves towards greater integration (El-
Kuwaiz 1987, Koppers 1995). The desire to preserve sovereignty is reinforced by the
fact that all the GCC are monarchies. This latter factor will be further explored below.
Theoretically, economic integration between countries goes through five stages, as
suggested by Balassa (in Koppers 1995): free trade area, customs union, common
market, economic union and finally complete economic integration (see figure 6.14).
In the first stage, which is the operation of a free trade area, goods are granted free
movement between the member states. If the tariffs against the non-member states are
not equalised, then "customs authorities have to distinguish between partner and
foreigner products according to the shares of value added in the product" (Koppers
1995, p. 58). In the second stage, there should be complete free trade between the
member states as well as a unified tariff wall against the non-member states. After
establishing a customs union, the group of states must move towards a common
market. At this stage, the member states will abolish any restriction on the movement
of factors of production, i.e. labour, capital, and services. The next stage is economic
union, when the member states harmonise their economic policies in order to remove
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any discrimination caused by disparities in those policies. A good example of this is
the forming of a joint industrial policy by the members of the GCC. The final stage is
complete economic integration, when member states have unified their economic
policies and have set up a supra-national authority "whose decisions are binding for
the member states" (Koppers 1995, p.58).
The GCC's states have established a free trade area, through the UEA. Articles 1
and 2 state that all types of national products should be treated equally (see Appendix
V), and all tariffs should be lifted against those products. Article 3 asserts that:
I- For products of national origin to qualib, as national manufactured products, the
value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less
than 40% of their final value as at the termination of the production phase. In
addition, Member States citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant
shall not be less than 15%
2- Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of
origin duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.
Since 1982, several summits have been held and yet the Member States have still
not reached an agreement about the unified tariff wall against non-member states. The
differences are over which goods should be listed, and over the tariff level itself (GCC
1998, Wilson 1998). However, the Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal
announced in November 1999 that there had been a break-through and that the
Customs Union would be implemented in March 2001 (Al-Madinah Newspaper
1999). In 1983 the Saudi government started exempting the GCC's industrial,
agricultural, livestock and natural resources products from customs duties (GCC
1998). However, according to the second paragraph of Article 3, the customs
authority has to check that every truck carrying a commodity produced in a GCC
country is eligible for exemption from customs duties. This procedure along with
other procedures, as will be explained later, have contributed to a noticeable delay in
truck movements through the Saudi check-points.
Although Saudi Arabia's trade with its GCC neighbours accounts for less than ten
percent of its total trade (see table 6.1), trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the
rest of the GCC States increased through the period 1985-1996 (see figures 6.1 &
6.2). This increase can be attributed to two factors, first is the flourishing industrial
development in the region which is planned and supported by the GCC's governments
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(Koppers 1995). The second is the UEA which has increased trade exchange between
the GCC Members, as emphasised by Dr. Alajbor the General Director of the Saudi
Customs Department:
"The UEA since its implementation in 1982 has effectively contributed to increasing trade
exchange between the GCC states" (Interview with Dr. Aljabor, 1998).
Table 6.1: Saudi trade of national products with its GCC neighbours (1994)
(Million US Dollars)
Countries Exports Imports
U.E.A 887.22 297.26
Bahrain 1311.66 168
Oman 78.48 43.76
Qatar 91.94 96.08
Kuwait 366.08 78.37
Total * 2735.38 683.47
Saudi World Trade** 42614.076 23342.633
% of total trade 6.42% 2.93%
Source: * GCC, Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XII, 1997.
** U.N. International Trade Statistical Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1997.
Several observations can be made about the exports shown in figure 6.1. First, the
amount of exports from Saudi Arabia to the other GCC's States is generally greater
than the amount of imports (See figure 6.2). This is because of the dominance of the
Saudi economy over the other states' economies. The apparent decline of export value
to Bahrain in 1996 is because the figure for that year did not include the value of
export oil for reasons which are not obvious. Second, apart from the year 1996,
exports to Bahrain are the highest, reaching about two billion US Dollars in 1990.
However, this can be explained by figure 6.5 which shows that oil exports were the
dominant part of exports to Bahrain. Exports to U.A.E. come in second position when
they reached about 1.3 billion Dollars in 1995. Third, exports to Kuwait have reached
approximately 400 million Dollars in 1996, while exports to Oman and Qatar never
exceeded 200 million Dollars over the same period.
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Saudi imports, as shown in figure 6.2, have never exceeded 400 million US Dollars
over the years 1985-1996 from all the GCC countries. This confirms that the trade
balance of national products is in favour of Saudi Arabia. The highest imports were
from U.A.E. which reached about 400 million US Dollars in 1996. Bahrain is in the
second place, while the Saudi imports from it reached about 260 million US Dollars
for the same year. The imports from the rest GCC countries are less than 100 million
Dollars from each country. The previous description reflects that trade exchange
between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is increasing with various degrees
between those countries.
The structure of commodities exchanged between Saudi Arabia and the three GCC
states selected for this study can be seen in figures 6.3 to 6.8. Exports from Saudi
Arabia to Kuwait were dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.3) from 1985-
1996, which accounted for not less than 50% of the total, except in 1986 when they
accounted for about 40%. Agricultural products have accounted for less than 40%
from 1985 to 1990, but in 1991 and 1992 they accounted for about 50% of Saudi
exports. This increase in the share of agricultural products could be explained by the
increase in demands in the Kuwaiti market after the second Gulf war. Natural
resources products accounted for about 18% in 1986, but they represented no more
than 10% in the years 1987-1989, and they accounted for less than 2% afterwards.
While the imports from Kuwait are dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.4),
which accounted for no less than 80% from 1985-1996.
The structure of trade exchange, especially exports, between Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain is quite different from the other two countries. Figure 6.5 shows that, from
1988 until 1995, Saudi exports to Bahrain were dominated by natural resources (crude
and refined oil products). This situation can be explained by the fact that Bahrain oil
production is the lowest among the GCC states. It is therefore trying to compensate
for this shortage by importing crude and refined oil from Saudi Arabia. Saudi imports
from Bahrain are dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.6).
With the U.A.E., Saudi exports were dominated by natural resources in the years
1985, 1987 and 1988 (see figure 6.7), but the rest of these years industrial products
dominated the exports. The imports were also dominated by industrial products for the
whole period, which accounted for no less than 75% of the total (see figure 6.8).
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The above mentioned structure of trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the
three GCC states indicates that because of the high level of demand for manufactured
goods reflecting high incomes and a well developed industrial sector, notably
petrochemicals, most of the exchanged commodities were industrial products. This
suggests that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states are aware of the importance
of the industrial base in their countries as a key part in the drive to diversify their
economies. It should also be noted here that trade exchange and commodity structure
discussed above also encompass goods exported and imported through air, sea, and
land. The following section will analyse access of goods through land check-points
only.
In order to test the ease of access for goods through the Saudi check-points, a
sample of truck drivers was taken at the check-point with Bahrain on the King Fahad
Causeway. Although the author is aware that to obtain a better understanding of truck
and goods movements, it would have been preferable to make a more detailed study
covering several check-points with the GCC countries, the time and resources
available to the author were very limited, so he was obliged to confine the sample to
this check-point. However, KFC in many ways is unique, for Bahrain is an island with
no through trade by land. A sample of 57 truck drivers, 32 arrivals and 25 departures
on the Saudi side, was selected randomly. The sample size was determined according
to the number of trucks passing in and out in a single day, and from the table in
Appendix XII. The selected truck drivers were given questionnaire forms to fill in
themselves (see Appendix III). The results of the returned questionnaire forms are
discussed below.
6.2 Truck drivers' characteristics
Truck drivers (all male) were asked about their age, occupational details and
nationality. The results showed that the majority of the drivers, in both directions of
travel, were aged between 20 and 40 years (see figure 6.9 a, b). For the arrivals, 6% of
the drivers were aged less than 20 years, and 39% of them were between 41 and 60.
Those who were between 20 and 40 represented about 55% of the arriving drivers
(see table 6.2). The situation is rather different for the departures, where there were no
under 20 drivers. The first group was those between 20 and 40, representing 13%. The
second group of between 41 and 60 represented 87% (see figure 6.9 b).
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Figure 6.9: Truck drivers' age groups
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Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
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Table 6.2: Age groups of truck drivers
Age Groups (Years) <20 20-40 -	 41-60 >60
No. `)/0 No. % No. ')/0 No. °A
Arrivals 2 6 17 55 12 39 0 0
Departures 0 0 21 87 3 13 0 0
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
The second aspect of the survey focused on details concerning the truck drivers'
employment status. The survey showed that the majority of the drivers worked for
private companies (see figure 6.10 a, b). About 74% of the arrivals were employed by
private sector companies, and 26% were self employed. For the departures, about 67%
were employed in private companies and 33% were self employed (see table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Truck drivers' employment details structure
Private Self
Type of employer company employed
employees
No. % No. %
Arrivals 23 '	 74 8 26
Departures 16 67 8 33
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
Finally, data about the nationality of truck drivers showed that for the arrivals, about
68% were Bahraini and about 3% were Saudi and Qatari. Other Arab nationals
represented 10% of the sample and about 16% were other nationals— most of whom
were south-east Asians and south Asians. For the departures, only four major
nationality groups were found (see table 6.4). Saudis represented 33% of the sample,
while Bahrainis were 29%. Other Arabs amounted to 17% and other nationals, most
of whom were south-east Asians and south Asians were about 21% (see figure 6.11 a,
b).
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Figure 6.10: Truck drivers' employment status
la Private Company Employee
B Self Employed
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
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Figure 6.11 :Truck drivers' nationality
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
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Table 6.4: Nationality of truck drivers
Nationality Saudi Bahraini .Qatar, - Other Arabs Non-Arabs
No. % No. °A) No. % No. % No. °AI
Arrivals 1 3 21 68 1 3 3 10 5 16
Departures 8 33 7 29 0 0 4 17 5 20
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
6.3 Types of goods
Most of the goods carried by the selected trucks were industrial products as table 6.5
shows. They represent about 65% for the trucks arriving from Bahrain and about 63%
of the trucks departing from Saudi Arabia. Then comes processed food which
represented about 26% of the arriving trucks and around 8% of departures.
Agricultural products, chiefly fruit and vegetables, represented about 29% of
departures only. This is because Saudi Arabia has a well established agricultural
sector enabling the country to attain a surplus in some types of agricultural products.
Table 6.5: Types of goods transported by trucks
Arrivals Departures
Type No. % Type No. %
Industrial Products 20 64.5 Industrial Products 15 62.5
Processed Food 8 25.8 Agricultural Products 7 29.2
Empty Trucks 3 9.7 Processed Food 2 8.3
Total 31
,
100 Total 24 100
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
6.4 Frequency of crossings by truck drivers
As for the individual travellers, truck drivers were asked about their frequency of
crossing the border using the same four categories: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily
bases. The results show that for the arrivals, 49% of the sample cross the borders on a
monthly basis (see figure 6.12 a), while 38% of them cross on weekly basis. Only 6%
cross on a yearly basis, and those who cross daily represent 8% of the drivers.
The frequency of travelling for departures is rather different from the previous one
as illustrated in figure 6.12 (b). The drivers who are travelling on a monthly basis
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represent about 24% of the total sample, while those who travel on a weekly basis
represent 50%. Drivers travelling on a daily basis represent 13% of the sample. This
pattern contrasts with the previous pattern of arrivals, especially on monthly and
weekly bases, reflecting to some extent that there are more flows of goods from the
Saudi side to the Bahraini side than the reverse. The arriving trucks from Bahrain to
the Saudi side face a considerable amount of regulation and bureaucratic procedures
that result in a substantial time delay at the check-point as will be explained below.
The trucks going out of the Saudi side to the Bahraini side do not seem to be
experiencing the same delays, as the results of the questionnaire show.
6.5 Time consumed at the check-points
Generally, there are two types of trucks passing across the Saudi borders. One type
is the 'transit' trucks whose destination is not Saudi Arabia, whether their origin is a
GCC country or other than GCC, i.e. Arab countries such as Syria or Jordan or some
times Turkey or a European country. The second type is those trucks which are
heading for a Saudi destination, or which started from the Saudi side and aim at a
GCC destination. At KFC, the first type spends less time in both directions, arrival
and departure, because there are specific procedures regulating the movement of
transit trucks. For example, if there is a transit truck coming from Jordan and heading
for Bahrain, the truck should be sealed and secured and not allowed to be checked
until it reaches its final destination. The same situation applies if a transit truck is
coming from Bahrain heading to a country other than Saudi Arabia; the Saudi customs
officials just check the papers of that truck and let it pass through without checking its
load. Such transit trucks represented less than 36% of the total trucks in both
directions in 1995 (see table 6.6). But the second type of trucks spend much more
time, especially the arrival trucks, because the Customs Department conducts a
thorough check for each coming truck and this takes a considerable amount of time at
the check-point.
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a) Frequency of crossing the border for arrivals
Yearly	 Monthly	 Weekly	 Daily
b) Frequency of crossing the border for departures
Yearly	 Monthly	 Weekly	 Daily
Figure 6.12: Frequency of crossings by truck drivers
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
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Table 6.6: Type and number of trucks passing through 1CFC 1995
Arrivals Departures
Truck Type No. % Truck Type No. %
Saudi destination 10,900 64.7 Bahraini destination 31,800 76.2
Transit 5,900 35.3 Transit 10,000 23.8
Total 16,800 100 Total 41,800 100
Source: Saudi Customs, The Yearly Report, 1995.
The result of fieldwork reported above illustrates the pattern of time consumed for
arrival and departure trucks as can be seen in figure 6.13 (a-c). First, 33% of the
sample of truck drivers departing the Saudi check-point answered that they waited
less than 30 minutes before exiting the Saudi check-point, and about 42% said they
spent from 30 to 60 minutes. Those who waited from 61 to 90 minutes represented
21% of the drivers and only 4% answered they spent from 91 to 120 minutes. Nobody
waited more than 120 minutes (see figure 6.13 b). This can be compared with trucks
departing the Bahraini check-point (see figure 6.13 a), where 45% of arriving truck
drivers reported that they spent less than 30 minutes at the Bahraini crossing point,
while 48% of them said that they spent between 30 and 60 minutes. Only 3%
answered they spent more than 120 minutes. From figure 6.13 b, one can conclude
that up to 70% of the trucks departing from the Saudi side spent an hour or less to
finish their regulations and formalities at the check-point, which means a quite
reasonable time if one take into consideration that the daily average of trucks leaving
the Saudi check-point is 172 trucks*.
As to the truck arrivals from Bahrain at the Saudi check-point, the survey revealed
that about 61% of the drivers said that they spent more than 120 minutes (see figure
6.13 c). Some of this category, as a Customs official told the author, waited up to 24
hours before being allowed to pass through. In contrast to this, only 6% of the drivers
said they waited less than 30 minutes. Between these two extremes, about 19%
answered that they spent from 30 to 60 minutes, while 12% spent from one hour up to
two hours (see table 6.7).
The author calculated this figure for 1998 according to unpublished statistics provided by the Saudi
Customs.
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This delay for arrival trucks at the Saudi crossing point is not unusual in global
terms. For example, at some of the major crossing points within the European Union,
specifically in central and eastern Europe, lorries during high seasons experience
considerable delays reaching up to 24 hours, as revealed by the Official Journal of the
European Community (Official Journal 1995, pp. C152/35-36). In the GCC case, it is
the regulations and procedures undertaken by Saudi Customs which have mainly
contributed to this delay, i.e. it is not the number of trucks. An interview with the
General Director of the Saudi Customs Department revealed that his Department is
aware of the delay problem, and has acted accordingly:
"Since last year (1997) the Customs Department has undertaken some measures to increase
the service hours at the check-points with the GCC from 8 hours to 12 hours daily to
decrease the pressure on the check-points and to decrease the waiting time for trucks, and
the service time for sections pertinent to immediate clearance designated for vulnerable
goods, such as vegetables and dairy products, has been increased up to 24 hours daily"
(Interview with Dr. Aljabor, 1998).
However, as the results of the fieldwork revealed, the delay for trucks at KFC has
still not been resolved. The regulations which are applied at KFC are as follows.
According to Article 3 of the UEA mentioned above, for any product to qualify as a
'national' product should have a locally value added of it at least 40% of its final
value. In addition, a GCC citizen should own at least 51% of the producing plant. To
apply this regulation properly, the Saudi Customs officials should check every truck
arriving at the border from a GCC neighbour and carrying 'national' products, by
reference to the following documents. First, a 'certificate of origin', which contains
information about the exported goods, to show that it has been produced nationally in
order to exempt it from tariffs. Second, the 'export manifesto', which contains
detailed information about the exported goods, i.e. their types, quantity and the like.
Third, the invoice issued by the exporter concerning the goods on the truck giving
information such as the value, the name of merchant, the name of customer and other
details. Finally, a declaration produced by the exporter that all the information
provided is correct and nothing prohibited is being dispatched (GCC, Cooperation in
Customs no date). Of course, these regulations represent only part of the bureaucracy
involved, other formalities undertaken by Passport Control officials also playing a
part. Checking such details as well as checking the contents of each truck to make
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sure that illegal items are not hidden takes a considerable amount of time. It is
surprising that more time is not taken than appears to be the average.
The GCC as an organisation is still in the first stage of Balassa's classification of
economic cooperation (see figure 6.14), which is the free trade area as explained
earlier. To open the boundary further to good movements, the GCC should move
towards the common market stage, where all the barriers at the borders can be
removed. However, political factors are playing a major role in maintaining the status
quo, and contributing to the slow pace of progress toward the final objectives of the
GCC. This can be explained by two main factors can be highlighted, the first is the
lack of legal sovereignty or a 'supra-national' government, and the second is the
influence of different interest groups in Saudi society.
Table 6.7: Time consumed by trucks at the check-points
Time Categories
(Minutes)
Arriving at
The Saudi Check-point
Departing from
the Saudi Check-point
No. % No. %
<30 2 6.4 8 33
30-60 6 19.4 10 42
61-90 2 6.4 5 21
91-120 2 6.4 1 4
>120 19 61.3 0 0
Total 31 100 24 100
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.
As for legal sovereignty, it is hard for a regional organisation such as the GCC to
implement decisions and agreements that have been reached without having a higher
authority which possesses a legal power over each entity in the organisation. As
Peterson's model suggests (Koppers 1995), the stronger that authority the faster the
progress toward economic integration (see figure 6.14). In reality, however, the
contemporary GCC leaders seem very reluctant to abdicate the national sovereignty of
their states, as the former Associate General Secretary for Economic Affairs of the
GCC, Abdullah El-Kuwaiz made clear:
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Figure 6.14: Peterson's view of the relationship between legal sovereignty and
Balassa's classification of economic cooperation
Legal Sovereignty
Cooperation	 Customs Union
Free Trade Area	 Common Market
Economic Union
Economic Integration
Strong Central
Institutions
Weak Central
Institutions
Source: (Koppers 1995, p. 209)
"The issue of national sovereignty is still very dear to the people and leadership in each
of the six Gulf States. The GCC as a regional integration institution, does not have power
over national entities" (El-Kuwaiz 1987, p. 77).
To clarify this, Saudi Arabia has its own legislative system based on the shariah or
Islamic law. In this law the trading and use of goods such as alcoholic beverages,
pornography, and explicit sexual literature are prohibited, thus the Saudi government
does not dare to open its border totally to trade with the other GCC Members, while
some of those States are not banning the use or import of such goods. For example, in
Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai, most of all alcoholic beverages are sold publicly. In
addition, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia is based on sharia, while most of the
judicial system in the other states, except in certain areas such as personal status laws,
is based on civil jurisdiction. These differences in legislation and judicial systems
have their impacts on life in general and on trade in particular; what is considered
legal in one country may be considered illegal in the other.
The second factor influencing the policy making process in Saudi Arabia, which in
turn has its impact on the government strategies toward its borders with the other
GCC's Members, relates to the role of interest groups (Koppers 1995). Saudi society
has powerful interest groups, the most important among them being the royal family
and the ulima or religious scholars. Each of these groups has different interests, but in
the end they are in agreement regarding the broad objectives of society.
It is not the aim of this study to assess in detail the role of each group, but it is
enough to say that the two groups are guided by the main value system of the society
which is mainly derived from the principles of Islam. Thus, one can expect that even
though those groups generally support more cooperation with the rest of the GCC
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countries, they would prefer to proceed toward the final objectives at a moderate pace.
Together they are a force for conservative values, and open borders are not high on
their agendas.
By looking at what has already been achieved in the economic sphere, one can
realise more clearly the current level of economic integration. The main achievements
have been the exemption of national products from duties and tariffs, establishing the
Gulf Establishment for Investment, and permitting GCC nationals to practice certain
business activities freely such as hotel industry, restaurants and retail trade. The GCC
has also agreed on a common agricultural policy, a common strategy for industrial
development, and on an emergency plan for oil production. If one member state has a
shortage in oil for any reason other members are obliged to supply the quantity
needed as a loan. However, there are several areas which have not been achieved, for
example the single currency, a unified tariff wall against the non-member states, and
to connect the GCC with a unified network of electricity and roads (GCC 1998).
Although the GCC agreed to construct such projects, they have still not been started
yet.
Despite the fact that the economic cooperation between the GCC's States is clearly
emphasised in its charter and given more explicit exposure in the media, some
scholars argue that security cooperation was the main motive in establishing the GCC
(Nakhleh 1986, Koppers 1995). This has clearly not received the same attention, as
will be discussed in the following chapter.
6.6 Conclusion
Despite the increase in trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the GCC, its
magnitude is still small compared to its total world trade (see table 6.1). However,
there is a great opportunity to increase this amount if there is freer movement of goods
across the boundaries. Industrial products represented the majority of trade between
Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, except with Bahrain, and this is related to the
developed industrial base in those countries. A detailed exploration of trade exchange
between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain showed that, according to truck frequency of
crossings (see figure 6.12), about 50% of arriving trucks from Bahrain cross on
weekly and daily bases, and about 60% of departing trucks cross on weekly and daily
bases. This show the effect of geographical proximity on goods movement as well.
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The analysis of time consumed by trucks at KFC check-point showed that there is a
considerable delay especially for the arrivals, and as the fieldwork showed is mainly
due to the regulations carried out by the Customs Department. Those regulations are
of two types, the first group relate to criteria for exempting 'national' products from
tariffs, and the second group relate to security checks to prevent smuggling illegal
materials. By doing so, Saudi Arabia is moving slowly towards a 'common market' as
in Balassa's classification of economic co-operation. The ultimate aim is political
integration and to be achieved through economic integration, so that progress towards
economic integration is an important gauge of progress towards political integration.
The introduction of a single currency may represent the final milestone in this
process, which would be symbolically a very important step.
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Chapter Seven
Security of Saudi Arabia's Borders
7.1 Introduction
To maintain a degree of 'openness' and at the same time to preserve 'security' at the
boundary is a major challenge facing contemporary states in their relationships with
neighbouring countries. The more open a boundary becomes, the more difficult it is to
secure it (Blake 2000). In this chapter, an attempt will be made to answer three key
questions: What does border 'security' mean in general? What does it mean in respect to
the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours in particular? What are the measures and
methods used by the Saudi government to maintain security at its borders? This chapter
draws, among other sources, on unpublished information gathered from some
government institutions, notably the Border Guards and the Customs Department. These
data are analysed and published for the first time.
There are several perspectives on security at the border that have been proposed, and
three of them will be discussed here. First, Pearcy suggests that in order to make a
balance between a degree of isolation and a degree of interchange at the border:
"A state strives to prevent the entry of detrimental influences, but encourages beneficial
intercourse. To effect such an ideal situation it becomes necessary to establish a well-
ordered method of screening all ingress to and egress from the state" (Pearcy 1965, p.
346).
Therefore, security means effective control over the border, and this control, as Pearcy
goes on to explain, ranges from minimum restrictions on the movement of people, goods
and ideas, to tight control
The second perspective is proposed by Kambudzi and Linington who suggest that
security at the border:
"[R]efers to the absence of a real or perceived threat; the absence of disruptive instability
or action, or simply the reign of order. It should be considered as the security of
inhabitants and their property as well as the security of the state. .... Thus, in the absence
of attacks, occupations and other unfriendly gestures, we can talk of security in the border
area" (Kambudzi & Linington 1997, p.31).
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According to this perspective, security in the border area means peace and stability
between the neighbouring countries, and this encompasses not only the borderland
inhabitants but also the state as a whole. In addition, it is arguable that international
borders provide the location for the first line of defence against a wide range of threats to
national security. For example, Blake said that, in addition to conventional military
security, borders are widely perceived as providing three other types of security to the
citizens of the state:
• Protection from unwanted people (e.g. illegal immigrants, terrorists, criminals,
refugees, bogus asylum seekers);
• Protection from unwanted goods (e.g. smuggled goods, drugs, weapons,
pornography);
• Protection from hazards to health and the environment (e.g. diseased animals,
polluted rivers, infected foodstuffs, diseased seeds and plants) (Blake 2000, p.2).
It is worth noting here that the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever which has recently
afflicted livestock in Jizan in Saudi Arabia (reports of this disease began in September
2000, Al-Riyadh Newspaper 15 September, 2000) was originally brought across the
border by livestock from Yemen. This disease is of great danger not just to animals but to
human beings as well; 120 deaths have been reported so far by the Saudi Ministry of
Health, especially in Jizan and Asir provinces (Al-Riyadh Newspaper 1 February, 2001).
This provides a good example of an undesirable trans-boundary incursion which the
border has limited capacity to intercept.
To sum up the previous three perspectives, it can be said that land boundaries must play
a crucial role in securing the state from external and internal threats. An external threat
means any real or perceived danger of attack, aggression or occupation by an external
power. Land boundaries still act as a trip-wire to conventional invading forces. Animosity
between two countries may lead to government-sponsored sabotage operations across the
boundary, and this may fulfil some of the objectives of the aggressor without having the
risk of full-scale launching wars. The internal threat means any real or perceived danger
of damage to the society (e.g. crime, drugs, riots, terrorism). Boundaries, in this respect,
could facilitate for instance terrorism if they are not tight by providing bombs, weapons
and the like which can be used to undertake such unlawful acts. While terrorism or any
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criminal acts can be undertaken without relying on foreign sources, it is also true that
cross-border links between criminal groups has been increasing in recent times.
Therefore, the state has a legitimate right to implement all necessary measures along its
border to maintain security of its people as well as its territory. This leads us to the
question of what are the threats, external and internal, to Saudi security? And how does
the Saudi government acts to protect its people and territory from such threats?
7.2 Threats to Saudi security
Saudi Arabia is an important actor in the international community for three main
reasons: the existence of the two holy places- Makkah and Medinah- on its territory; its
possession of approximately 25% of the world's proven oil reserves; and its geostrategic
position on the main world trade routes in the Red Sea and in the Arabian Gulf. These
elements have created some challenges to Saudi Arabia, especially the substantial oil
wealth. As a guardian of the holy places, some radical states such as Iran during the
Khomeini revolution criticised Saudi Arabia and challenged its position as a guardian to
the two holy mosques. This led Iran to take actions and policies which represented threats
to Saudi Arabia as will be shown below.
In respect of oil wealth, this made Saudi Arabia a tempting target for a number of
powers. Saudi policies and actions regarding its oil production may be regarded as a
threat by foreign powers. For example, the 1973 oil embargo on the United States and
Western Europe following the outbreak of the Arab-Israel war (in October 1973), was a
major factor which made the US develop its Rapid Deployment Force during the Carter
administration in the early 1980s.
As to the geostrategic location of Saudi Arabia on main world trade routes, this makes
the country very vulnerable to any blockade by sea (see figure 7.1). In the north, there is
the Suez Canal bounded by Israel east of the Sinai desert. In the south, there is Bab El-
Mandab and bounded by Yemen to the east and Horn of Africa countries to the west. On
the Arabian Gulf; there is the Strait of Hormuz, which is bounded by Iran to the east. The
most prominent external threats to Saudi Arabia come from three main powers in the
region, Israel, Iran, and Iraq as discussed in the following section.
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7.2.1 External threats
The external threats to Saudi Arabia have varied, from the early days of its existence as
a sovereign state in 1932 through to the present. Nevertheless, the present major sources
of threat lie in some of the surrounding regional powers, such as Israel from the north-
west, and Iraq and Iran from the north-east (see figure 7.1).
Although there has been no direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the
Kingdom has always supported the Palestinians and the other Arabs in their prolonged
struggle with Israel. During the 1973 War between the Arabs and Israel, Saudi Arabia
sent troops to participate in the war effort alongside the Egyptian and Syrian forces, and
at the same time used oil as a weapon to influence the Western countries, especially the
United States, to pressurise Israel to stop the war (Safran 1985). According to some
sources, Israel has developed, since 1987, 100 (or perhaps more) nuclear warheads which
can be delivered by Jericho and Lance ballistic missiles with a range up to 1,500
kilometres (IISS 1993). This range puts most of the key cities in Saudi Arabia within
reach (see table 7.1 and figure 7.1).
Since the revolution that toppled the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, Iraqi-Saudi relations
have been unstable culminating in two particular episodes. The first was in 1961 when
Iraq threatened to annex Kuwait based on historic claims of its subordination to Iraqi
territory in Ottoman times. The second was during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990, when Saudi Arabia condemned the invasion and strongly supported Kuwait, its
GCC neighbour, and allowed the allied forces to use its territory and participated in the
war to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the Al-Sabah, its ruling family, to
their original position. Those events, as well as the conflicting political ideologies
between the two countries, played a major role in formulating Saudi policy towards Iraq,
which has always been characterised by discretion and distrust. Despite the disarmament
process undertaken by the UN, Iraq is still a major military threat to Saudi Arabia. As
table 7.1 shows, Iraq's military capabilities still far outnumber those of the Kingdom,
especially the ground forces.
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Table 7.1: Military balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iraq and Israel
Country Population
(Million)
Total Armed
Forces'
Tanks Combat
Aircraft
Submarine Warships Missiles
(ssm, SAM)'
Iran 71 540,000 307 115 3 117 Frog-7, Scud-B, Scud-
c, CSS, SA, HN-5
Iraq 23.1 429,000 2700 310 0 15 SA-3/6/7/8/9/13/14/
16,Scud, Roland'
Israel 6 175,000 4300 474 3 52 Lance, Jericho, Stinger,
Redeye, Chaparral,
Patriot
Saudi
Arabia
17.5 105,000 1055 432 0 58 CSS-2, Crotale, Stinger,
Redeye, Patriot
Not including reserves.
SSM= surface-surface missiles & SAM= surface-air missiles.
2 Many of the Iraq ballistic missiles capabilities have allegedly been destroyed after the War in 1990 by the
UN inspection teams.
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998), The Military Balance 1998-
1999, London.
Although the Iranian-Saudi relationship during the Shah's reign was an unruffled one,
the Saudis have been very cautious in their relations with Iran especially after the latter
seized in 1971 three small islands in the Arabian Gulf- Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser
Tunbs. Moreover, there have been several disagreements between the two countries
regarding oil production quotas and prices (Quandt 1981). The tension between the two
sides noticeably increased after Khomeini's accession to power in 1979. During the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988), Saudi Arabia supported, alongside the other GCC members, the
Iraqi position against Iran to prevent the latter from gaining an overwhelming victory
which, they believed, would have a devastating effect on the stability of the Gulf region
as a whole. Several events during the 1980s represent clear evidence of the threat that
Iran could generate, not just to Saudi Arabia, but to the other GCC countries as well. For
example, on December 13th, 1981 Bahrain's authorities announced that they had
uncovered a major Iranian induced plot to overthrow the Bahraini government and
destabilise Saudi Arabia (Safran 1985). Some days later, Prince Naif Bin Abdulaziz, the
Saudi Interior Minister, visited Bahrain and signed a bilateral security agreement. He
stated in a press conference that:
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"The encroachment of the security of any GCC state is an encroachment of the security of
the Kingdom... the uncovered subversive conspiracy in Bahrain which has been produced
by Iran is also directed at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" (Albahrain 1981, p.6).
In 1982, an Iranian F-4 fighter intruded into Saudi airspace and was shot down by
Saudi defences. During the Haj season, there have always been tensions, especially in
1986 and 1987. In the 1986 Haj season, a Saudi Customs officer discovered explosives in
some Iranian pilgrims' bags upon their arrival at Jeddah airport, and the investigations
showed that some elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard planned to use the
explosives in sabotage operations in the Holy places. Those investigations were broadcast
on Saudi TV shortly after the incident. In the 1987 Haj season, thousands of Iranians
marched through Makkah streets against the Saudi regulations which prohibited any
demonstration during Haj and, according to some reports, the Iranians started to attack
the Saudi security forces who responded very fiercely to disperse the mobs (Wilson &
Graham 1994).
From the above description, it is obvious that Saudi Arabia is bounded by several states
with military capabilities exceeding those of the Kingdom (see table 7.1). Saudi Arabia's
vast geographical area and its limited enlisted military manpower are the most important
factors limiting the country's ability to confront these dangers. A total area of about 2.5
million square kilometres (965,000 square miles), maritime boundaries of about 2,510
kilometres (1,600 miles) and land boundaries of 4,172 kilometres (2,600 miles) need, in a
context of threat, very large defence capabilities, especially in ground and naval forces
(see figure 7.1). In addition, the enlisted military personnel, including National Guard, are
estimated at about 105,000 (as shown in table 7.1). Therefore, Saudi Arabia has to rely
heavily on air power to compensate for these shortcomings. The Saudi government
started projects to develop its air forces in the early 1980s. An example is the Al-
Yamamah Project, launched in 1985 following an agreement with the British government
to provide Tornado fighters, helicopters, trainers, munitions and British support services
to Saudi Arabia (Cordesman 1997).
The mentioned threats, especially from Iran and Iraq, have clearly had direct effects on
border security, as hostilities between neighbours increase the pressure on their common
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border to protect it from unwanted people entering for sabotage purposes. While such
threats exist, it is difficult to operate a more open border policy.
7.2.2 Internal threats
Internal factors play a more significant role in security matters. The development
process, which started in the early 1970s, has noticeably changed Saudi society and made
a great socio-political-economic impact on life. The flow of wealth gained from oil
revenues has pushed society into modernisation on an unprecedented scale and at
unprecedented rate. Moreover, interaction with the outside world and the flow of
expatriate manpower has introduced new values to the society, which some times conflict
with its traditional values. These factors, among others, have affected society and created
a wide range of behavioural patterns that did not exist before. For example, drugs and
alcohol trafficking have increased, as will be discussed in detail below, suggesting a clear
and growing demand for these types of illegal goods. Another example is the two
bombings in Riyadh in November 1995 and in Al-Khubar in June 1996 which represent a
clear indication of the political impact of the Gulf war, as some extremist groups opposed
the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait.
The people committed the first bombing in November 1995 admitted, after they were
caught, that they smuggled explosive materials used in the bombing from Yemen, as well
as some light arms and munitions such as rifles.
Thus, the major internal threats to Saudi security can be summed up as: illegal
immigration, terrorism, crime, and smuggling including notably drugs and arms
smuggling. In some cases, these issues are interrelated and they become difficult to
separate. For instance, terrorism or illegal crossing can be linked with smuggling.
Customs officials told the author there were a number of cases where the officials caught
some people trying to smuggle explosives through the Saudi check points to carry out
subversive actions in the country. In practice, the seriousness of external threats from
individual and small armed groups is less from Kuwait, Bahrain and the U.A.E. than from
Yemen. Until the 2000 boundary treaty, the boundary with Yemen had the scene of
serious incidents and loss of life over several decades.
Two of the security related issues will be discussed below; illegal border crossings and
smuggling, for they are closely related to border management, the main focus of this
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study. It might be noted that modern communications leap frog international boundaries,
and state governments can do very little to control the flow of information and ideas. The
government of Saudi Arabia is one of the few which has attempted to control the internet,
not least in an effort to stem pornographic and politically inflammatory material. In
February 1997, the Saudi government permitted the introduction of internet services to
the country under the control and supervision of King Abdulaziz City for Science and
Technology (KACST), which is technically responsible for implementing such control
(KACST 2000). Nevertheless, before proceeding into a detailed study of the two issues
mentioned earlier, it is necessary to throw some light on the means by which the Saudi
government is maintaining security at its border with its GCC neighbours.
7.3 Methods of border security management
The Saudi government has adopted several methods to secure its long borders with
neighbouring countries from illegal crossings and smuggling. These methods are: the
achievement of security agreements with its GCC neighbours, the control over the
borders, both land and maritime, through the Border Guards, and firm control over the
formal check-points through the Customs Department. Below is a brief description of
each method.
7.3.1 Security Agreements
Saudi Arabia tried to persuade the other GCC members to sign a unified security
agreement, similar to the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA), but it failed to reach its
goal, partly because of pending border disputes between the member mtates, and also
because Kuwait objected strongly to the Saudi proposal (Nakhleh 1986, Qassim, 1997).
Nevertheless, the Saudi government was successful in reaching bilateral security
agreements with the GCC's States with the exception of Kuwait. As mentioned earlier, in
December 1981 the Saudi Minister of Interior signed a security agreement with Bahrain
following the discovery of the Iranian sponsored plot in Bahrain to destabilise both
countries. In the last week of February 1982, the Saudi Minister of Interior reached
similar agreements with Oman, Qatar and U.A.E. (Safran 1985).
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It is worth saying here that the author was able to read those agreements but was not
allowed to include their full texts in this study, for they are confidential. However, the
following remarks can be made. First, the wording of all the agreements is almost the
same with slight differences between them, which gives an indication that they were
intended to represent a unified approach to all the GCC members. Second, the agreements
have two main parts, the first relating to security cooperation, and the second to criminal
extradition.
The first part of the agreements, which is the most relevant to this study, has three main
sections; which are: cooperation within border areas, cooperation in combating illegal
crossing, and cooperation in combating crime. The section on cooperation within border
areas stated that there should be regular meetings between officials of the Border Guards
on both sides to coordinate their efforts and to exchange information regarding their
work. In addition, it is stated that Border Guards patrols, in those cases when they are
chasing law breakers along the borderline, must not exceed 20 kilometres inside the
territory of the neighbouring country. This section also laid down some rules that should
be followed during such pursuit.
The second section, which focuses on cooperation in combating illegal crossings, sets
out some rules for dealing with the problem. For example, any individual who enters
legally the territory of one state and enters illegally the territory of another, when
apprehended he should be handed over to a Border Guards station of the first state where
he entered legally. But those people, who illegally enter one state and illegally enter the
other, should be treated by the laws of the state where he is caught.
The third section, which is related to cooperation in combating crime, draws out general
principles regarding all types of crime, such as exchanging information regarding
criminals and/or criminal activities, exchanging crime research and studies conducted by
the ministries of Interior and exchanging information about any conference, workshop or
session related to combating crime or to any field within the interests of the Ministry of
Interior in each side.
From this evidence, it can be concluded that the first line of defence against smuggling
and illegal crossing lies in the close cooperation between the neighbouring countries
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along their borders. Without such cooperation, stopping or at least minimising smuggling
and illegal crossing would be a very difficult task.
7.3.2 The Border Guards
The second method of security management is by controlling borders through a
specialised military force, which is the Saudi Border Guards. This force has expanded
gradually through time from a small force with the limited task of patrolling the offshore
areas until reaching its present status as a major force of about 10,500 men, with about
4,500 men assigned to coastal areas (Cordesman 1997), and equipped with modern light
weapons and advanced equipment such as night vision devices. The main tasks assigned
to this force as stated in its Register are:
1- Guarding the Kingdom 's boundaries (land and maritime), sea ports and wharves and
combating smuggling and illegal crossing (incoming or outgoing) according to legitimate
regulations.
2- The early warning of any unusual activities at/or near the borderline.
3- To carry out search, rescue, and guidance operations and to provide assistance to the
marine transportation.
4- To guide lost people in the land borders area and provide assistance to them.
5- The surveillance of the land/maritime boundary to make sure that every individual
within border areas is acting according to the laws and regulations.
6- Ensure security within seaports and wharves.
7- To cooperate with other official agencies within the law and regulations to maintain the
public interest according to the prescribed tasks to the Border Guards. (The Saudi Ministry
of Interior, 1998, p.16).
The wide range of missions and tasks assigned to this force makes it act as 'a light
defensive screen' (Cordesman 1997, p. 175), which protects Saudi territory from any
unwanted people or goods entering the country and harming its people. It also acts as an
early warning system, as stated in paragraph 2 above, in case of military invasion to
Saudi territory. This force has adopted a number of strategies to reduce the incidents of
smuggling and illegal crossing to the lowest possible rate. First, they conduct a very
complex system of surveillance along the entire land/maritime boundaries with GCC
Chapter 7	 216
neighbours, through fixed watch-towers and mobile patrols using four wheel-drive cars,
hovercrafts and helicopters. The author discussed using the latest technology of satellite
imagery in surveillance along the border in a private conversation with Brigadier Faisal
(manager of operations in the Saudi Border Guards), but he explained that the Saudi
Border Guards are not yet using this technology because of its high cost. However, a
cost-effective highly advanced technology has been adopted from the 'Star Wars' project
in U.S.A. and recently developed to be used in boundary surveillance (oral
communication with Ewan Anderson 2001). Second, the Border Guards maintain a range
of stations along the border area connected with the latest wireless communication to
facilitate their patrols operations and other tasks mentioned above assigned for the
Guards.
Third, they have established some types of physical barrier along the land boundaries
and their main purpose is to reduce smuggling. Two types of barrier are worth
mentioning here. The first, is the building of a sand-bank up to eight metres in height
(lower in some areas), along the 456 kilometres Saudi-U.A.E. boundary line (see plate
7.1) and along some sections of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line as well, at a distance of
about 500 meters from the boundary line itself (see figures 7.2 and 7.3). At the foot of
this sand-bank, there is a ditch about one metre deep and two metres wide the main
purpose of which is to hinder vehicles from crossing the boundary line. The second type
of barriers, is the construction of a 60 centimetre diameter pipe about one metre above the
ground (see plate 7.2), for about 60 kilometres along the southern section of the Kuwait-
Saudi boundary line (see figure 7.2). The main purpose of this pipe is also to prevent
vehicles from crossing the boundary. The Border Guards officials claim that these
barriers have been very successful in reducing the rate of smuggling incidents since their
establishment in 1985 (the sand-banks) and 1994 (the pipe).
The Saudi Border Guard is also responsible for managing and organising the legal
crossings of Bedouin, for grazing purposes, at certain check-points exclusively
designated for this purpose. For example, the Saudi Border Guards in 1992 had an
agreement with its counterpart, the Kuwaiti Border Guards, to organise the Bedouin'
trans-border movement at a point along the western section of the Kuwaiti-Saudi
boundary line called Alhamalyiat on the Saudi side, and Alrodaifah on the Kuwaiti side
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(see figure 7.2). The agreement sets out the rules by which the Bedouin are allowed to
cross the borderline to/from each side, such as giving them entry permission, after
keeping their passports at the Border Guards check-point, to cross the border. As well as
having a certificate of vaccination for their animals against communicable diseases,
crossings are only allowed during daytime. All these regulations imply security measures
which have to be managed by the Border Guards to make sure no one is utilising this
arrangement for illegal purposes. A similar agreement had been reached in 1998 between
the Saudi Border Guards and the Emirates Border Guards. They set out two crossing
points for Bedouin, one is at Albateha, near the formal crossing-point, and the second at
Shabitah, further to the south of first point (see figure 7.3).
Also the Border Guards has developed good relations with its counterpart GCC's
border guards following the security agreements mentioned above. They meet regularly
on a yearly bases, and they were able to construct a linked communication network
between the Saudi Border Guards and the other GCC's border guards, to facilitate
cooperation and coordination between them (Interview with Anqawi, 1998).
7.3.3 Customs Department
With 6,224 employees working in all Saudi international airports, seaports and land
crossing-points (The Saudi Customs Department 1995), the Customs Department has two
main tasks: to inspect travellers, merchandise, trucks and the like to prevent smuggling of
illegal goods and materials into Saudi territory, and second, collecting duties on various
commercial goods. To accomplish the first task, which is related to security, the Customs
Department employs various methods ranging from using x-rays machines to using well-
trained dogs for detection of various goods in vehicles.
Total arrivals at all Saudi land crossing-points, as table 7.2 shows, were more than 6
million people in 1996 representing 59% of arrivals at all Saudi check-points. Of these
about 4.5 million people arrived at the check-points with the GCC countries, which
represents 44% of total arrivals into Saudi Arabia. By contrast, all other Saudi land
crossings with Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen only account for 15%. This implies that security
measures that need to be undertaken by the Customs Department at the land crossing-
points are huge compared to sea and airports check-points. If we add the amount of goods
to these figures, it can be demonstrated how vast is the task of this Department. Table 7.3
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shows the amount of goods that cleared and entered through all Saudi check-points in
1995.
Table 7.2: Total arrivals at all entry points in 1996
Check-Point Airports Seaports Land-Crossing-Points
(other than with GCC)
Land Crossing-
Points with GCC
Total
Total Arrivals 3,720,268 523,044 1,559,181 4,552,794 10,355,287
Percentage 36% 5% 15% 44% 100%
Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Statistical Yearbook 1996.
As table 7.3 illustrates, 87% of total cleared goods entering Saudi Arabia in 1995
entered through seaports. But less than 1% entered through airports, and about 12%
through land check-points of which 5% entered through land check-points with GCC
countries. All these goods cannot be cleared and entered into Saudi territory before
checking them for security purposes and, as we have discussed earlier in Chapter six,
these procedures contributed to a considerable delay of truck movements at the check-
points with the GCC countries.
Table 7.3: Total amount of cleared goods entered the Kingdom in 1995
Check-Point Airports Seaports Land-Crossing-Points
(other than with GCC)
Land Crossing-
Points with GCC
Total
Total cleared
incoming goods
(Million Tons)
0.200 22.7 1.8 1.3 26
Percentage 0.77% 87.2% 7% 5.01% 100%
Source: The Saudi Customs Department, The Yearly Report 1995.
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Plate 7.1: The Border Guards' Sand-bank along the Saudi-UAE boundary line.
Plate 7.2: The Border Guards' pipe along the Southern section of Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary.
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Although the methods outlined above - security agreements, the Border Guards' control
over the borders, and the Customs Department control over formal check-points - have
reduced the incidence of illegal crossing and smuggling, these two problems still occur at
the borders with the GCC. The following sections will address the two issues of illegal
crossing and smuggling in more details illustrating their size, pattern and trends.
7.4 Illegal crossing
Illegal immigration is one form of voluntary migration, and the major factors that are
responsible for generating this form of migration are varied. Among the primary factors
are inequalities between the sending and receiving countries in terms of economic
development, income levels and wealth (Parnwell 1993). Moreover, political and
economic instability, political persecution, rapid population growth, and economic
stagnation are also inducements for people to leave their original home and find a better
place to live (Collinson 1993, Leitner 1995).
Generally speaking, illegal immigration takes two forms, illegal crossings and
immigrants who enter legally on short-term visas and subsequently overstay (Collinson
1993). The latter form is not the concern of this study, for it is more related to migration
policy studies rather than boundary management. Rather, we are concerned here with the
first form which is illegal crossing, for it actually occurs at the land borderlines, and
points at entry by sea and air.
Considering the magnitude of illegal crossings (see figure 7.4), the number of captured
illegal migrants at all the Saudi borders has dramatically increased over the period 1982
to 1997, from about 12,000 people in 1982 to 118,000 in 1997. As an oil rich country,
Saudi Arabia is attracting more people, especially from poorer neighbouring countries, to
enter the land of 'promised wealth'. The sudden increase in the number of captured
people illegally crossing in 1992, and the continued rise until 1997, may be explained as
follows. In 1992, about 84% of illegal entrants were from Yemen, and in the following
years their percentage never fell below this proportion of those apprehended (see table
7.4 and figure 7.5). To understand this, during the Second Gulf War in 1990, about
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500,000 Yemenis left Saudi Arabia (Segal 1993) as a result of the Saudi government's
new regulations imposed on the Yemenis who resided in the Kingdom as a reaction to
their government's support of Iraq. Therefore, in the following years, many Yemeni
people tried to re-enter Saudi Arabia illegally thus escaping their country's economic
crises and at the same time hoping that they would be able to find jobs for themselves.
Iraqis come second in rank of those who illegally cross the border. Before the Gulf War
in 1990, they never exceeded 1.5% of the total numbers, but in 1997 they reached about
6,000 people representing 5% of the total captured crossing illegally (see table 7.4 and
figure 7.5). This increase is, obviously, due to the deteriorating political, economic and
social situations in Iraq in the aftermath of the war, which placed a tremendous pressure
on Iraqi people to flee their own country.
Table 7.4: Captured illegal crossings at all Saudi land boundaries 1982-1997
Year 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997
Total	 Captured
Illegal Crossing
11,808 11,302 9,923 10,098 10,692 25,786 55,754 110,146 117,640
Captured Yemeni 10,928 8,977 - 7,318 6,742 6,196 21,752 48,659 100,598 108,592
Percentage 92.5% 79.4% 74% 67% 58%
'
84% 87% 91% 92.3%
Captured Iraqi 171 129 57 93 33 606 1,559 4,497 6,198
Percentage 1.4% 1.1% 0.6% 0.9% 0.3% 2.3% 3% 4.1% 5.2%
Source: Saudi Ministry of Interior, Statistical Yearbook, 1982-1997.
The same trend applies, with slight differences, to the Saudi boundaries with the GCC
in terms of the number of people captured crossing illegally. As figure 7.6 illustrates, in
1982, only 79 people were apprehended at the borders, but the number rose to about
3,200 people in 1998. These figures represent a small percentage, not more than 2%, of
the total apprehended (see figure 7.5). In an interview with the General Commander of
the Saudi Border Guards, the author asked about the proportion caught to uncaught
crossing illegally, but he answered that they "do not have any information about it"
(Interview with General Anqawi, 1998). However, one might suggest that for every
person caught, there is at least one uncaught, so the figures provided by the Border
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Guards could be doubled in this respect. Nevertheless, in 1990 and 1991, the numbers
caught fell significantly to 196 and 59 people, because of the impact of the Gulf War
during these two years. From 1993 the number crossing illegally started to rise again and
continued to do so, with some fluctuations in the years 1993 and 1995 (see figure 7.6).
The nationality of most of the people who illegally cross the eastern boundaries of
Saudi Arabia is illustrated in table 7.5. Most of them (94%) are Iraqis (see table 7.5 and
figure 7.7). The Sudanese come second (1.2%), then the Yemeni (0.9%). Ethiopian and
Saudis representing less than 0.9% of the total people. The remaining 2.4% are from
other nationalities, and there are some unidentified. Most of the Iraqi people were caught
near the border with Kuwait, while most of the Sudanese and Yemeni were caught near
the borders with the U.A.E.. This pattern of nationalities, if we exclude the Saudis,
confirms that the countries of origin are either poor countries or those experiencing an
unstable political-economic situation or both. Thus, these factors appear to be the most
important as 'push factors' in illegal migration in general and illegal crossing in
particular.
Table 7.5: Nationality of captured illegal crossing at the Saudi eastern boundaries with its
GCC neighbours in 1998
Nationality Iraqi Sudanese Yemeni Unid. Ethiopian Saudi Others Total
Number 3,035 39 29 23 18 17 77 3238
Percentage 94% 1.2% 0.9 0.7 0.6% 0.5 2.4% 100%
* Unidentified
Source: Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1998.
The border sections with Kuwait (Alrighi and Allchati) are the busiest in terms of the
number of illegal crossings (see figure 7.8), probably because there is no security
agreement between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. However, there is some form of cooperation between the Saudi Border Guards
authorities and their Kuwaiti counterparts. Most of the people caught at the Kuwaiti-
Saudi border, 12 cases out of 17 in 1998 as the Border Guards' officials told the author,
were trying to cross the border on foot (informal conversation with Major Khalid
Alsobayee, 1998).
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7.5 Smuggling
Smuggling occurs in two different areas of the border, at the check-points and along the
borderline itself. As mentioned above, one of the main tasks of the Saudi Border Guards
is to prevent unlawful materials from being smuggled through the boundary in areas
where there is no official check-point. One of the main tasks of the Saudi Department of
Customs is to prevent unlawful materials from being smuggled through the official
check-points. Below we will discuss each area in more detail.
Before discussing smuggling, it is worth noting at the outset of this section that the
available data about smuggling which the author could obtain from the relevant
government institutions, was not as complete as hoped. For example, the number of
smuggling incidents along the border areas other than the official check-points was not
available in the official statistics of either the Ministry of Interior or the statistics of the
Border Guards. Moreover, information about the types of smuggled materials was not
available for all types of materials for all the years, which makes it difficult to analyse the
trends. For example, the author found that the statistics about drug smuggling are
available for the years 1982, 1983, 1997 and 1998 only, and for the rest of the years they
are not available thus creating a gap in the date between the four years 1984 to 1997.
Fortunately, data about smuggling incidents at the check-points was available, which has
made the analysis of some trends possible.
7.5.1 Smuggling along the borderline
Materials smuggled across the Saudi boundaries are varied. However, the major
materials at all the boundary sections are drugs, alcohol, livestock, light arms and
foodstuffs. The available information in 1982 shows that each border section has a
specific type of material which people were trying to smuggle. As table 7.6 illustrates,
68% of drugs seizures were at Alqurayat on the border with Jordan, and 20% at Arar on
the border with Iraq. Only 5% of drugs that year were seized at the border section with
Yemen (Najran). Regarding alcohol, 71% of alcohol was seized at the border with the
GCC countries (Dammam), 20% seized either on Saudi territorial waters in the Red Sea
(Jeddah) or at the shore, and 8% was seized at the border with Yemen (Jizan). Although
the amount of smuggled livestock that year was very small, 11 head or 52% were seized
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at the border with Yemen (Jizan). At the borders with Iraq and Jordan only 4 head or 19%
were seized. As to foodstuffs, 99% of smuggled material (for example rice, cooking oil,
petrol) was seized at the border with Yemen (Jizan), but most of these materials were
smuggled from Saudi Arabia to Yemen, for their prices are cheaper in Saudi Arabia than
in Yemen. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, we can not compare the situation that
existed in 1982 with the current situation, because the available information is not
complete.
The trend of smuggled materials will be illustrated for some of those materials for
which detailed information for the period 1984-1996 is available. Those materials are
alcohol, livestock and foodstuffs. For other types of material such as drugs and arms
detailed information is available for only two years, 1997 and 1998, and then only for the
borders with the GCC countries which is the focus of this study.
For alcohol, as figure 7.9 illustrates, the trend of smuggling appears to be decreasing,
especially at the borders with the GCC. In 1984 the amount of seized smuggled alcohol
was about 43,000 bottles at all the borders and about 17,000 bottles at the borders with
the GCC which is lesser than those figures of 1982 (see table 7.7), and it declined
significantly afterwards reaching 4,000 bottles in 1988 at all the borders and just 50
bottles in 1991 at the borders with the GCC, which is the lowest amount in this period.
This decline at the borders with the GCC in this particular year is probably due to the
Gulf War which affected smuggling activities across the Eastern borders. Livestock
smuggling at all the borders has a different pattern (see figure 7.10), which fluctuates
from 1984 until 1996, but at the borders with the GCC, is apparently almost absent from
1984 until 1990. Then it begins to rise gradually until reaching a peak of about 10,000
head of livestock in 1995 before dropping to about 7,000 head in 1996 and continuing to
drop until reaching about 1,300 head in 1998 (see table 7.6).
The trend for foodstuffs (see figure 7.11), was not stable from 1984 until 1990, but
begins to drop afterwards, with a slight rise in 1994 before continuing its decline again in
1996. At the borders with the GCC, the smuggling of foodstuffs scarcely feature except
for four years and then only in small quantities. In 1984, only 48 items were seized, and
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100 items were seized in 1988 and 13 and 30 items in the years 1995 and 1996
respectively. This can be explained by the fact that foodstuff prices between Saudi Arabia
and the GCC's countries have no major differences between them, by contrast with the
case between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as noted above.
As to drugs seized at the borders with the GCC, in 1997 about 1,500 tablets * of drugs
were seized (see table 7.6). This significantly increased in the next year to reach more
than 53,000 tablets. Most of this amount was seized at the borders with Kuwait for both
years. Another type of drug, which is hashish, is insignificant in both years. However, in
1999 the Border Guards caught a very large amount of hashish (551 Kilograms) near the
border with the Emirates, as one official informed the author. Arms seized in 1997 and
1998 were less than 400 items (see table 7.6), chiefly at the border with Kuwait. In
addition, livestock seized in the same two years were almost all at the borders with
Kuwait. This indicates that the border with Kuwait has witnessed the majority of the
smuggling and illegal incidents for two possible reasons. As explained earlier in this
chapter, one reason is no doubt the absence of a security agreement between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. The second is the topography of the border area which is almost flat and
easy to cross, and the major roads to the main cities are close to the border area. An
extension of the steel pipe defence to cover the remaining sections of the border might
reduce this activity along the boundary.
Table 7.6: Major smuggled materials seized at the borders with the GCC
Major caught materials 1997 1998
Drugs (tablets) 1,521 53,286
Hashish (sacks) 16 4
Arms (items) ** 391 362
Alcohol (bottles & cans) 26,577 2,851
Sheep (heads) 4,053 1,331
Goats (heads) 77 25
**Different types of guns, pistols and rifles.
Source: The Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1997 & 1998.
* Some types of drugs are made in the form of tablets, the usual form is powder.
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In respect to the nationality of the smugglers at the borders with the GCC, the majority
of them (94%) are Iraqi (see table 7.8 and figure 7.12). Saudis come second (3%), while
other nationalities represent 3% of the total caught in 1998. Smuggling at official check-
points to some degree looks different from open border smuggling, which the next
section will discuss.
Table 7.8: Nationality of caught smugglers at the borders with the GCC 1998
Nationality Number %
Iraqi 757 94%
Saudi 24 3%
Others 21 3%
Total 802 100%
Source: The Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1998.
7.5.2 Smuggling at land check-points
The huge number of people arriving at Saudi airports and land check-points (see table
7.2), as previously mentioned in this chapter, makes the task of the Saudi Customs
Department very difficult and expensive. As figure 7.13 illustrates, most identified
smuggling attempts took place at land check-points and airports. This reflects the small
number of people who arrive in the Kingdom by sea, excepting those who arrive during
the Haj season (their numbers are not included in table 7.2). Figure 7.13 shows a sudden
increase in caught smuggling cases from about 500 in 1988 rising to 6,000 cases in 1989.
This sudden increase is largely because the caught cases at KFC alone in the same year
reached up to 3,000, because the KFC was opened in 1987 but there were not enough
Customs staff at that time as will be explained below. However, the number decreased
sharply in 1990 and onwards until it started to rise again in 1993 until it reached about
1,300 cases in 1995. This decrease in the number of caught cases could be attributed to
more control procedures conducted by the Customs Department. At airport entry points,
the number of caught cases is below 1,000 for the whole period, and it reached its peak in
1990 up to about 700 cases (see table 7.9 and figure 7.13). While, for sea entry points, the
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highest number of caught cases of smuggling was 46 cases in 1995 (see table 7.9).
Nevertheless, this figure may not reflect the actual situation, because as mentioned earlier
the Haj figures are not included in these statistics.
Table 7.9: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995
Entry-Points 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Airports 815 458 668 365 460 361 524 605
Seaports 28 27 8 12 5 3 39 46
Land check-points 586 6,129 1,107 719 579 766 872 1,232
Source: Saudi Customs Department, Yearly Statistical Book, 1995.
The analysis of the official statistics, provided by the Saudi Customs Department, of
caught smuggling cases at the three check-points selected for this study, Alkhafji, KFC
and Albateha revealed the following results. First, most of the smuggling cases in 1997
were at KFC, which represent 80% of the total caught cases at the three check-points for
the year (see table 7.10). This high figure reflects the huge number of people travelling
through this check-point, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5. Alkhafji check-point comes
next, with 19% of the total caught smuggling. Albateha check-point is the smallest in
terms of the number of smuggling cases, representing only 1%. The author interviewed
the General Director of Customs Department as well as the Managers of Customs offices
at the three check-points and asked them about the proportion of caught cases of
smuggling to uncaught cases, but they all answered that they do not have any absolute
figure about this particular matter (Interview with Dr. Aljabor 1998; Attwaijeri 1998;
Alamro 1998; Alhamad 1998). This uncertainty, makes it difficult to evaluate the
smuggling process at the check-points in a more accurate way.
Second, in terms of seized illegal materials, there are five main types seized by
Customs officials at the three check-points (see figure 7.14). These are alcohol, drugs,
arms and munitions, pornographic materials (e.g. photos, videos) and banned publications
(e.g. books, political pamphlets, magazines). Alcohol represents 55% of the total cases of
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smuggled goods at the three check-points (see table 7.11), then comes pornography in the
second place with 20%, banned publications represent 15% and arms and munitions
represent about 8% of the total cases. Drugs and other goods (e.g. cigarettes, watches)
represent less than 1% each.
Table 7.10: Total cases of caught smuggling at each check-point
Check-Point Cases %
Alkhaiji 193 19%
ICF'C 831 80%
Albateha 13 1%
Total 1037 100%
Source: The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.
Third, each of the three check-points reveals differences from the others in terms of the
type of illegal materials seized (see figure 7.15). For example, at Alkhafji 54% of the 193
cases in 1997 were pornographic materials, and about 36% arms and munitions (see table
7.12). The number of alcohol cases at Allchafji was very small, because the law in Kuwait
also prohibits alcohol. After the second Gulf War (1991), arms sales in Kuwait
flourished, as Customs officials at Allchafji (Interview with Alantro, 1998) told the
author, and this is why arms smuggling is the highest at this check-point. The structure is
different at 1CFC; about 67% of the cases were alcohol and about 17% banned-
publications. Pornographic materials made up about 13% of the cases. Alcohol seizures at
this check-point are the highest among the three check-points, because, unlike Kuwait,
alcohol is not prohibited by law in Bahrain. At Albateha, nine cases of caught smuggling,
which forms about 69% of the total cases at this check-point, were alcohol and only 3
cases drugs and 1 case banned-publications. Nevertheless, although the number of caught
cases of alcohol is relatively small compared to the other two check-points, the quantity
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of alcohol in these cases reached more than 40,000 bottles according to Customs official
at Albateha (Interview with Alhamad, 1998).
The above description reveals two aspects. First, in terms of smuggling incidents,
Alkhafji and ICFC check-points are the highest, related largely to the large number of
people who cross these check-points, especially KFC, and partially because of
differences in laws and patterns of social life between Saudi society and the other Gulf
societies. Second, in terms of the types of illegal materials caught, the data shows that
alcohol is the most smuggled material into Saudi Arabia through all three mentioned
check-points. Because alcohol is permitted in two GCC countries, i.e. Bahrain and
U.A.E., the people inevitably try to smuggle it through to Saudi Arabia where it is
forbidden. This may be an indication of social change in Saudi society, which needs to be
studied more thoroughly to understand what is happening. The same thing can be said
about pornography and banned-publications. In respect to arms smuggling, carrying arms
(e.g. pistols, guns, hunting guns) is a very old tradition deeply rooted in Saudi culture,
which stands for security and self-esteem. Therefore, people there find it important to
own weapons although they are not allowed to trade them locally. As to drugs, incidents
of smuggling are the lowest, because the penalty for smuggling drugs in Saudi Arabia is
death. This is made clear to all incoming passengers and travellers. Overall, the level of
drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia is still low compared with many other countries.
Table 7.11: Types of illegal materials caught at all the three check-points 1997
Type Alcohol Pornography Banned
Publication
Arms Drugs Other Total
r Cases 571 208 155 -	 87 7 9 1037
Percent 55% 20% 15% 8.4% 0.7% 0.9% 100
Source: The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.
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Fourth, in respect to the trend of smuggling at the three check-points, figure 7.16 (a-c)
shows the following patterns. At Alkh4 (see figure 7.16 a), smuggling of arms has two
peaks, the first in 1989 when the Customs caught about 450 cases. The second is in 1991
when it reached about 200 cases. By examining more detailed statistics of both years that
the author had access to from the Customs Department, showed that most of those arms
are rifles, pistols, and hunting guns. At KFC (see figure 7.16 b), a significant increase in
alcohol cases was in 1989, when they reached up to 3,000 cases, but other types increased
suddenly in this year as well. This can be attributed, as the Customs officials asserted
(informal conversation with Statistics Section at the Customs Department Headquarter),
to the new situation that the opening of KFC in 1987 has created when so many people
travelled (see Chapter 5) through the Causeway, and many of whom thought it would be
easy to smuggle such materials. At Albateha, the trend is different from the other two
check-points. There was a drop of smuggling incidence in 1992 and 1993, but it rose
from 1994 onwards, especially alcohol which reached its peak in 1996 at about 30 cases
and dropped again afterwards. Smuggling cases of other types never exceeded 15 cases.
Table 7.12: Cases of smuggling illegal materials caught at the three check-points 1997
Check-Points Alcohol Pornography Banned
Publications
Arms Drugs Other Total
Alkhafji 4 104 12 70 1 2 193
Percent of Total (2.1%) (54%) (6.2%) (36.2%) (0.5%) (1%) (100%)
KFC 558 104 142 17 3 7 831
Percent of Total (67.2%) (12.5%) (17.1%) (2%) (0.4%) (0.8%) (100%)
Albateha 9 0 1 0 3 0 13
Percent of Total (69.2%) (0) (7.7%) (0) (23.1%) (0) (100%)
Total 571 208 155 87 7 9 1037
Source: The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.
Finally, the available data for 1997 showed the composition of smugglers' nationality
(see figure 7.17, a-c) at each of the three check-points. At Alkhafji, 71% of the 193 cases
involved Kuwaiti nationals (see figure 7.17, a), 24% Saudi nationals, and only 3%
Bahraini. The remaining 2% are divided between Indians and Syrians. At KFC (see
figure 7.17, b), 76% of cases were Saudi nationals, 9% Kuwaiti and 5% Bahraini. The
rest of the cases (10%) are distributed between the following nationals: Qatari (2%),
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English (1%), American (1%) Indian (1%), Filipino (1%), Unidentified (3%) and other
nationalities (1%). At Albateha, the representation is slightly different, and the number of
cases is smaller than at the other two at check-points. However, as figure 7.17 (c) shows,
39% of cases were Pakistani, 31% Syrian, 15% Saudi and 15% Thai nationals. From the
previous description, it is obvious that the three major nationals who attempted
smuggling at the studied check-points are Saudis, Kuwaitis and Bahrainis.
7.6 Conclusion
In summary, illegal crossing and smuggling, at both the open border areas and check-
points, represent a moderate but significant threat to the internal security of Saudi Arabia.
The measures undertaken by the Saudi Border Guards to control and maintain security in
the border areas with the GCC, are best described as tight and effective as reflected in the
relatively small proportion of illegal crossings and smuggling along the borders with the
GCC compared to the other border sections of Saudi Arabia (see figure 7.4 and table 7.6).
However, although it is difficult to evaluate the measures undertaken by the Saudi
Customs Department, the rate of smuggling at the check-points with the GCC shows that
more effort may be needed in future to control check-points. There is a balance of course
to be achieved between more stringent controls and long delays to passengers, and more
open borders which inevitably allow illegal goods to pass through.
Although topography has a salient effect on the Border Guards' activities (Interview
with Brigadier Abuthneen, 1998), they seem very efficiently adaptive to harsh
geographical conditions. Moreover, as interviews with various Border Guards officials
revealed (Interview with General Anqawi, 1998; with Abuthneen, 1998), there were no
problems in identifying the border line for their patrols, and they never lost their way and
crossed the border accidentally to the other side. This is because the border line is clearly
marked with man-made features, i.e. the sand-bank and the steel pipe constructed by the
Border Guards themselves, which make the tasks of patrols very easy.
Despite illegal crossing is not yet a major problem at the borders with the GCC
neighbours, as figure 7.6 illustrates, it is already a major problem with Yemen where
more than 100,000 illegal immigrants are caught at the border each year. Thus, proposals
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to include Yemen to the GCC requires serious consideration, for this step might help to
improve the general economic situation in Yemen and in turn help to release much of the
pressure from the Saudi border with it.
To conclude this discussion, one can say that maintaining security at the borders is a
vital element for Saudi Arabia as a state despite the pressures on it to relax those borders.
The GCC charter, theoretically at least, asserts the principle of 'unity' between the
Member States in Article 4, and the Unified Economic Agreement calls for 'opening' the
borders and guarantees the free movement of people and goods. The Customs Union,
which the Member States agreed at their 20th summit in Riyadh in November 1999, will
come into force from 1 st of March 2005 (Aljazirah 1999). This requires abolition of all
the obstacles from the borders which inhibit movement of trade and goods (see Chapter
6). Therefore, the Saudi decision makers will have to find which way is best for the
national interests, of which security is a fundamental part, and how to reconcile the
regional collective cooperation efforts with the continued autonomy and uniqueness of
the Saudi state. One practical solution might be the expansion of staff and facilities at
crossing points to intensify surveillance while maintaining rapid transit for passengers.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
In our contemporary world, `globalisation' is sweeping fast into many regions of the
world. The most important aspect of `globalisation' is to free world trade from barriers
imposed by governments, which means more 'open' borders. However, this trend is
confronted by many obstacles. Today, one can notice that there are two opposite trends in
the world. On the one hand there is more cooperation and integration towards 'open'
borders (integrated borderlands in the Martinez Model); the European Union is a good
example here. By contrast, there are trends towards more 'closed' borders (alienated
borderlands in the Martinez Model); for example in some Eastern European countries,
including the former Yugoslavia, and many new international boundaries have appeared
in the last decade or so.
Saudi Arabia, of course, cannot escape global trends, and it is evident from this study
that the Saudi experience lies at a point between the two extremes mentioned above. Its
borders with its GCC neighbours are not totally 'open', especially in terms of trade
exchange, and at the same time are not totally 'closed'. The management task at the
borders is to maintain the delicate balance between more open borders and continuing
security. This is not easy to achieve. The study of management practices at the Saudi
boundary revealed the following important conclusions.
8.2 Study Conclusions
The geographical setting of Saudi Arabia, as well as almost all the area of the GCC
countries, is characterised by hot and dry climate which in turn has affected, for centuries,
natural resources and the economic system which is based mainly on agriculture and
above all pasturage. Because of the aridity, there were no permanent stream flows on the
surface and people depended largely on ground water and on wet season for grazing their
herds. Mobility was thus the key to survival in this system. The topography of the eastern
Saudi territories showed that it is characterised mainly by low-lying sand dunes and salt
marshes. This has some effects on the management practices under study, especially
security management.
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As the historical background revealed, the borderless concept of state in Islam, which
prevailed during the first and second Saudi states, was confronted by the new Western
concept of territorial limits of states, which the people in Arabia first met in 1922 in the
Uqair Convention. Ibn Saud was persuaded by the British to accept this concept, which
he could not reject despite the strong opposition by his army the Ikhwan.
The good will policy of Saudi Arabia towards her GCC neighbours has enabled her to
settle several territorial disputes with them, notably the dividing of the Neutral Zone in
1965 with Kuwait, and the establishment of the Fasht Abu-Safah maritime triangle with
Bahrain in 1958 as part of a maritime boundary agreement. Moreover, the legal status of
the Saudi boundaries with the three countries, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the U.A.E. is well
established although there were some detailed shortcomings in the treaties. Those
shortcomings still have recent political impacts (e.g. the Emirates position towards the
opening of Shaibah oil field). However, these shortcomings proved to have little
significant effect on day to day management practices. The condition of the boundary
monuments on the ground has deteriorated, but this also has little effect on management
practices. There was apparent absence of institutional arrangements, apart from the
KSJC, to deal with day to day low-profile matters as well as more serious crisis and
friction that may occur on the border areas.
Despite similarities and good relations between the GCC countries, and despite the
GCC having produced general policies, such as the Unified Economic Agreement, which
aim to open the borders between the member states for free movement of people and
goods, there are some political differences between Saudi Arabia and those countries.
The differences are mainly manifested in legislation and legal systems which affect Saudi
strategies towards its borders with the GCC.
The management of access for people showed that despite Saudi Arabia having allowed
other GCC citizens to enter the Kingdom without visas for long or limited stay, it is still
requiring passports as the accepted document for entry, whereas several member states
such as Oman and U.A.E. have accepted the ID card for passage. However, these
requirements did not hinder people from travelling across the Saudi borders, rather the
movement of people has noticeably increased after the UEA, especially between Saudi
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Arabia and Bahrain. For example, the number of Saudis travelling to Bahrain increased
from 94,000 in 1982 to about 1.6 million in 1996. The Bahrainis who entered Saudi
Arabia in 1982 were 47,000 and they increased to 880,000 in 1996.
The study revealed that the travellers across the Saudi borders with Kuwait, Bahrain,
and U.A.E., Saudis and non-Saudis, varied in their characteristics such as age,
occupation, mode of transportation, companions, and nationality. It also revealed that the
three check-points varied in terms of infrastructures and the availability of amenities.
Despite computer systems being introduced to the check-points for processing the
passage of travellers, the study showed that infrastructures at Allchafji and Albateha are
not as adequate as at the KFC. The shortcomings in providing good facilities could affect
not just travellers but also officials at the check-points which might cause considerable
delay.
The frequency of travelling across the border is a result of two factors, geographical
distance and regulations at the check-points. At KFC, the geographical proximity and the
reasonable efficiency of the check-point shows that for arrivals the majority of travellers
(40%), which most of whom are Bahrainis, are travelling on a monthly basis and 12% on
weekly basis, which perhaps underlines the effect of geographical distance. For the
departures at KFC, 27% were travelling on a monthly basis and 28% on a weekly basis.
This contrasted by travelling frequency at Allchafji where 44% of arrivals and 31% of
departures were travelling on a yearly basis. This is possibly affected by the regulations at
Allchai which make the proportion of people travelling yearly rather high. At Albateha
the majority of travellers on both directions are travelling on yearly basis, and a very
small proportion on weekly and daily basis.
Analysis of the purpose of travelling showed that most of travellers at Alkh4i in both
directions are travelling to visit their relatives, while most of them at KFC on both
directions are travelling for leisure. At Albateha, most of departures are travelling for
leisure, and most of arrivals are travelling to visit their relatives.
The efficiency of the check-points can be roughly measured by the time taken by
travellers to pass through. The study showed that for arrivals at Alkhafii, 58% of
travellers spent more than 50 minutes to finish their formalities as regulations differ for
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departures and arrivals. This may reflect the fact that the infrastructure at the check-point,
as discussed above, is not adequate and causes a considerable amount of delay, or it could
be attributed to normal congestion which can occur at check-points. At KFC, by contrast,
37% of the arrivals spent less than 10 minutes, and 32% spent from 10-20 minutes. This
suggests that this check-point may be more efficient in terms of procedures and
infrastructure. At Albateha, 35% spent more than 50 minutes. This could be attributed to
the local regulations and the mode of transportation; 33% of the arrivals came by bus. For
the departures, the situation is different. The majority of travellers at Alkhafji and
Albateha spent 20 minutes or less, while at KFC 26% spent 10-20 minutes and 50% spent
21-50 minutes. In general, the time consumed seems reasonable by international
standards.
Access for goods reveals a different picture from the above. As a result of the UEA,
tariffs on GCC's national products have been abolished between the members states, and
therefore the trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the three countries has increased,
but it still represents only about 6% of the country's total trade. The majority of exports
from Saudi Arabia to the three countries comprise industrial products, agricultural
products, and natural resources. The amount of Saudi exports is larger than imports which
reflects the dominance of the Saudi economy over other states' economies.
The survey of trucks crossing to/from Bahrain showed that most of the exported goods
from Saudi Arabia are industrial products which represent 60% of the goods passing to
Bahrain. Then comes agricultural products, which represent 29%; the remaining
proportion is for processed foods. Also most of the imports from Bahrain are industrial
products, but there were few agricultural products, because agriculture in Bahrain is very
limited compared with Saudi Arabia. The frequency of trucks crossing reflects the extent
of trade links between the two sides. For the departures, 50% of trucks cross weekly and
13% daily, while for the arrivals, 49% cross monthly, 38% cross weekly, and 8% cross
daily.
With respect to time consumed for trucks at the border, the survey revealed a very
interesting result, especially for the arrivals; 61% of the arrival trucks spent more than
120 minutes at KFC, some of them as long as 24 hours. This can be largely attributed to
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the detailed regulations specifying how the Saudi Customs Department must check
trucks, which are very time consuming. The situation for departures is rather better,
where 33% of the trucks spent less than 30 minutes and 42% 30-60 minutes, because the
regulations for departing trucks are less complicated.
It is arguable that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states are still in the second
stage of Blassa's classification of economic cooperation (Kopper 1995), which is the
'free trade area'. The move towards the third stage, which is the 'common market', is
hindered by a number of factors, the most important of which are: sovereignty issues,
boundary disputes (e.g. the Bahrain-Qatar dispute, which resolved in 2001) differences in
reconciling legislation and legal systems, and national interest groups.
Therefore, management practices at the three Saudi boundaries show inconsistency
with the GCC's long term objective of political unity. Regrettably the trend is seemingly
not towards more openness. In due course, Saudi Arabia may be forced to conclude that
the modern state can no longer function as the:
"Container of modern society, but policy makers seem some way distant from this radical
alternative" (Agnew 1998, p. 51).
Fundamentally, the policy regarding border crossings, and control of movement across
the border is the result of foreign policy, as primarily expressed in the GCC Charter.
Local factors dictate the levels of demand for crossing, and the implementation of
government legislation and directives is left to officials on the ground.
The analysis of security management practices at the border showed that both external
and internal threats have their impacts on the border. The methods adopted by the Saudi
government to manage all the country's borders with neighbouring states in terms of
security, which are security agreements with the GCC neighbours; the Border Guards;
and the Customs Department, were quite effective, despite the fact that there is a lack in
adopting the latest technology in surveillance. However, as the official statistics showed,
most of the challenge is at the land check-points with the GCC neighbours where 44% of
arrivals to all the entry points come through the check-points with the GCC states. This is
also reflected in the amount of smuggling at those check-points, especially the KFC.
Another challenge to the Border Guards is tackling increasing levels of illegal migration,
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a global phenomenon attributed to a number of factors, among them economic
inequalities between countries, political instabilities and the like (Wood 1994). This is
very clear in the nationalities of the caught illegal migrants, most of whom are Iraqis,
Sudanese and Yemenis. Nevertheless, the rate of caught illegal immigrants at the borders
with the GCC is lower than that with Yemen and Iraq (see figure 7.5).
Smuggling represents a serious problem at both check-points and open bordersA high
proportion of the smuggled goods across open borders with the GCC countries are
alcohol, livestock (e.g. sheep and goats), drugs, and arms. Most smugglers are Iraqis and
Saudis. Most of the seized materials at the check-points are alcohol, pornographic
materials, banned publications, and arms (e.g. rifles, pistols, and guns). At KFC most of
the seized goods are alcohol and banned publications. At Alkhai, most of the seized
goods are arms and pornographic materials, and at Albateha, most of the seized materials
are alcohol and drugs. This suggests that there are significant changes in Saudi society
which create a demand for such materials, except arms whose ownership represents a
deeply rooted tradition in Saudi society.
It can be said that management practices along the Saudi borders with its GCC
neighbours have achieved reasonable success in maintaining security and allowing a
degree of access. The success of security measures at the borders is evidenced by illegal
crossings and smuggling which, however serious, are the lowest compared to the other
Saudi borders. This can be mainly attributed to the cooperation between the Saudi
authorities and their GCC counterparts, which at other non-GCC borders is not as strong
as at these borders. The success in allowing access appeared in the reasonable time taken
in crossing the borders, especially for people. There could be some improvements for
allowing access for goods, but generally it is not fundamentally hindering the movement
of goods.
Therefore, the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours lie somewhere between open
and closed. Almost all the studied borders share the same situation, with small
differences, and it is likely that this situation will prevail for some time in future unless
Saudi Arabia and the GCC states reach a stage where they will concede some of their
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sovereignty in the common interest, and until they find a formula to reduce remaining
differences between them.
The foregoing results can be integrated in a general model of the Saudi boundary
management (see figure 8.1). The model shows that there are two main sets of factor
affecting Saudi foreign policy, boundary management policies and management
practices. On one hand, there are the GCC Charter and general policies such as UEA,
public opinion of the people, and economic realities (e.g. industrial policies, agricultural
policies). Such factors are pushing towards more open borders to achieve the ultimate
aim of the GCC which is 'unity' between its Member States. While, on the other hand
security considerations, legal system and values, and illegal migrants are factors pushing
towards more closed borders. Saudi foreign policy as it is affected by the GCC and other
factors has its impact upon boundary management policies and practices in respect of
access for people, access for goods, security management, environmental management,
and resources management. Those practices in turn have a feedback to boundary
management policies and strategies and to foreign policy as well.
The numbers in the model indicate the chapter numbers in this thesis where those topics
have been covered. The dotted lines of the two boxes of environmental and resources
management indicates that these two topics have not been covered in this study. The
boxes on the bottom of the model shows which government body is responsible for
certain management practice. The model reveals, however, how complicated is 'boundary
management' and the wide range of factors which may affect management practices.
8.3 Recommendations
It is very difficult to see how the contradictory objectives of open borders and a high
level of security can be achieved. This problem is being faced by states all round the
world which are experiencing the same dilemma. Even the citizens of most states have
not decided whether they would prefer the social and economic benefits of open borders,
or the sense of security which closed borders create. Although no easy solution can be
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suggested, there are certain actions which Saudi Arabia and the GCC states might take in
an effort to reconcile open borders with national security. These are set out below as
recommendations for serious consideration and further investigation. In detail they lie
beyond the scope of this research. Taken together, they might provide important
guidelines for the future management of Saudi Arabia's land boundaries. They might
enable the borders examined in this thesis to move from about halfway along the
spectrum between 'closed' and 'open', towards 'open'.
8.3.1 Provision of better facilities at border crossing points
It has been shown that the facilities available at the border crossings selected for study
are not good enough for the present number of travellers. Consideration should be given
to providing a range of services for the comfort and convenience of those who pass
through, including truck drivers. These might include some amenities typically found in a
moderate-sized European motorway service station including shops, restaurants,
mosques, and play area for children. The aim is to make delays at such places as tolerable
as possible.
Secondly, the infrastructure necessary to process large numbers of transit passengers
rapidly and thoroughly needs to be redesigned and expanded. With more lanes, larger
offices, and more staff, transit times might be reduced without affecting the thoroughness
of the Customs and security operations. There will always be a balance to be struck
between time spent on searching vehicles and people, and the level of security to be
achieved. From a political viewpoint what happens at the point of entry and exit creates a
profound impression on visitors. If the GCC is to capture the enthusiasm of many of the
common people on both sides of the border, crossing procedures need to be convenient,
efficient and courteous. It goes without saying that tourists need to be treated with special
courtesy. Consideration might be given to training border and borderland personnel in the
art of courtesy and hospitality for which the region is traditionally renowned.
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8.3.2 Adoption of high-technology surveillance systems
More open borders might be achieved if there was less emphasis on security and
control at the boundaries and more activity in the borderlands, assisted by a range of
high-technology surveillance systems. Such systems might help in eliminating smugglers
and illegal migrants, and assist in ensuring tighter control in a zone adjacent to the border.
There would need to be agreements about the deployment of surveillance systems
between states on both sides of the border. In recent years all kinds of detection systems
have been developed particularly for use in coastal waters to assist in the interception of
illegal travellers, smugglers, and the like. These include radar systems, electronic
listening devices, advanced satellite monitoring, and sophisticated patrol vessels and
aircraft. A lot more could be done to deploy these systems on the land. For example, there
is a 200 kilometres electronic 'screen' in place along the south coast of Spain to protect
the European Union from illegal migrants; a system of this kind would be a powerful
deterrent to unwanted border crossing along selected sectors of the Saudi borders (Lynch
2000).
8.3.3 Tracking illegal migrants
The fear of illegal migrants is one of the most compelling reasons why the GCC
boundaries have not opened up in the way the GCC Charter had envisaged. This is hardly
surprising. Migrations world-wide follow a similar pattern flowing from the poor and
populous states to the rich states with employment opportunities. This has long been a
problem because of Saudi Arabia's relative wealth, but even more powerful forces are at
work today generated by poverty, political instability, and greater competition. The trend
is likely to increase substantially with the oil rich states becoming targets for long-
distance migrants from Asia and Africa. The problem needs to be tackled at the point of
origin, in transit, and at the border.
Not enough is known about the routes being followed by international migrants, which
can follow complex routes often by land and sea after paying large sums to agents to
organise their journeys. It would represent a big contribution to the problem if a thorough
investigation could be funded by the GCC states. The funding of such research might
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help authorities to anticipate future coastal landings and attempted crossings, and
concentrate efforts on critical spots. This research would need the full cooperation of a
number of states beyond the Arabian Gulf It might be difficult, because the most popular
routes are liable to change, and they can follow very improbable itineraries. Nevertheless,
GCC states would do well to attempt a comprehensive investigation and adopt policies to
stem the flow before it becomes almost overwhelming.
8.3.4 Borderland development
There is probably not a lot of potential for borderland development on the Bahrain-
Saudi and the Saudi-U.A.E. boundaries. Populations are too sparse and economic
opportunities are limited by the absence of small towns or agricultural production.
Nothing remotely like the borderland region of Europe can be expected to develop along
these borders. However, the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia borderland in the vicinity of Alkhafji
might have some potential. It deserves to be explored. The idea would be to open up the
border to investment in industrial enterprises. On the face of it there is the potential to
generate light industrial activities which might include fish processing based on fisheries
in local waters, and oil-industry related products and services. The Kuwait-Saudi
borderland might also be developed as a free trade zone of some kind to attract regional
as well as local investment. Such a scheme would not resolve the security problem, but it
might be managed so that it makes a significant contribution to the borderland security.
Illegal migrants would have to pass into and out of the borderland zone where
surveillance would be in place. Whatever happens on this border, it is likely to remain the
most susceptible to illegal crossings of all the borders studied in this thesis, with Iraqis
the largest group of migrants.
8.3.5 Institutional arrangements
It has been shown that a number of agencies work together to manage the Saudi Arabia-
GCC international boundaries (see figure 4.1). In general they clearly deliver a service of
reasonable efficiency, maintaining a delicate balance between freedom of movement and
security control. Moreover, the Saudi-GCC borders enjoy one advantage which many
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international boundaries do not enjoy; political harmony between the neighbouring states.
Essentially they share the same aspirations and have signed up to the same objectives in
the GCC Charter. From these sound foundations, it is arguable that a great deal more
could be done to generate borderland prosperity (as recommended above), to facilitate
movement of people and goods, and to continue a high level of local and national
security. In addition, important activities which have not been discussed in this thesis
need to be encouraged and developed, including transboundary resource management,
and environmental and conservation projects in borderlands.
It is recommended that a Borderland Commission should be established with
representatives from all the GCC states, to investigate and possibly implement some of
the initiatives proposed in this section. Much needs to be done which the present agencies
are unable to achieve. In future the challenges will become greater. A Borderland
Commission with a permanent secretariat and a sensible budget would be able to carry
these proposals forward. Its role would be consultation and planning, and of course it
would be available to resolve problems rapidly as they arise between states. One of the
early tasks of the Commission would be to assemble 'best practice' from borderlands
around the world which might be useful in the Saudi-GCC context. The European Union
and the Mexico-United States experiences might be of particular interest. In addition, the
Saudi long experience in solving peacefully almost all of its boundary disputes with its
neighbours enables her to take the lead in such a proposal. The Commission might also
encourage appropriate borderland research, and the preparation of large scale
transboundary borderland surveys and maps. In time, and given continuation of the
critical ingredient of potential goodwill, the Commission may be able to lay foundations
for a borderless world between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, but it is likely to
take a long time.
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Appendices
APPENDIX I
Questionnaire Form for the Departures
Dear the Traveller:
I wish you a very nice and safe trip to where ever you go. This
questionnaire is about a study concerning the "boundaries management",
to see how easy to cross the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours.
So, I would be grateful if you would answer all the questions in this form.
Please remember, the more accurate your answers are, the more reliable
this study is.
Thank you very much for your kindness and cooperation.
The researcher:
A. Alshaikh
King Saud University, Riyadh
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Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In
International Boundary Management
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PEOPLE TRAVELLING THROUGH THE
SAUDI-GCC BOUNDARIES
Check point:---------
Time: -- : — PM, AM
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1PART THREE: Personal Information 	 1
1. Sex:	 El Male	 0 Female
0 less than 20 yrs
El 41-60 yrs
EI 20-40 yrs
El more than 60 yrs
2. Age:
0 Student	 0 Government employed El Private employed
El Self employed 0 Retired	 0 Other, (please specify) 	
3. Occupation:
IPART ONE: Trip Information:
	
	1
1. In which country do you permanently live?
2. From which (city, village) did you start your trip?
3. What is your itinerary? ------ ----
4. What is the purpose of your trip?
	 0 Trading Ef Work	 1:1 Study
0 Leisure	 El Visiting relatives
0 Other, (please specify) 	
5. How many times do you cross the border? (Please indicate the number)
0 Every year 	
 El Every month
0 Every week 	  El Every Day
6. Are you travelling: 12 By your self
0 With friends
El With your family
7. Do you have any relatives on the other side: 	 El Yes El No
IPART TWO: Border's Check Points Information: 	 1
8. How long did you take to cross the Saudi check-point (all formalities)?
O Less than 10 minutes 	 0 10 -20 minutes 0 21 - 30 minutes
O 31 -40 minutes
	
El 41-50 minutes El more than 50 minutes
9. Did you use the services available at the crossing-point:	 0 Yes El No
10. If yes, What sort did you use:	 El Restaurant	 0 Bank	 El Petrol
0 Mosque	 0 Clinic	 0 Shops
El Other, (please specify) 	
11. Nationality: El Saudi	 0 Bahraini	 El Qatari	 0 Omani
0 Kuwaiti 0 U.A.E	 0 Other Arab 0 Non-Arab
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15. Method of transportation:
El Small car mi Mini bus 1E Bus
Ef Other, (please specify) 	
The end of questionnaire
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APPENDIX II
Questionnaire Form for the Arrivals
Dear the Traveller:
I wish you a very nice and safe trip to where ever you go. This
questionnaire is about a study concerning the "boundaries management", to
see how easy to cross the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours. So, I
would be grateful if you would answer all the questions in this form. Please
remember, the more accurate your answers are, the more reliable this study
is.
Thank you very much for your kindness and cooperation.
The researcher:
A. Alshaikh
King Saud University, Riyadh
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Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In
International Boundary Management
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PEOPLE TRAVELLING THROUGH THE SAUDI-
GCC BOUNDARIES
Check point: -------
Date: — / -- / ---	 Time: -- : — PM, AM
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IPART ONE: Trip Information: 	 1
1. In which country do you permanently live?
2. From which (city, village) did you start your trip?
3. What is your itinerary?---------
4. What is the purpose of your trip?
	 El Trading El Work	 El Study
0 Leisure	 El Visiting relatives
CI Other, (please specify) 	
5. How many times do you cross the border? (Please indicate the number)
0 Every year 	
 El Every month 	
0 Every week 	
 0 Every Day
6. Are you travelling: El By your self
El With friends
DI With your family
7. Do you have any relatives on the other side:	 El Yes Ell No
IPART TWO: Border's Check Points Information:
8. How long did you take to cross the Bahraini check-point (all formalities)?
0 Less than 10 minutes	 a 10 - 20 minutes 1: 21 - 30 minutes
1:1 31 - 40 minutes	 El 41-50 minutes 0 more than 50 minutes
9. How long did you take to cross the Saudi check-point (all formalities)?
El Less than 10 minutes 	 El 10 - 20 minutes El 21 - 30 minutes
1:1 31 -40 minutes
	
El 41-50 minutes 0 more than 50 minutes
10. Did you use the services available at the crossing-point: 	 El Yes El No
11. If yes, What sort did you use: 0 Restaurant	 0 Bank	 0 Petrol
0 Mosque	 0 Clinic	 0 Shops
El Other, (please specify) 	
IPART THREE: Personal Information	 1
12. Sex:	 lj Male	 0 Female
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Saudi	 Et Bahraini	 El Qatari	 El Omani
0 Kuwaiti l=1 U.A.E
	 0 Other Arab 13 Non-Arab
15. Nationality: mi
13. Age: El lesser than 20 yrs	 121 20-40 yrs
13 41-60 yrs	 0 more than 60 yrs
14. Occupation: 13 Student 	 El Government employed 1::1 Private employed
El Self employed 0 Retired
	
13 Other, (please specify) 	
16. Method of transportation:
0 Small car El Mini bus 13 Bus
El Other, (please specify) 	
The end of questionnaire
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APPENDIX III
Questionnaire Form for the Truck Drivers
Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In
International Boundary Management
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TRUCK DRIVERS TRAVELLING THROUGH THE
SAUDI-GCC BOUNDARIES
Check point:------
Time: — : -- PM, AM
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IPART ONE: Trip Information:
1. In which country do you permanently live?: 
	
2. From which (city, town, village) did you start your trip?:
3. What is your itinerary ?: 	
4. How many times do you cross the border:
Every year 	 	 0 Every month
	  0
Every week 	  0Every Day	 0
5. What kind of goods do you carryout?-	
6. What is your truck capacity:
1-less than 10 Tons	 010-20 Tons 0 21-30 Tons 0
more than 30 Tons
IPART TWO: Border's Check Points Information:
7. How long did you take to cross the check point:
	less than 30 minutes	 0	 30 - 60 minutes	 0
	
60- 90 minutes
	 0	 90 - 120 minutes	 0
more than 120 minutes 0
8. Did you use the amenities available on the crossing-points: 	 Yes 0	 No 0
9. What sort did you use:
	 Restaurant	 0	 Bank 0	 Petrol 0 Mosque 0
Clinic	 0	 Shops 0	 Other, pecify 	
IPART THREE: Personal Information
10. Age: less than 20 0	 20-40 0
41-60 0 more than 60 0
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11. Nationality:	 Saudi 0	 Bahraini 0	 Qatari 0
	
Omani 0	 Kuwaiti 0
	
U.A.E 0
Other Arab 0 Non-Arab 0
The end of questionnaire
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APPENDIX W
THE GCC CHARTER
The States of
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Sultanate of Oman
State of Qatar
State of Kuwait
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds and special relations, common characteristics and
similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and
Based on their faith in the common destiny and destination that link their peoples; and
In view of their desire to effect coordination, integration and cooperation among them in all
fields; and
Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and integration among them serve
the higher goals of the Arab nation; and
In order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links; and
In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all vital fields that concern their
peoples and realize their hopes in a better future on the path to unity of their states; and
In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realization of
closer relations and stronger bonds; and
In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Establishment of Council
A council shall be established hereby to be named "The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of
the Gulf," hereinafter referred to as the "Cooperation Council."
ARTICLE 2
Headquarters
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
ARTICLE 3
Cooperation Council Meetings
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may convene in any
member state.
ARTICLE 4
Objectives
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
1. To effect coordination, integration and cooperation between member states in all fields in order
to achieve unity among them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing between
their peoples in various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
a. Economics and finance
b. Commerce, customs and communications
c. Education and culture
d. Social and health affairs
e. Information and tourism
f. Legislation and administrative affairs.
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4.	 To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, minerology,
agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research centers; to implement
common projects, and to encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their
peoples.
ARTICLE 5
Council Membership
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers'
meeting held at Riyadh on February 4, 1981.
ARTICLE 6
Structures of the Cooperation Council
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main structures:
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat -General.
Each of these structures may establish branch organs as necessary.
ARTICLE 7
Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed
of heads of member states. Its presidency shall rotate alphabetically according to the names of
the member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may be
convened at the request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territory of member states.
4. A Supreme Council meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member
states.
ARTICLE 8
Supreme Council's Functions
The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council,
particularly concerning the following:
1. Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the
Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations.
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and nominate its
members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.
ARTICLE 9
Voting in Supreme Council
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous
approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural
matters shall be carried by a majority vote.
ARTICLE 10
Commission for Settlement of Disputes
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1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for Settlement of
Disputes," which shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the nature
of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not
resolved within the ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer
such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme
Council for appropriate action.
ARTICLE 11
Ministerial Council
1. The Ministerial Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or other
delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among members every three months
by alphabetical order of the states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary sessions
at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE 12
Functions of the Ministerial Council
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following:
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing
cooperation and coordination among member states in the various fields and adopt required
resolutions or appropriate recommendations.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities between member states in all fields.
Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further
submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the
Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities,
develop cooperation between the member states' chambers of commerce and industry, and
encourage flow of working citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized
committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate
recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedure as well as the Rules of Procedure of the
Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a
renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative and
financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General, and submit recommendations to the
Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare their agendas.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE 13
Voting in Ministerial Council
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council on substantive matters shall be carried by a unanimous
vote of the member states present and voting, and on the procedural matters by a majority vote.
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ARTICLE 14
Secretariat-General
1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by
deputies and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the
Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be renewed for one time
only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries-general.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-General's staff from among the citizens of
member states and may not make exceptions with the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-General and
the smooth flow of work in its various organizations. He shall represent the Cooperation
Council with other parties within the powers vested in him.
ARTICLE 15
Functions of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions:
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, integration and programs for member
states' common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the implementation by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of
the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth of
the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budgets and accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings, prepare agendas and draft resolutions for the Ministerial
Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convening of extraordinary sessions
of the Council whenever necessary.
9. Perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.
ARTICLE 16
The Secretary-General, the assistant secretaries-general and all members of the Secretariat-General's
staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the member
states.
They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their duties and from
divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.
ARTICLE 17
Privileges and Immunities
1. The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the territories of all member states
such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize their objectives and
carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council and the Council's employees, shall enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose
among the member states. A special agreement shall organize the relations between the Council
and the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are pre-pared and put into
effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall
enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar organizations.
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ARTICLE 18
Budget of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal
amounts.
ARTICLE 19
Charter Implementation
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of the six member states
named in this Charter's Preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs which shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state, pending the establishment
of the Secretariat-General at which time the latter shall become depository.
ARTICLE 20
Amendments to Charter
1. Any member state may request an amendment to this Charter.
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer
them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if it is approved unanimously by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE 21
Closing Provisions
No reservations may be voiced with respect to the provisions of this Charter.
ARTICLE 22
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of
Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab
1401 corresponding to May 25, 1981.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Sultanate of Oman
State of Qatar
State of Kuwait
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APPENDIX V
The Unified Economic Agreement
Between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council
CHAPTER ONE
TRADE EXCHANGE
ARTICLE 1
a. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, animal,
industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they shall permit
exportation thereof to other Member States.
b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from Member
States shall receive the same treatment as national products.
ARTICLE 2
1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin
shall be exempted from reciprocal charges.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, freight or
unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on domestic
products.
ARTICLE 3
1. For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value
added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40% 'of their
final value as at the termination of the production phase. In addition Member States
citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51%.
2. Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly
authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.
ARTICLE 4
1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs tariff applicable to the products
of countries other than G.C.C. Member States.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff shall be the protection of national
products from foreign competition.
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented gradually within five years from the date
on which this agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its gradual implementation
shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.
ARTICLE 5
Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of any Member State's goods to other
Member States, exempting them from all duties and taxes whatsoever, without prejudice to the
provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.
ARTICLE 6
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a Member
State by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the Customs
authorities of the Member States.
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ARTICLE 7
Member States shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other states and
regional economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and
equitable circumstances and terms of trade therewith.
To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the following arrangements:
1. Coordination of import/export policies and regulations.
2. Coordination of policies for building up strategic food stocks.
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases where joint benefits to Member
States would be realized.
4. Taking of action for the creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their
negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and
exportation of major products.
CHAPTER TWO
THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND INDIVIDUALS AND THE EXERCISE OF
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 8
The Member States shall agree on executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall
grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens
without any discrimination of differentiation in the following fields:
I. Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.
ARTICLE 9
The Member States shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish joint ventures in
order to link their citizens' economic interests in various spheres of activity.
CHAPTER THREE
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT
ARTICLE 10
The Member States shall endeavour to achieve the coordination and harmonization of their
respective development plans with a view to achieving integration in economic affairs.
ARTICLE 11
1. The Member States shall endeavour to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects
of the oil industry including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, the exploitation
of natural gas, and development of energy sources.
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate united oil policies and adopt common
positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in international and specialised organizations.
ARTICLE 12
To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the Member States shall
1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms which will lead to
industrial development and the diversification of their products on an integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local production
units to meet their needs.
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3.	 Allocate industries between Member States according to relative advantages and economic
feasibility, and encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary industries.
ARTICLE 13
Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the Member States shall pay special
attention to the establishment ofjoint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and services,
and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve economic
integration j productive interface, and common development on sound economic bases.
CHAPTER FOUR
TECHNICAL COOPERATION
ARTICLE 14
The member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical cooperation aimed
at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and applied
sciences and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet the needs of the region
and to achieve the objectives of progress and development.
ARTICLE 15
Member States shall establish procedures, make arrangement and lay down terms for the transfer
of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve
their various needs. Member States shall also, whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements
with foreign governments and scientific or commercial organizations to achieve these objectives.
ARTICLE 16
Member States shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs for technical,
vocational and professional training and qualification at all levels and stages, They. shall also
develop educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development
needs of the Member States.
ARTICLE 17
Member States shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and
standardized criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in
different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among themselves and to optimize the
utilization of available human resources.
CHAPTER FIVE
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
ARTICLE 18
Member States shall accord passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the other
Member States, when transiting or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord to the
means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their own citizens, including exemption
from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, local means of transportation are excluded.
ARTICLE 19
1.	 Member States shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation, and
communications. They shall also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such as
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seaports, airports, water and power stations and roads, with a view to realizing joint
economic development and the linking of their economic activities with each other.
2.	 The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies among them and
promote all areas of joint action at various levels.
ARTICLE 20
Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any Member
State freely to use the various port facilities .and grant them the same treatment and privileges
granted to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage and docking
services, freight, loading and unloading, maintenance, repair, storage of .goods and other similar
services.
CHAPTER SIX
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION
ARTICLE 21
Member States shall seek to unify investment rules and regulations in order to achieve a joint
investment policy aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investments towards serving their
interest, and realising their peoples' aspirations for development and progress.
ARTICLE 22
Member States shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies and
enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including the endeavour to
establish a joint currency in order to further their desired economic.
ARTICLE 23
Member States. shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere of international and
regional development aid.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CLOSING PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 24
In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting therefrom,
consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development as between Member
States and the local development priorities of each. Any Member States may be temporarily
exempted from applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary
local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a
specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the
Arab States of the Gulf.
ARTICLE 25
No Member State shall grant any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that
granted herein.
ARTICLE 26
a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the Supreme Council.
b. This Agreement may be amended by consent of the Supreme Council.
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ARTICLE 27
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States, execution of the provisions
of this Agreement shall prevail.
ARTICLE 28
Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreements. Drawn
up at Riyadh on 15 Muharram 1402, corresponding to 11 November 1982.
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APPENDIX VI
Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention 1922
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi
al Aujah (W. al Audja) with the Batin (El Batin), leaving Raq'i (Rikai) to Nadj, from
this point it continues in a straight line until it joins latitude 29° and the red semi-
circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 29th July 1913. The
line then follows the side of the red semi-circle until it reaches a point terminating
(sic) on the coast of south of Ras al-Qali'ah (Ras el Kaliyah) and this is the territory
bounded on the North by this line and which is bounded on the West by a low
mountainous ridge called Shag (Esh Shakk) and on the East by the sea and on the
South by a line passing from West to East from Shaq (Esh Shalck) to 'Ain al 'Abd (Ain
el Abd) and thence to the coast north of Ras al Mish'ab (Ras Mishabb), in this
territory the Governments of Nadj and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the
good offices of the Government of Great Britain a further agreement is made between
Nadj and Kuwait concerning it.
The map on which this boundary has been made is Asia 1-1,000,000, made by the
Royal Geographical Society under the direction of the Geographical Section General
Staff and printed at the War Office in the year 1918.
Written in the port of 'Umiak and signed by the representatives of both Governments
on the Second day of December 1922 corresponding to 13th of Rabi'al Thani, 1341.
Abduallah Sa'id Damluji
Representative of His Highness the Sutlan of Najd
J.C. More
Major Political Agent, Kuwait
I have agreed to the content of this agreement,
'Abdul 'Aziz bib 'Abdul Rahman As-Sa'ud
Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies
I have agreed to the content of this agreement,
Ahmad Al-Jabir As-Subah
Hakim of Kuwait.
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APPENDIX VII
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to partition the Neutral Zone
Signed at Al-Hadda, Saudi Arabia
7 July 1965
Agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
relating to the partition the Neutral Zone
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Whereas the two Contracting Parties have equal rights in the shared Zone whose land
boundaries are delineated in accordance with the boundary Convention made at Al
Uqair in 13 Rabi, Thani 1314 corresponding to 2nd December 1922, and the agreed
Minutes signed at Kuwait on 12 Shaual 1380 corresponding to 21st March 1961
(called hereinafter the 'Partitioned Zone"), and
Whereas the aforesaid Convention did not regulate the exercise of those rights, and as
that state of affairs was of a provisional nature which entailed serious practical
difficulties, and
Whereas the two Contracting Parties, by an exchange of notes on 15/3/1383
corresponding to 5th August 1963 (in regard to partitioning the Neutral Zone), have
accepted to put an end to that temporary state of affairs by means of partitioning that
Zone into two sections, so that one shall be annexed to the State of Kuwait and the
other shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, provided that these equal
rights of the two Parties shall be preserved in full in the whole Partitioned Zone as this
had originally been decided by the Convention made at Al Uqair that is shared
between the two parties, and shall be safeguarded by the provisions of international
responsibility. They therefore have agreed upon the following:
Article I. The boundary line between the two sections of the Zone is to be the line
which divides them into two equal parts and which begins from a point at the mid
eastern shore on the low-tide line, and ends at the western boundary line of the Zone.
That boundary line shall be demarcated in a natural manner by the Committee of
Survey which is to be set up in the manner agreed upon in the protocol annexed to the
notes exchanged between the two parties at Jeddah on 15/3/1883 corresponding to 5th
August 1963. This boundary line shall be approved by the two sides in an agreement
they will conclude later on.
Article II. Without prejudice to the provisions of this agreement, the part lying to the
north of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to
Kuwait as an integral part of its territory, and the part lying to the south of the line
dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia as an integral part of its territory.
Article III. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise the rights of administration,
legislation and defence over that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory
in the same manner exercised in his territory of origin while observing other
provisions of the Agreement, and without prejudice to the rights of the contracting
parties to natural resources in the whole of the Partitioned Zone.
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Article IV. Each of the Contracting Parties shall respect the rights of the other Party to
the shared natural resources either existing at present or that shall exist in future in
that part of the Partitioned Zone which is annexed to his territory.
Article V. If one of the parties cedes or otherwise alienates all or part of those equal
rights which are safeguarded by the provisions of this Agreement and which are
exercised over any part of the Partitioned Zone to any other State, the other party shall
be relieved of his obligations under this Agreement.
Article a Each of the Contracting Parties shall be under obligation not to take any
local or international measure or action which may result in whatsoever form of
hindering the other party from exercising the rights which are safeguarded by this
agreement, and he shall be under obligations to co-operate with the other Party fully
to protect these rights.
Article VII. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise over the territorial waters
which adjoining that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory
the same rights as those exercised over the part annexed to its territory; and the two
Contracting Parties shall agree to determine the boundary line which divides the
territorial waters which adjoin the Partitioned Zone.
For the purpose of exploiting the natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, not more
than six marine miles of the sea-bed and sub-soil adjoining the Partitioned Zone shall
be annexed to the principal land of that Partitioned Zone.
Article VIII. On determining the northern boundary of the submerged Zone adjoining
the Partitioned Zone, it shall be delineated as if the Zone has not been partitioned and
without regard to the provisions of this Agreement.
And, the two Contracting Parties shall exercise their equal rights in the submerged
Zone beyond the aforesaid six miles limit mentioned in the previous Article, by means
of shared exploitation unless the two Parties agree otherwise.
Article IX. Each of the Contracting Parties shall in the part annexed to the other party
of the Partitioned Zone evacuate the establishments occupied by the government
officials who perform administrative and legal work, and hand it over to the other
party provided that such provisions shall not apply to establishments occupied by
employees engaged in measuring oil, checking and auditing accounts, technical
supervision and purchasing committees and such similar supervision work.
Article X. If one of the Contracting Parties entrusts the companies that have been
granted a joint concession by the two parties, with the construction of establishments
for judicial and administi	 alive purposes in accordance with terms of the concession in
that part of the Partitioned Zone to be annexed to his territory, the cost of establishing
such constructions shall be deducted from the capital expenses of the concessionary
companies, provided that such costs shall be limited to necessary and reasonable
expenses.
Article XL The present agreements of oil concessions shall remain in force and either
Party pledges to respect their provisions and the amendments entered into in that half
of the Partitioned Zone which shall be annexed to its territory. He shall also undertake
such legislative and legal measures necessary for the continued exercise by the
concessionary companies of their rights and discharge of their obligations.
Article XIL Each Contracting Party shall be responsible in that part of the Partitioned
Zone which will be annexed to its territory for protection and security according to the
obligations provided for in the present concession agreements in force.
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Article XIIL To avoid double taxation, each Contracting Party shall undertake to enact
legislative safeguards which ensure the non-imposition of taxation or custom duties or
royalties on the companies that have been granted a concession, in the Partitioned
Zone by the other Party.
Article XIV. Entry of citizens of the two Contracting Parties, and their moving about
in the Partitioned Zone, who are working as officials, employees, labourers and
contractors in establishments and firms engaged in the exploitation of natural
resources according to concessions now in force and their subsidiaries shall be by
valid passports issued by the other Party or by a card of special form to be issued by
one of the Contracting Parties, and to be agreed upon, without the need for obtaining
entry visa.
Article XV. Without prejudice to the concessionary oil agreements in force, each of
the parties shall safeguard in that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory,
freedom of work to the citizens of the other party and the right to practise any
profession or occupation on equal levels with his citizens, concerning oil resources
granted in the present concessions or in what may supersede them in future.
Article XVL Each of the contracting parties shall respect the rights of the other party's
citizens in the present establishments and constructions, existing in that part of the
Partitioned Zone which shall be annexed to its territory.
Article XVIL To safeguard the continuance of the two Contracting Parties' efforts in
exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, a joint permanent committee
shall be set up and called hereinafter the 'Committee'.
Article XVIIL The Committee shall be composed of an equal number from the two
Contracting Parties' representatives, and the two competent ministers for natural
resources, in each of the Contracting Governments, shall agree upon the number of
the Committee members, its rules of procedure and how to safeguard the necessary
appropriations for it.
Article XIX. The Committee shall have the following powers:
(a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary Companies and of
ancillary companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than citizens of
the two Parties.
(b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.
(c) To study the new licences, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural
resources and submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to what
should be done in this respect.
(d) To discuss whatever the two competent ministers refer to it.
Article XX. The two competent ministers shall consult together to grant or two amend
any new concession relating to common natural resources and the party who does not
agree with the other, shall send him a written notification giving the reasons, before
granting or amending the new concession.
If any other establishment or company is allowed to replace any present establishment
or company exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, this replacement
shall not be considered as a new concession provided that the rights of the other Party
shall remain in tact.
Article M. The two Contracting Parties shall undertake to supply the Committee
with information, data and documents which are needed by it to facilitate its task.
Article MI. If a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation or application of this
agreement or the rights and obligations which it creates, the two Contracting Parties
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shall seek to settle such disputes by friendly means for the settlement of disputes
which include having recourse to the Arab League.
If the aforesaid methods fail to settle the dispute, then it shall be submitted before the
International Court of Justice.
The two Contracting Parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in this respect.
If one of the two Contracting Parties takes a measure which is objectionable to the
other Party, the objecting Party may ask the International Court of Justice to indicate
any provisional measures to be taken to suspend the measure which is objected to or
allow its continuance pending the final decision.
If one of the Contracting Parties refuses to abide by the judgment made against it,
then the other party shall be relieved of its obligations under this Agreement.
Article XXIIL This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by each Contracting
Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures and shall come into force on the
date of exchanging of instruments of ratification.
Done in two original texts in the Arabic Language and both of them are authentic.
For the State of Kuwait	 For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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APPENDIX VIII
Annexed Agreement
Delimiting the boundary Line dividing the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone
This annexed agreement has been held in Kuwait City on 9 Shawal 1389 Hijrah corresponding to
18 December 1969, between:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by his Excellency Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources as a First Party, and
The State of Kuwait, represented by his Excellency Abdulralunan Salim Al-atiqee, the Minister
of Finance and Oil as a Second Party.
Whereas the two Countries signed an agreement to divide the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone on 9
Rabi Awal 1385 Hijrah corresponding to 7 July 1965, which was known as "An agreement
between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to partition the Neutral Zone" and
henceforth referred to as "the Partition Agreement".,
Whereas Article 1 of the Partition Agreement states that the dividing line for the Neutral Zone
shall be delimited, based on direct observation, by the Committee of Survey of the Neutral Zone
which has been formed according to the Agreement,
Whereas the mentioned Committee of Survey, which has been called "the Joint Technical
Committee", supervises the delimitation process of the dividing line on the ground conducted by
"Pacific AeroSurvey" company, who undertook the work according to two agreements the
Company signed with the Saudi government and the Kuwaiti government. The Committee
decided that "Pacific AeroSurvey" company has accomplished its mission according to the two
mentioned above agreements, which in turn are based on the rulings of the "Partition
Agreement". Consequently, the Committee approved the final report and the final map which
have been designed by the mentioned above Company, and both sides, the Saudi and the Kuwaiti,
signed copies of the report and the map and reported this in the minutes of the fourth meeting of
"the Joint Committee" which was held from 10-12 Dhu Alqidah 1388 Hirjrah corresponding to
28-30 January 1969,
Whereas the pertinent authorities in the two contracting governments have approved the decision
of "the Joint Committee", and each party has informed the other party about his consent of this
decision,
Whereas Article 1 of "The Partition Agreement" states that the delimitation of the dividing line of
the Neutral Zone shall be agreed upon in a subsequent agreement, and
To execute the "annexation" mentioned in Article 2 in "The Partition Agreement", the two Parties
agreed to delimit the dividing line as follows:
Article 1: The boundary line which divides the Partitioned Zone and which represents the final
separating limit between the two Parts, is considered as straight lines connecting the points
mentioned below with their coordinates. This boundary line is the one which "Pacific
AeroSurvey" company has delimited, defined, and specified in the final report and the final map.
Both contracting Parties signed a copy of the final map which has been annexed to this
agreement. The final map, the final agreement, and the mentioned above fourth meeting minutes,
all of which have been signed by the two Parties, and each Party has a copy of each, all together,
these documents are representing a reference in defining and stating the dividing line:
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Point Latitude-North Longitude-East
Z 28° 32' 02,488" 48° 25' 59,019"
1D-1 280 32' 01,985" 48° 25' 12952"
D-2 28° 32' 01,184" 48° 14' 09,339"
D-3 28° 32' 00,874" 48° 23' 32787"
D-4 28° 32' 00,382" 48° 22' 48,927"
D-5 28° 31' 59,676" 48° 21' 46,685"
D-6 28° 31' 59,239" 48° 21' 08,534"
D-7 28° 31' 58,580" 48° 20' 11A30"
D-8 28° 31' 58,021" 48° 19' 23,434"
D-9 28° 31' 57,530" 48° 18' 41,590"
D-10 28° 31' 57,050" 48° 18' 00,993"
D-11 28° 31' 56,662" 48° 16' 36,094"
D-12 28° 31' 56,035" 48° 16' 36,094"
D-13 28° 31' 55,485" 48° 15' 50,592"
D-14 28° 31' 54,947" 48° 15' 06,374"
D-15 28° 31' 54,362" 48° 14' 18,748"
D-16 28° 31' 53,713" 48° 13' 26,262"
D-17 28° 31' 52,948" 48° 12' 25,088"
D-18 28° 31' 52076" 48° 11' 16,032"
D-19 28° 31' 51,410" 48° 10,23,736"
D-20 28° 31' 50,630" 48°' 09"23,111
D-21 28° 31' 49,779" 48° 08' 17,593"
D-22 28° 31' 48,907" 48° 07' 11,206"
D-23 28° 31' 48,056" 48° 06' 07.037"
D-24 28° 31' 47,518" 48° 05' 26,799"
D-25 28° 31' 46,788" 48° 04' 32594"
D-26 28° 31' 45,842" 48° 03' 22,995"
D-27 28° 31' 44,833" 48° 02' 09,560"
D-28 28° 31' 44,361" 48° 01' 35,432"
D-29 28° 31' 43,435" 48° 00' 29,090"
D-30 28° 31' 42,472" 47° 59' 20,742"
D-31 28° 31' 41,526" 47° 58' 14,252"
D-32 28° 31' 40,470" 47° 57' 00,761"
D-33 28° 31' 39,454" 47° 55' 50,778"
D-34 28° 31' 38,554" 47° 54' 49,360"
D-35 28° 31' 37,795" 47° 53' 57,908"
D-36 28° 31' 37,363" 47° 53' 28,842"
D-37 28° 31' 36,567" 47° 52' 35,536"
D-38 28° 31' 35,865" 47° 51' 48,853"
D-39 28° 31' 35,156" 47° 51' 02,006"
D-40 28° 31' 34,360" 47° 50' 09,793"
D-41 280 31' 33,596" 47° 49' 19,867"
D-42 28° 31' 32789" 47° 48' 27,676"
D-43 28° 31' 31,833" 47° 47' 26,188"
D-44 28° 31' 30,941" 47° 46' 29,303"
D-45 28° 31' 30,339" 47° 45' 51,168"
D-46 28° 31' 29,449" 47° 44' 55,060"
D-47 28° 31' 28,369" 47° 43' 59,412"
D-48 28° 31' 27,072" 47° 42' 52,962"
H 28° 31' 26,526" 47° 42' 25,153"
Article 2: This agreement, with the documents mentioned in Article 1, is complementing and is
part and parcel of "The Partition Agreement".
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Article 3: This agreement has been written in Arabic in two original copies, each Party retained
one copy, and both copies are equally binding and will be effective from the date of signing them,
and
The two mentioned above representatives, as authorised by their respective governments, have
signed this annexed agreement.
on behalf of the government 	 on behalf of the government
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	 of the State of Kuwait
Ahmed Zaki Yamani	 Abdulrahman Salim Al-atiqee
The Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources 	 The Minister of Finance & Oil
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Appendix IX
Border Agreement signed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 2 July 2000
Demarcating their offshore Neutral Zone border
In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate,
An agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the
offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone.
Consolidating and strengthening the bonds of faith and brotherhood which bind the two
brotherly peoples in the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
Confirming the unshakeable and deeply-rooted relationship between the two brotherly
countries and the bonds of love and friendship that characterise the relationship;
And based on a desire on the part of His Highness Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah Amir of
the State of Kuwait, and his brother, the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines. King Fahad ibn
'Abd al-'Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to determine a line dividing the offshore
area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone in a way that guarantees the interests and rights of the
two brotherly countries in the area.
Based on the Agreement partitioning the Neutral Zone between the two states signed on
9/3/1385 H corresponding to 7/7/1965 AD (referred to henceforth as the Partitioned Zone),
and the agreement to determine the median line in the Neutral Zone between the two states
signed on 9/10/1389 H corresponding to 18/12/1969 AD
'The two brotherly countries have agreed on the following:
Article 1
1. The line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, which constitutes
the dividing line between the area of each of the two states, runs from the land point on the
shore (point Z), with the geographical co-ordinates (28° 32' 2.488" north and 45° 25' 59.019"
east) and runs through four points with the following co-ordinates:
Point Latitude North Longitude East
1. 28° 38' 20" 48° 35' 48"
2. 28° 39' 56" 48° 39' 50"
3. 28° 41' 49" 48° 41' 18"
4. 28° 56' 06" 49° 26' 42"
And from point No 4, the line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone
extends to the end of this line in an easterly direction.
2. The contents of paragraph (1) of this article do not prejudice the contents of Annex (1) this
agreement.
Article 2
The northern boundary of the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone has been
demarcated, beginning at point 1 on the coast, with geographical co-ordinates 28° 49' 58.7"
north and 48° 17' 00.177" east, on the basis of the principle of equal distances from the low
tide line on the coast, without taking into consideration the location of islands, shoals and
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semi-submerged rocks, in compliance with the contents of Article 8 of the agreement
partitioning the Neutral Zone.
Article 3
The course of the designated northern line shall be adjusted in accordance with Article 2 of
this agreement by using the Failaka group of islands as the starting point for the demarcation,
without contravening the contents of Annex (1) of this agreement.
Article 4
The southern boundary of the offshore areas adjacent to the Partitioned Zone is the line
currently established between the two countries, beginning at point 5 on the coast with the
geographical co-ordinates 28° 14' 05.556" north and 48° 36' 06.916" east.
Article 5
As regards the ownership by the two contracting parties of the natural resources in the
offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, an agreement on this issue is stipulated in
Annex (1), which is considered an integral part of this agreement.
Article 6
The company commissioned by the two states to carry out a survey and prepare maps of the
offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone will determine the co-ordinates of the northern
boundary according to Articles 2 and 3 of this agreement, and prepare maps in their final
form, which will be signed by representatives of the two countries and be an integral part of
this agreement.
Article 7
The State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be deemed as one party in
negotiations to determine the eastern boundary of the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned
Zone.
Article 8
Agreement shall be reached between specialist bodies in the two countries on measures and
arrangements related to recreational fishing in the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned
Zone.
Article 9
The provisions of this agreement do not prejudice the agreement dividing the Neutral Zone
signed on 9/3/1385 H, corresponding with 7/7/1965 AD.
Article 10
This agreement is subject to the ratification of the two parties, and shall come into effect
upon the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
This agreement was drawn up and signed in Kuwait City, with two original copies, on
Sunday 30th of the month of Rabi'al-Awal of the year 1421 H, corresponding to 2nd July
2000 AD
Fr the State of Kuwait 	 For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Sabah Al-Ahmad
	
Sa'ud al-Faisal
First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 	 Foreign Minister
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Annex I
The two contracting parties have agreed that their ownership of the natural resources in the
offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone shall be jointly shared, and this includes the
islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim and the area lying between the northern line
mentioned in Article 2 of the agreement and the adjusted course of the northern boundary,
pursuant to Article 3 of the agreement.
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APPENDIX X
The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement
dated 22 February 1958
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Bahrain
Whereas the regional waters between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
Government of Bahrain meet together in many places overlooked by their respective
coasts,
And in view of the royal proclamation issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the
1st Sha'aban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May 1949) and the ordinance
issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June 1949 about the exploitation of
the sea bed,
And in view of the necessity for an agreement to define the under-water areas
belonging to both countries,
And in view of the spirit of affection and mutual friendship and the desire of H.M. the
King of Saudi Arabia to extend every possible assistance to the Government of
Bahrain,
the following agreement has been made:
First Clause
1. The boundary line between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain
Government will begin, on the basis of the middle line from point 1, which is situated
at the mid-point of the line running between the tip of the Ras at Bar (A) at the
southern extremity of Bahrain and Ras Muharra (B) on the coast of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.
2. Then the above-mentioned middle line will extend from point 1 to point 2 situated
at the mid-point of the line running between point A and the northern tip of the island
of Zaldumniya (C).
3. Then the line will extend from point 2 to point 3 situated at the mid-point of the
line running between point A and the tip of Ras Saiya OD).
4. Then the line will extend from point 3 to point 4, which is defined on the attached
map and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points
E and F which are both defined on the map.
5. Then the line will extend from point 4 to point 5, which is defined on the map and
which is situated at the point (sic) of the line running between the two points G and H
which are defined on the map.
6. Then the line will extend from point 5 to point 6, which is defined on the map and
which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points I and J
which are defined on the map.
Appendices	 312
7. Then the line will extend from point 6 to point 7 situated at the mid-point of the
line running between the south-western tip of the island of Umm Nasan (K) and Ras
Al Kureya (L).
8. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity
of the island of Al Baina As Saghir, leaving the island to the Government of Bahrain.
9. Then the line will extend from point 8 to point 9 situated at the eastern extremity of
the island of Al Baina Al Kabir, leaving the island to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
10. Then the line will extend from point 9 to point 10 situated at the mid-point of the
line running between the north-western tip of Khor Fasht (M) and the southern end of
the island of Chaschus (N).
11. Then the line will extend from point 10 to point 11 situated at the mid-point of the
line running between point 0 situated at the western edge of Fasht Al Jarim and the
point N referred to in subsection 10 above.
12. Then the line will extend from point 11 to point 12 situated at latitude 26 degrees
31 minutes 48 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 23 minutes 15 seconds east
approximately.
13. Then the line will extend from point 12 to point 13 situated at latitude 26 degrees
37 minutes 15 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 33 minutes 24 seconds east
approximately.
14. Then the line will extend from point 13 to point 14 situated at latitude 26 degrees
59 minutes 30 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 46 minutes 24 seconds east
approximately, leaving the Rennie Shoals (known as Najwat Al Riqai and Fasht Al
Anawaiyah) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
15. Then the line will extend from point 14 in a north-easterly direction to the extent
agreed upon in the royal proclamation issued on the 1st Sha'aban in the year 1368
(corresponding to 28th May 1949) and in the ordinance issued by the Government of
Bahrain on the 5th June 1949.
16. Everything that is situated to the left of the above-mentioned line in the above
subsections belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and everything to the right of
that line to the Government of Bahrain, with the obligation of the two governments to
accept what will subsequently appear in the second clause below.
Second Clause
The area situated within the six defined sides is as follows:
1. A line beginning from a point situated at latitude 27 degrees north and longitude 50
degrees 23 minutes east approximately.
2. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 31 minutes 48 seconds north
and longitude 50 degrees 23 minutes 15 seconds east approximately.
3. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 37 minutes north and longitude
50 degrees 33 minutes east approximately.
4. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds north
and longitude 50 degrees 46 minutes 24 seconds east approximately.
5. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds north
and longitude 50 degrees 40 minutes east approximately.
6. From there to a point situated at latitude 27 degrees north and longitude 50 degrees
40 minutes east approximately.
7. From there to the starting point.
This area cited and defined above shall be in the past falling to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of
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H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area will
be carried out in the way chosen by His Majesty on the condition that he grants to the
Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of
Saudi Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the understanding that this
does not infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the
right of administration over this above-mentioned area.
Third Clause
Two copies of a map shall be attached to this agreement, making as clear as possible
the positions and points referred to in the foregoing subsections, subject to the map
being made final by the expert knowledge of the committee defined in the fourth
clause below. This map shall become final and an integral part of this agreement after
approval and signature by the accredited representatives of the two governments on
behalf of the two parties.
Fourth Clause
The two parties shall choose a technical body to undertake the necessary measures to
confirm the boundaries in accordance with the provisions of this agreement on the
condition that this body shall complete its work two months at the most after the date
of execution of this agreement.
Fifth Clause
After the committee referred to in the fourth clause has completed its work and the
two parties agree on the final map which it will have prepared, a body of technical
delegates from both sides shall undertake the placing of signs and the establishing of
the boundaries in accordance with the detailed announcements made clear in the final
map.
Sixth Clause
This agreement shall come into effect from the date on which it is signed by the two
parties.
Given in Riyadh in two original Arabic copies on the 4th of Sha'aban in the year 1377
corresponding to 22nd February in the year 1958.
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Appendix XI
The Saudi Arabia - United Arab Emirates
Boundary Agreement
His Excellency Brother Zayed Bin Sultan AI-Nhayyan President
of the United Arab Emirates. Date 3 Shaban 1394 H
(corresponding to 21 August 1974).
Your Royal Highness,
I am pleased to refer to chapter three of article five of the boundary agreement signed
between the two states on the 3rd of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of August
1974).
I would also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links, according to
this agreement, the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the international
waters does not include the potent natural resources which lay underneath the water surface
and the sea bed. Such resources shall remain under the ownership of the United Arab
Emirates alone and be excluded from the mutual sovereignty.
Thus, if the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding this issue matches that
of the United Arab Emirates, I recommend that this letter, together with your excellency's
response to it, be considered an agreement to determine that issue, and be annexed to the
above mentioned agreement.
Please accept my best, truthful and respected regards, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Date 3 Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to 21 August 1974)
I am pleased to refer to your Majesty's letter dated the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding
to the 21st of August 1974) which reads as follows: "Your excellency Shaikh Zayed Bin
Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates,
Your excellency,
I am pleased to refer to chapter 3 of article 5 of the boundary agreement signed between the
two states on the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of August 1974). I would
also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links according to this
agreement the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the international waters
does not include the potent natural resources which lay underneath the water surface and sea-
bed.
Such resources shall remain under the ownership of the United Arab Emirates alone and be
excluded from the mutual sovereignty. Thus, if the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia regarding this issue matches that of the United Arab Emirates, I recommend that this
letter, together with your excellency's response, be considered an agreement to determine that
issue, and be annexed to the above mentioned agreement".
I am pleased to inform your Majesty that the understanding of the United Arab
Emirates regarding the fight of ownership of the natural resources mentioned in your
Majesty's letter matches that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Please accept my best, truthful and respected regards.
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan
President of United Arab Emirates
His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
and His Excellency Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the United Arab
Emirates, in accordance with the principles of the Islamic tolerant law which is followed by
the Islamic nation, and proceeding from the spirit of Islamic solidarity which overshadows
the Arab Peninsula, and on the basis of the peoples and the established relations of
neighbourhood between the two states, and urged by the wish of the governments of the two
states to determine the land and sea borders between them once and for all under the
auspicious of Islamic and Arabic brotherhood, the two parties agree on the following:
Article 1:
The land borders between the state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates shall be the line which will be determined in accordance with the items of this
agreement.
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Article 2:
1. The land borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the state of the United
Arab Emirates shall start from point A on the coast of the Arabian Gulf, situated on the
Latitude line 24° 14' 58" North, and on the longitude line 51° 35' 26" East.
2. The land borders shall extend from point A in a straight line to point B which lies on
the latitude line 24° 07' 24" North, and on the longitude line 51 0 35 26" East.
3. The land borders shall extend from point B in a straight North-East line until point C
which lies on the latitude rifle 22° 56' 09" North, and on the longitude line 52° 34' 52"
East.
4. The land borders shall extend from point C in a straight Northern-Eastern line until
point D which lies on the latitude line 22° 37'41" North, and on the longitude line 55°
08' 11" East.
5. The land borders shall extend from point D in a straight Northern-Eastern line, leaving
Umm Al-Zumul east of point E which lies on the latitude line 22° 42' 02" North, and on
the longitude line 55° 12' 10" East.
6. The land borders shall extend from point E in a straight line that reaches the following
points which geographically lie on:
Point
1
Latitude line-North
23° 32' 11"
24° 00' 00"
24° 01' 00"
24° 13' 00"
24° 11' 50"
Longitude line-east
55° 30' 00"
55° 34' 10"
55° 51' 00"
55° 54' 00"
55° 50' 00"
7. The land borders shall extend from point J to point K which geographically lies
approximately on the latitude line 24° 13' 45" North and on the longitude line 55° 45'
East.
8. The land borders shall extend from point K to point which geographically lies
approximately on latitude line 24° 19' North on the latitude line 55° 50' East.
9. The land borders shall extend from point L to the meeting point of the borders
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of
Oman, which will be agreed upon between the three states.
All the above-mentioned points are initially posted on a 1:500,000 map, attached to this
agreement and signed by the two contracting parties of dignitaries.
Article 3:
1. Hydro-Carbonic material located in Al-Shayba-Zararah field shall be owned by the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree and observe its obligation of not to carry out any
search, drill for, invest or to profit from the Hydro-Carbonic material, or give
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permission to do so, in the part of Shayba-Zararah field which lies north of the border
line.
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or any company or establishment working under its
name, shall be authorised to carry out search and during operations and invest and
profit from the Hydro-Carbonate material in that part of Al-Shayba-Zararah field which
lies north of the border line. Any agreement regarding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's
carrying out of such operations shall be agreed upon at a later time.
Article 4:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall observe their obligation of
stopping any drilling and investing or granting permission to do so the hydro-carbonate
material in that part of their regions in which the hydro-carbonate field primarily extends
inside the region of the other state.
Article 5:
1. The United Arab Emirates shall recognise the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia over Huwaisat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall recognise the
sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over all islands which lie opposite to its coasts
on the Arabian Gulf.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's establishment
of any general purpose installations wished by the Kingdom on the islands of Qafay
and Makasib.
3. Representatives of the two contracting parties shall determine, in the shortest time
possible, the Sea borders between the region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that
of the United Arab Emirates, and between the islands that are under the sovereignty of
each state on just basis which secures a free and direct link between the regional waters
that belongs to that part of the region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which lies
adjacent to the region of the United Arab Emirates and the regional waters which
belongs to Huwaisat island mentioned in the above paragraph, in a way that secures the
possibility of navigation between the deep international waters and that part of the
region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia mentioned above.
Each contracting party shall have the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links
according to this chapter - between the regional water which belongs to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the international waters.
Article 6:
A specialised international company, selected by the two states, shall assume the
responsibility of surveying and determining the locations of the points and the border lines on
the ground as explicated in article two above, and shall prepare a map, showing the land
borders between the two countries and the date which accompany such a map, which will
become, after being signed by the two contracting parties of dignitaries, the official map that
shows the required borders and shall be attached to this agreement.
Article 7:
A joint technical committee, consisting of 3 members from each state, shall be organised in
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order to prepare the specification for the required tasks of the company mentioned above and
to post the points and border lines between the two countries in accordance with the items of
this agreement and to supervise the execution of the these tasks and to study its results.
Article 8:
Each state shall keep a copy of the two produced copies of this agreement.
Article 9:
This agreement shall become effective at the time of signing it.
Article 10:
This agreement is written in Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 3rd of Shaban
1394 H, corresponding to the 21st of August 1974.
First Party
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.
Second Party
King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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Appendix XH: Sample size selecting method
N S N S N S
10 10 220 140 1200 291
15 14 230 144 1300 297
20 19 240 148 1400 302
25 24 250 152 1500 306
30 28 260 155 1600 310
35 32 270 159 1700 313
40 36 280 162 1800 317
45 40 290 165 1900 320
50 44 300 169 2000 322
55 48 320 175 2200 327
60 52 340 181 2400 331
65 56 360 186 2600 335
70 59 380 191 2800 338
75 63 400 196 3000 341
80 66 420 201 3500 346
85 70 440 205 4000 351
90 73 460 210 4500 354
955 76 480 214 5000 357
100 80 500 217 6000 361
1103 86 550 226 7000 364
1202 92 600 234 8000 367
130 97 650 242 9000 368
140' 103 700 248 10000 370
150 108 750 254 15000 375
1606 113 800 260 20000 377
170 118 850 265 30000 379
1804 123 900 269 40000 380
190 127 950 274 50000 381
200 132 1000 278 75000 382
210 136 1100 285 1000000 384
N = population size
S= sample size
1:Al-IChafji Checkpoint (Arrivals).
2: Al-Khai (Departures).
3: KFC (Arrivals).
4: KFC (Departures).
5: Al-Bateha (Arrivals).
6: Al-Bateha (Departures).
Source: (Krejcie, R.V. 1970, p. 608)
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Appendix XIII: Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode
of transportation for the Arrivals
Alicha i
Time
Travellers' companion Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 8 5 1 0 14 7 5 1 1 14
10-20 5 7 9 1 22 8 6 o 8 22
21-30 1 o 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 2
31-40 1 0 0 0 1 1 o o o 1
41-50 3 1 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 4
>50 11 22 27 0 60 26 30 2 2 60
Total 29 _	 35 38 1 103 44 45 3 11 103
KFC
Time
Travellers' companion
,
Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family.
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 2 12 13 0 27
.
12 14 0 1 27
10-20 8 12 4 0 24 14 9 0 1 24
21-30 3 8 3 o 14 7 6 o 1 14
31-40 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 0 3
41-50 0 0 1 0 1 o 1 o o 1
>50 0 4 1 0 5 1 4 0 0 5
Total 13 37 24 o 74 35 36 0 3 74
Albateha
Time
Travellers' companion Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 0 1
,
2 1 4 2 1 0 1 4
10-20 11 7 4 2 24 9 11 0 4 24
21-30 0 4 1 0 5 3 1 1 0 5
31-40 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 o o 1
41-50 1 3 3 1 8 4 3 1 0 8
>50 13 5 3 2 23 2 1 20 0 23
Total 26 20 13 6 65 20 18 22 5 65
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
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Appendix XIV: Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode
of transportation for the Departures
Alkhafji
Time
Travellers' companion Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 11 11 5 1 28 20 6 0
.
2 28
10-20 8 18 10 0 36 20 15 0 1 36
21 -30 1 3 2 0 6 2 4 0 0 6
31 -40 2 3 1 0 6 3 2 0 1 6
41 -50 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 2
>50 2 2 1 0 5 3 2 0 0 5
Total 25 37 20 1 83 49 29 1 4 83
KFC
Time
Travellers' companion Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 3 3 0 0 6 3 3 0 0 6
10-20 14 3 11 0 28 18 8 0 2 28
21-30 11 3 14 1 29 19 8 0 2 29
31-40 3 3 9 0 15 11 4 0 0 15
41 -50 3 1 8 0 12 8 3 0 1 12
>50 1 4 11 0 16 13 3 0 0 16
Total 35 17 53 1 106 72 29 0 5 106
Albateha
Time
Travellers' companion Mode of transportation
By
himself
With
family
With
friends
Other Total Small car Mini bus Bus Other Total
<10 17 11 25 0 53 36 8 6 3 53
10-20 6 7 15 1 29 21 6 1 1 29
21 -30 2 3 6 0 11 6 5 0 0 11
31 -40 2 4 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 6
41-50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
>50 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0
Total 27 25 46 1 99 69 19 7 4 99
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
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Alkhafji
Arrivals Departures
Purpose No. % Purpose No. %
Multiple Purpose 4 22 Finding a job 1 50
Check Camels 2 11 Multiple Purpose I 50
Check Sheep 1 6
Fishing 1 6
Garden Trip 1 6
Marriage 1 6
Reading Quran 1 6
Moving 1 6
Shopping 2 11
Deliver Birds 1 6
Visiting 3 14
Total 18 100 2 100
ICF'C
Arrivals Departures
Purpose No. OA Purpose No. OA
Shopping 11 69 Multiple
Purpose
5 31
Multiple
Purpose
2 13 By a Medication 1 6
Returning 1 6 Finding a job 1 6
To Have Dinner 1 6 Returning Home 2 13
Not Specified 1 6 Shopping 1 6
Meet Arrivals 4 25
Fly to Japan
Picking Family 1 6
Total 16 100 16 100
Albateha
Arrivals Departures
Purpose No. 0/0 Purpose No. OA
Doing Omrah 5 36 Multiple Purpose 70
Multiple
Purpose
3 21 Attend Camel
Race
1 10
Driving a Bus 1 7 For Treatment 1 10
Buy a Car 1 7 Not specified 1 10
Hunting 1 7
Check Camels 1 7
Passing
Through
2 15
Total 14 100 10 100
Appendix XV: Other types of travellers' purposes
Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.
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Jiluwi FEISAL (ruled 1834-8; 1843-65)
ABDUL-AZIZ
(ruled 1765-1803)
1
SAUD
(ruled 1803-1814)
1
ABDULLAH
(ruled 1814-1818)
ABD'ULLAH
I
TURIU (ruled 1819-33)
Saud	 Abdullah
(d. 1875)
	
(d. 1889)
Many other sons
and daughters
APPENDIX XVI
Simplified Family Tree of Al Saud Families
I
Thunayan
SAUD (d. 1725)
1
MUHANIMAD (ruled 1725-65)
ABDUL-RAHMAN (d. 1928)
(Married Al-Sudairi)
Saad (killed 1915)
Abdu -Aziz ... 1 st cousins and rivals ... ABDUL-A7IZ (1876-1953)
(`Ibn Saud')
Saud Al-Kabeer
Source: After Mcloughlin, (1993), with slight modification.
Muhammad
(d. 1899)
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